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Preface 
The dissertation has been undertaken with logical and analytical means to 
come across the region that occupies space on the map in the name of South Asia. The 
region is constituted of many countries like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Srilanka, 
Bhutan, Nepal, and Maldives. This region has, since time immemorial, achieved 
relevance in one way or the other. It had has got to unleash certain geographic, 
political, economic specialties that made it attractive and subservient to the varied 
interests. The region for keeping a balance among the nations and arresting hegemony 
of any one on the scene witnessed voluminous importance, and has caught sharp 
imaginations of the people. Therefore, its impregnable importance invited big guns 
like, USA, USSR, China, India, and Pakistan to set the stage right in the region, which 
otherwise would end in any bitter experience. Their mindful exercises sometimes left 
the region in the lurch and therefore, what would have blessed it became detrimental 
force to wither away its resource both manual and material. 
The region became more imperative and meaningful since the partition of 
Indian subcontinent, which approved two countries of the said region to appear from a 
single embryo. The countries, in cumulative argument, that surfaced out of this 
doleful state were „India and Pakistan‟. The two countries looked all firm to dilute or 
shrink the geographical boundaries of each other which culminated sometimes into 
heinous acts. The two nascent countries used main and might to command secure 
position. This tussle at times motivated only and only with wars which without an iota 
of doubt played ducks and drags with the potentialities of the two countries. The 
issues between the two were sometimes pacified by either indulging in dialogues or 
negotiating with broadmindedness after succumbing to political expediencies. 
However, what acidified their already wavered taste was appearance of struggle of 
East Pakistan for the goal of independence. This came as a stigma to the sub-continent 
and added insult to injury. The people of East Pakistan put everything at stake to see 
this dream come true. This country came into existence because of the concerted 
efforts and after a tooth nail fight which shed blood even of intellectuals besides 
soldiers who fought out in the middle. This ultimately won favours for Bengalese in 
1971 and blessed them with what is called „Independence‟. This independence was 
more celebrated by India than by the Bangladesh, for it answered the political needs 
of the former and nominally licensed the avoidance of Pakistani incursions which 
earlier were expected time and again. Keeping in mind the assistance at the dire need 
of an hour the two countries took pledge to narrow down the gulf and frown upon the 
concerns that would distance the respective countries from each other. The leadership 
that was heading took recourse to the policies, visits, agreements and cold headed 
exchange of dialogues to redress the issues, and get bonded with each other more 
strictly. This of course paid the two countries to some extent but the pre-mature 
assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman gave death knell to the infant relations 
which, therefore, unfortunately went no long. However, after this grave situation the 
foreign policy of the Bangladesh fell victim to communal understanding and concept 
of „Muslim‟ and „Hindu‟ began to deteriorate the relation. This at times resulted in 
aggressive alliance directly or indirectly with Pakistan which was backed by, Arab 
countries, China, USA etc. These countries played into the hands of an ideology, be it 
religion, political, or economic which shook the relation with India and ended with 
suspicion atmosphere. Both countries kept their minds busy to look into the policies 
that would either won laurels for the respective countries or would facilitate them by 
dint of providing upper hand over the other. The period particularly up to 1975, which 
once upon a time was woven to get amicably involved with India and is treated to be 
honeymoon phase, faded away with the onset of coups and hence, there led to military 
rule in Bangladesh. Their manifestation did not prove in line with the requirements of 
the relationship and lacked consistency, broad vision and were led by such motives 
that barred them from taking any initiative to minimize the differences.  
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Chapter 1 
Pre Independence Period 
he area comprising Bangladesh was under Turks, Afghans, Moguls and 
sometimes independent and sometimes under Delhi. This process went on until 
the advent of the British in the mid-eighteenth century when the last ruler of Bengal 
Siraj-ud-Daula was defeated by Robert Clive on June 23, 1757 at the battlefield of 
Plessey.
1
 This proved to be the first step towards territorial supremacy that paved the 
way for British conquest of Bengal and eventually the whole country.
2
 Before British 
intervention there was an uninterrupted rule by sultanas and emperors of the Islamic 
faith for over five hundred years. It was a period of relative peace, prosperity and 
harmony particularly during the mid fourteenth to the mid-sixteenth century. But the 
battle of Plassey changed all within a century and half that followed. The sections of 
Hindu Bengali found encouragement under the Britishers not only in landed gentry 
but also in services and professions which provide sustenance to the Bengali 
renaissance. Meanwhile, the Muslims of Bengal continued to nurse their grievances 
real as perceived their aspirations and activities and socio-economic development 
remained outside the mainstream politics.
3
  The permanent settlement of Bengal 
introduced by Lord Cornwallis in 1793 was very much beneficial for the Hindu 
sections so far as their trade and commerce was concerned and landed class came into 
existence in the Bengal in 19
th
 century.  
  The Muslims with few exceptions like the Nawabs of Dacca, Bogra, and 
Jalpaiguri could not take the advantage of the permanent settlement. The Muslims 
suffered greatly in consequence. This inequality in the permanent settlement of 
Bengal gave rise to the feelings of the Muslims against both British Indian 
government and the Hindus.  Consequently communal feelings in Bengal commenced 
                                                          
1
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3
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T 
in the course of time particularly in the later part of the 19
th
 century.
4
 The Hindu 
people were preferred in the services as being English knowing people.   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The two great renaissance leaders Raja Rammohan Roy and Vidyasagar 
encouraged the Hindu people to adopt English language. The Muslims however, 
generally remained aloof from these developments which overtook Bengal during 19
th
 
century and early 20
th
 century. Kazi Abdul Manan has explained the pathetic position 
of Muslims that,  
―They had neither the psychological background, nor the economic 
stability, nor the social atmosphere which was necessary to cultivate the 
European sciences and arts introduced in this country by the 
Britishers‖ 5  
Another stalwart Syed Mansoor Ali expressed, “In Bengal the landlord is 
Hindu, the peasant is Muslim. The money lender is Hindu, the indebted man is 
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   S. K Chakrabarti, The Evolution of Politics in Bangladesh 1947-1978, Associated Press, New 
Delhi, 1978, p.1. 
5
   Ibid. p.2. 
Muslim. The pleader is Hindu, the client is Muslim. The Jailer is Hindu, the prisoner 
is Muslim. The magistrate is Hindu, and the accused is Muslim. The doctor is Hindu, 
the patient is Muslim”. This social division which took place between Hindus and 
Muslims in the 19th century was further accentuated between the two communities in 
the 20
th
 century. The Muslim community in general was not ready to adopt English 
language because they considered it as a foreign intervention in their religious affairs. 
However, Nawab Salimullah of Bengal welcomed the English language to some 
extent only to secure jobs for the Muslims.
6
 
In such a situation, the Sepoy mutiny of 1857 assumed different forms. In a 
despondent Bengal the sepoys took part in 1857 uprising but masses literally were 
kept away.
7
  In Sir Syed‟s area of influence i.e. upper India, people generally 
remained loyal to the British rulers publicly. In Punjab, thanks to the Lawrence school 
of Administration, loyalty to the British was an act of faith and code of conduct in 
everyday life. It called the government “ma-bap”. In Muslim Bengal where 
company‟s crude rule lasted for 100 years from 1757 to 1858 did not inspire any such 
belief in loyalty. Therefore, Muslim improvement in Bengal came early and had a 
pattern of its own. Nawab Abdul Latief in 1860, started the Mohammadien Literary 
Society of Calcutta, which was not strictly a political organization, but it uplifted the 
Bengali Muslims from the depth of gloom. Nawab Abdul Latief was to Bengal what 
Sir Syed Ahmad was to upper India.
8
  But it was Syed Amir Ali who really set the 
pace for Muslim Bengal in political matters. He started the Central National 
Mohammadien Association (CNMA) in 1877 at Calcutta. The CNMA worked for the 
political betterment of Bengali Muslims as a result of which in 1882 Syed Amir Ali 
submitted a comphrenssive memorandum to lord Ripon enlisting some grievances of 
the Muslims and seeking remedial action.
9
  By the close of the 19
th
 century Britishers 
changed their attitude towards the Hindu and the Muslims. The Hindus, who were 
educationally far ahead from Muslim community, were rapidly becoming politically 
advanced and conscious. Through the Indian National Congress which was founded in 
                                                          
6
   Ibid. p.4. 
7
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8
  Ibid. p.9. 
9
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1985 by A.O Hume, Hindus demanded greater share in the services and 
administration. Here the British authority thought that it is better to deviate from 
earlier policy and extend a gesture of goodwill to the Muslims.
 10
  In Retrospect, in 
19
th
 century there had been Hindu-Urdu vernacular controversies which apparently 
sowed the seeds of an all India Muslims party. Nawab Viqar–ul-Mulk tried his best to 
form an independent organization but could not get a good response.
11
 A matter of 
great importance took place in early twentieth century i.e., the partition of Bengal. 
Bengal was divided by Lord Curzon in 1905 into two parts-West Bengal and East 
Bengal which later became East Pakistan, the present day Bangladesh. Muslims 
generally welcomed the partition because the Indian British government had 
convinced them that they would benefit immensely in terms of jobs and political 
power.
12
 Lord Curzon while touring East Bengal made it clear that he had divided 
Bengal in order to protect the Muslim culture. The partition worsened the Hindu 
Muslim relations.
13
 Swadeshi and Boycott movements led by Indian National 
Congress were opposed by the Muslims because being poor they preferred imported 
goods, particularly clothing which were cheaper than those produced in India. But it is 
important to mention that Bengali Hindus bitterly opposed the partition considering it 
as an attempt to undermine their culture, language and political salience by making 
them minorities in both the provinces of Bengal.
14
    
The events during the partition of Bengal and its aftermath also saw Muslim 
politics flourishing in India and the state of Bengal acquired its distinct contours. On 
October 15, 1906 his Highness Aga Khan- the first president of Muslim League led 
delegation comprising of nobles, Ministers of state, landlords, lawyers and merchants 
for the redress of their problems. The viceroy received the delegation at Simla and 
promised them for sympathetic consideration. The Aga Khan delegation based its 
demands on two facts. Firstly Muslims had a large feudal aristocracy, and secondly, 
they provided a large number of recruits to the British Indian Army.
 15
 Overlooking 
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the fact that none of these two points applied to Bengal, thus there arose a sharp 
difference in needs and interest of Muslims of Bengal and Muslims of other parts of 
India.
16
  The strong anti-partition movement particularly from Bengali Hindus and 
indifference of the non- Bengali Muslims to the cause of the Bengali Muslims 
convinced the Bengali Muslims of the necessity of a political organization. The 
British government also directly or indirectly supported them.
17
 Consequently Dacca 
was chosen the venue for the discussion of Muslim educational and political 
problems. They strongly expressed the need for the organization which could serve as 
a vanguard for the Indian Muslims.  Nawab Salimullah of Dacca took advantage of 
the time and put forward a proposal for all India Muslims confederacy. Dacca being 
as the venue of meeting proved a tactical advantage to the Bengali Muslims. The 
Bengali Muslims were present in large numbers at the conference on 30 December 
1906. Nawab Salimullah moved this resolution. The meeting was presided over by 
Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk
18
. The resolution was passed and thus a political organization 
for Muslims known as Muslim League came into existence. The objectives of the 
Muslim League were protection and advancement of the political rights and interest of 
the Muslims of India. The resolution also pledged the Muslims to be loyal towards 
British government.
 
 
However, irony of the fate was that all-India character of the Muslim League 
was not maintained for long. The first annual session of the Muslim League was held 
at Karachi on 26 and 27 December 1907. In 1908 Aligarh became its next venue. In 
1910 it‟s headquarter was shifted to Lucknow. It became clear from the fact that what 
was born on the soil of East Bengal came to be nurtured in the united province of 
Agra and Oudh under the patronage of Urdu group. Aga Khan the permanent 
president of the Muslim League wrote to the Bengali branch of the Muslim League 
that, “League recognizes British rule essential for India and it was up to the Muslims 
to apply all their energy to furthering British prestige and instilling respect and 
affection for the British in the public mind”. This unconditional loyalism of the 
                                                          
16
  S. K Chakrabarti, Op.cit, p.6. 
17
  D. N Banerjee, Op.cit, pp. 13-14. 
18
  Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk Kamboh or Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulq Maulvi also known as Mushtaq Hussain, 
(1841-1917) born in the Meerut in March 24, 1841; was a Muslim politician and one of the 
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Muslim League made the British to announce Minto-Morely reforms of 1909.
19
 The 
Muslims of Bengal welcomed the reforms but wanted that the partition of Bengal 
must not be annulled.
20
  However, the British Government decided to unsettle the 
settled fact and annulled the Bengal partition in 1911 which took Bengali Muslims by 
surprise and they became very much disappointed. The Muslim leaders particularly 
Nawab Viqar-ul-Mulk and Aga Khan appealed the Muslims of Bengal not to agitate 
against the decision. The younger Muslim tried to adopt a radical path. On the other 
hand, Nawab Salimullah extracted from British government special educational 
facilities, public appointments etc but these facilities hardly satisfied the educated 
younger Muslims of Bengal who made Calcutta the centre of their political 
activities.
21
 Fazlul- Huq
22
 who came to represent a modern type of Muslim politician 
and educated elite made a declaration in the Bengal legislature that the annulment of 
the Bengal Partition provided “Partition of ways” between the Bengali Muslims and 
the British government. Fazlul-Huq also played an important role by emphasizing the 
differences which existed between approach and interest of the Muslims of Bengal 
and those of the Muslims of the Northern and North- Western parts of India.
23
 The 
most significant event which took place during this confusing period was the entry of 
                                                          
19
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20
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 Abul Kashem Fazlul Huq, (26 October 1873-27 April 1962), often referred to as Sher-e-Bangla, 
was a well-known Bengali statesman in the first half of the 20th century. He held different political 
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Mohammad Ali Jinnah in 1913.
24
 While joining the league Jinnah declared, “loyalty 
to the Muslims League and Muslim interests would in no way and in no time apply 
even the shadow of disloyalty to the larger national cause to which his life was 
dedicated”. It is interesting to note here that Jinnah was then a strong nationalist 
figure who said that Indian Nationalism is a, “composite whole”. In 1916 Fazlul-Huq 
was the president of the Muslim League and the General Secretary of the Congress. 
Through the efforts of Jinnah and Fazlul- Huq Congress and Muslim League met in 
1916 in Lucknow and approved the historical “Lucknow pact”. Both parties in the 
pact agreed that one- third of the seats would be reserved for the Muslims in the 
central Legislature. In the provinces the minority communities were to be given 
weightage. Accordingly pact gave over-representation to the Utter Pradesh and other 
Muslim provincial areas. Bengal Muslims constituting 52.6 percent of population got 
only 40 percent of seats while on the other hand Punjabi Muslims constituting 54.8 
percent of the population got 50 percent of seats. Thus this discrimination between the 
Bengali Muslims and Punjabi Muslims created deep resentment in Bengal and 
ultimately exploded the pact.  Consequently neither the Lucknow pact nor Gandhi‟s 
move to combine the non- cooperation movement with the Khilafat Movement, which 
Muslims had launched in protest against the abolition of the Khilafat in Turkey after 
the First World War, could Unite Hindus and Muslims.
 25
  
A new leader Abdul-ul-Momen Suhrawardy came to the rescue of 
disappointed Bengalis induced them to join the Central National Mohammedan 
Association of Calcutta and founded the Indian Muslim Association later. Since then, 
Suhrawardy family played a prominent role in Bangladesh politics.
26
 In the 
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26
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meanwhile Fazlul Huq after the introduction of reforms of 1919 organized his own 
party known as Krishak Praja Party in Bengal. This party was non-communal and 
remained confined only to Bengal.
 
Deshbandu Chitranjan Das- a great nationalist 
leader- also tried to address the communal problem at the root level.
27
 For Deshbandu 
Chitranjan Das, Muslims had many grievances and suspicions against Hindus so he 
tried to keep them on the national front and thought it better to meet their grievances 
with economic and political reforms.
28
 
Thus a famous Bengal pact was made between Muslims of Bengal and Hindus 
under the guidance of Deshbandu. But Congress rejected the Bengal pact which was 
considered to be very liberal for the Muslims. This led the Muslims to think that the 
Indian National Congress being dominated by the Hindus did not care for the interests 
of the Muslims.
 
On the other hand Jinnah continued his struggle for the unity between 
Congress and Muslims League but the report of Moti Lal Nehru committee (1928) 
appointed by All-parties conference for drafting the future constitution of the country 
rejected the separate electorate and  reserved seats for the Muslims in the Muslim 
minority provinces strictly on the basis of population and on the same principle, 
proposed to give the Muslims one-fourth of the seats in the central legislature as 
against one-third of the seats promised in the Lucknow pact.
29
 The Nehru committee 
report was thus totally opposed by ex-khilafatist Maulana Mohammad Ali and M .A 
Jinnah. This report brought about the final “parting of ways” of M.A Jinnah and 
Congress and Jinnah finally left the nationalist front.
30
  M.A Jinnah summoned the 
meeting of the All India Muslim League at Delhi in March 1929 and put forward his 
fourteen points as the minimum Muslim demand for any political settlement. The 
Congress on the other hand was becoming a mass organization.
31
 Under the 1935 
Reforms Act, elections were held on 1935 Congress swept the polls in the majority of 
provinces, but could not get majority of votes from the Muslim vote bank. However, 
Congress was gaining strength and the conception of separate Muslim homeland was 
                                                          
27
  Chittaranjan Das (C. R. Das), (popularly called Deshbandu "Friend of the country"), (November 5, 
1870-June 16, 1925) was an eminent Bengali lawyer and a major figure in the Indian independence 
movement. 
28
  S. K Chakrabarti, Op.cit, p.11. 
29
  Ibid. pp. 11-12. 
30
  D. N Banerjee, Op.cit, p.23. 
31
  V. D Mahajan, Modern Indian History, New Delhi, 2004, p.319. 
also gaining depth and strength. The concept of separatism was first advocated by the 
great philosopher poet Sir Mohammad Iqbal.
32
 As the president of the All-India 
Muslim League he said,  
―I would like to see the Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sindh 
and Baluchistan amalgamated into a single state. Self government 
within the British empire or without the British empire, the formation of 
a consolidated North-west Indian Muslim state appears to me to be the 
final destiny of the Muslims at least of North-west India‖.  
The message of separatism only envisaged a North–West Indian Muslim state 
without making Bengal or East Bengal a part of it.
 33
 Chaudri Rahmat Ali a 
Cambridge student had a distinct philosophy. According to him, “but the 
incontestable fact remains that, in its fundamentals, the clash is neither inter-religious 
nor inter-communal nor even economic. It is in fact, an international conflict of two 
nations, ambitions-Muslims for survival and Hindus for supremacy”.34 The Pakistan 
of his conception was to comprise Punjab, Afghanistan (NWFP) Kashmir, Sind and 
Baluchistan. He had no idea of Muslim Bengal then.  It was later in 1937, Rahmat Ali 
spoke of two more Muslim states Bange-Islam (Bengal and Assam) and Usmanistan 
(Hyderabad).
35
 
All these developments at all India level were watched by the Bengali 
Muslims with more or less in pragmatic and philosophical context. Muslim League 
was then a very weak party in Bengal. It was Fazlul Haq‟s Krishak Praja Party which 
won 77 out of 117 Muslim seats in 1937 elections in the Bengal legislature, conceding 
only 40 seats to the Muslim League. This election made the Muslim League conscious 
of its limitations.
36
 Such was the situation of Muslim League that Sir Iqbal wrote to 
Jinnah who was in London requesting him to return and revive the Muslim League. 
Divided Muslim mind was then a fact.
37
 In Bengal Krishak Praja Party of Fazlul Huq 
and in Punjab Fazli Hessians Unionist Party were too well entrenched at that time to 
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be disturbed by obscurantist slogans of the Muslims League. Congress refused to 
form coalition government with any other party. In Bengal Fazlul-Huq extended his 
hand of friendship to Congress but Congress was not ready to do so. In any case, the 
refusal of Congress to join hands with the KPP created doubts in the minds of the 
Bengali Muslims. Nonetheless on June 23, 1938, a coalition government comprising 
the representatives of the Muslim League, Krishak Praja party and Hindu landlords 
came into existence. It was a most unnatural coalition - one faction standing for 
progress, and abolition of landed aristocracy and the others represented the vested 
interests of their own.
38
  
Thereafter Fazlul Huq was selected as the chairman of the committee 
constituted by All India Muslim League to investigate into and report on the misdeeds 
and atrocities committed against the Muslims in the provinces under the Congress 
administration. Fazlul Huq came up with a shocking report highlighting the miserable 
conditions of the Muslims under Congress government. This shift created a second 
thought in Fazlul Haq‟s mind and deeds and brought him closer to the All-India 
Muslim League.
39
 M.A Jinnah also extended his influence in organizing and raising 
youth and student organizations throughout India. Consequently by early 1940, Jinnah 
was fast moving to adhere and adopt the concepts of separatism and wrote publicly 
that the Hindus and Muslims were two different communities with two different 
identities. On March 23, 1940 M.A Jinnah prompted premier of Bengal formerly a 
moderate nationalist and opponent of M.A Jinnah, Fazlul Haq to move and introduce 
the Lahore resolution. The important Resolution contained that “the areas in which 
the Muslims are numerically in majority, as in the North-western and eastern zones of 
India, should be grouped to constitute an “Independent state in which the constituent 
units shall be autonomous and sovereign”. 40  By the end of 1940, Jinnah declared that 
no power on earth could prevent the formation of Pakistan as a Muslim state. Jinnah 
used to publish his own newspaper Dawn in collaboration with Muslim businesses 
men and industrialists which proved its mettle in galvanizing the mass feelings and 
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identity.
41
 Differences between the All India Muslim League leadership and the 
Bengali Muslim leadership surfaced again. On July 21, 1941 the viceroy of India Lord 
Linlithgow in the Simla communiqué nominated the premiers of the Punjab, Bengal, 
and Assam as the members of the National Defence Council. This he did without 
consulting Jinnah. At this Jinnah was much enraged and directed the three premiers to 
resign from National Defense Council. The premiers of the Punjab and Assam 
resigned meekly; Fazlul Haq, as a mark of protest, resigned also from the working 
committee and the council of the Muslim League. In a latter statement, Fazlul Haq 
remarked; “the genius of the Bengali race revolts against the autocracy and I could 
not, therefore, help protesting against the autocracy of a single individual”. He was 
every bit as good as Quaid-i-Azam himself and was not going to take orders from 
him.  All the Muslim League members of Bengal resigned and formed the Bengali 
Legislature Muslim League party and Premier Fazlul Haq organized the Progressive 
Coalition Party.
 42
  Fazlul Haq formed his second coalition government on December 
12, 1941 with the new progressive party, the Sarat Bose section of the Congress, 
Nationalist Muslims, the scheduled caste members, and the Europeans and the Anglo-
Indians as partners of the coalition.
 
On March 29, 1943 Fazlul Haq resigned as Chief 
Minister of Bengal. Decoyed the incident in a forward to Bengal Today, Huq says, “I 
was compelled (by the governor) into signing the letter of resignation of my office”. 
Nazimuddin- a Muslim League member and staunch reactionary- was taken in his 
place.
43
 M.A Jinnah in his marathon speech at the annual session of the All India 
Muslim League in Delhi said that, “For the last 16 months the Muslims of Bengal 
have been harassed and prosecuted by a man who, I am sorry to say is a Mussulman”.  
Strategically and very cautiously Jinnah brought the Bengal under his way. Jinnah‟s 
authority was unchallenged and nobody questioned or attempted to analyze his 
judgment.
44
 Thus after the fall of Haq ministry, Muslim League formed the 
government under Nazimuddin and Hassan Shaheed Suhrawardy.
45
  In the tenure of 
Muslim League Ministry, Bengal suffered one of the worst famines in its history. The 
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ministry struggled on through these crises and became so weak that in 1945 it was 
defeated in a snap vote in the assembly. Lord Casey Governor of Bengal temporarily 
suspended the parliamentary government under section 93 of 1935 act.
46
 In 1946 
elections Muslim League got a clear majority in the Bengal Assembly due to the 
organizing capacity of Hassan Shaheed Suhrawardy. Muslim League secured 115 out 
of 250 seats whereas the Congress secured only 84 seats. Suhrawardy became chief 
minister and formed a Muslim League cabinet with a little Hindu support. In the brief 
period between the end of World War II and the granting of independence to both 
India and Pakistan there was a growing polarization between Muslim League and 
Congress. The Muslim League was able to gain support during the war years. The 
Krishak Praja Party had fallen apart and Fazlul Haq had gone into temporary 
collapse.
47
  
Suhrawardy made an offer of coalition to the Congress party having an interior 
motive to free the Bengal politics from all India Muslim League influence. It was 
another chance for Congress to win over the Muslims of Bengal. However, Congress 
refused to join hands with Muslim League. Suhrawardy said, “I was quiet ready, 
willing and anxious to go into a coalition with the Congress and thus give an example 
to the rest of India. We might have ushered in a new era”.48 After the victory Muslim 
League met at the Anglo- Arabic College in Delhi from April 7-19, 1946. The main 
political resolution was moved on 9
th
 April 1946 by H. S. Suhrawardy reiterating the 
demand for Pakistan and for setting up the two constitution-making bodies. Before 
dissolving the convention Muslim League Legislators took an oath pledging to 
undergo any danger trial, sacrifice, whatever may be demanded for the attainment of 
Pakistan.
49
 The British government on the other hand was trying to arrive at a 
satisfactory solution of this bifurcation problem.
50
 Meanwhile the Cabinet Mission 
Plan headed by Lord Pethick Lawrence, the secretary of state for India  arrived in 
Delhi on March 24, 1946. The cabinet mission firmly rejected the proposal to hand-
over power “to two entirely separate sovereign states” and suggested interalia. 
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1. There should be a union of India, embracing both British India and the states 
which should deal with the following subjects: foreign affairs, defence and 
communications and which should have powers necessary to raise the finance 
required for the above union subjects; 
2. All subject other than the union subjects and residuary powers should vest in 
provinces and; 
3. Provinces should be free to form groups with executives and legislatures and 
each group could determine the province subjects to be taken in common. 
According to Cabinet Mission Plan Assam and Bengal could form a single 
group of provinces.
51
  
The All India Muslim League passed a resolution on June 6, 1946 by which it 
accepted the scheme in its entirety. On the other hand, the working committee of the 
Congress passed a resolution on June 26, 1946 by which it accepted the scheme 
partially. The Congress accepted that part of the scheme which dealt with 
constitution-making and it rejected the scheme of interim government.
52
 M.A Jinnah 
who had accepted the scheme entirely was annoyed for the British government‟s 
decision to postpone the formation of an interim government. He accused the lord 
Wavell of deception and angrily made to pass another resolution on July 29, 1946 by 
which it withdrew its former acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan.
53
 
On July 29, 1946 the All India Muslim League passed a resolution calling 
upon the Muslim masses to prepare for “Direct Action”. While explaining the 
programme Liaquat Ali Khan, the president of Muslim League said that direct action 
meant for resorting to non-constitutional means and it could take whatever from that 
might suit the conditions. The date fixed for “Direct Action” was 16th August 1946. 
On the “Direct Action day” a serious communal disturbances broke out in Bengal 
which resulted in the most famous Great Calcutta killing.
 
 The Congress, Indian press, 
and the general Hindu public have always made Suhrawardy responsible for these 
inhuman incidents.
54
 In 1946-47 events, both at the all India and at the provincial 
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level were moving at a hurricane speed. On February 20, 1947 Lord Atlee- the British 
Prime Minister announced in the British parliament that the transfer of power would 
take place by a date not later than 1948. At the same time Mountbatten was made the 
new viceroy for India continent. Mountbatten made it clear that no federal system 
would work and pressed for the partition of British India and persuaded Congress 
leaders Nehru and Patel that this was the only way to come out of the impasse. 
However, some Hindu and Muslim leaders including Sarat Base, Kiran Sankar Roy, 
H.S. Suhrawardy and Abdul Hassan advocated an independent and united Bengal.  
Jinnah as well as Mahatma Gandhi gave their blessing to such a move.
55
 But on April 
4, 1947 the Bengal provincial Congress committee demanded partition of the province 
into two units, even if there was no partition of India. This was considered necessary 
to make a west Bengal a Hindu majority province and prevent it from becoming a part 
of Pakistan in case the country was partitioned.  
On April 8, 1947, Suhrawardy issued a statement saying that, “if Bengal 
would remain undivided, the Bengalis would become a great nation in history, but if it 
is divided, he warned, that both Bengalis would be neglected by the two central 
governments”. When the partition of Bengal became a real possibility, the Bengali 
Muslims leaders were divided between “Divisionists” and “Unionist”. The former 
wanted division of Bengal and were led by Akram Khan, Hammed Haq Choudary, 
and Nurul Amin. Suhrawardy and Abdul Hashim wanted to preserve united and 
independent Bengal.
56
 But the efforts of these Unionists leaders could not yield any 
result because the Muslim League leaders had already taken the decision to accept the 
Mountbatten plan and they had no desire to go back upon it. In the midst of tense 
situation Bengal Legislature Assembly met on June 20, 1947 to take the fateful 
decision. The Assembly decided by a majority of 126 votes to 90 that Bengal should 
join the new constitution Assembly of Pakistan. The members from the non-Muslim 
majority areas of West Bengal met to decide the fate of West Bengal. It was decided 
by 58 votes to 21 that West Bengal also should be separated from East Bengal and 
join the existing constitution Assembly of India.
57
 Shaheed Suhrawardy remarked 
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with a touch of feeling that “the agony is over, Independent sovereign Bengal has 
been stabbed in the back and Bengal will soon be partioned. We were not destined to 
march together”.58 Finally the efforts for a united Bengal failed and British India was 
officially partitioned into the two independent nations - India and Pakistan on 14
th
 and 
15
th
 August, 1947 respectively. Bengal was split into the Hindu Majority area of West 
Bengal in India, which included Calcutta, and East Bengal was given to Pakistan as 
being called East Pakistan.
59
 
 
Post Independence Era 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The two wings of Pakistan from 1947 to 1970; East Pakistan became independent in 1971 as 
Bangladesh. 
Unlike many modern countries Pakistan was born on the basis of two-nation theory. 
But a state to be viable or stable must have a concrete national foundation. The two-
nation theory could not give Pakistan a basis for continued existence. Nobody knew 
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this better than M.A. Jinnah the founder and head of the new state.
 60
 In his famous 
address before the constituent assembly of Pakistan on August 11, 1948, he said that,  
―You may belong to any religion or caste or creed - that has nothing to 
do with the fundamental principles, that we are all citizens and equal 
citizens of one state. In course of time Hindus will cease to be Hindus, 
and Muslims would cease to be Muslims not in the religious sense 
because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political 
sense as citizens of the state‖.61  
It is clear from the above that inspite of the idealism expressed by Jinnah on 
the question of nationalism it was due to the political circumstances created by him 
and his associates that Pakistan never had the opportunity of becoming one nation by 
discarding the two nation theory or by enhancing and adhering different ethnic 
elements psychologically, economically or politically.
62
 The emotional charge had lost 
its appeal and the people of East Pakistan who had been swayed by the wave of 
communalism during the demand of the partition of the sub-continent, became aware 
of the designed discrimination against them in the new state of Pakistan.
63 
Instead of 
Hindu-Muslim conflict there was now the conflict between the eastern and western 
wings.
64
 The old conflict of the British period continued in a different form to the 
extent that in those days, as explained by Rahmat Ali was between the Hindus and the 
Muslims for supremacy of the former and survival of the later. But it was now 
between West Pakistanis and the East Pakistanis for supremacy of the former and 
survival of the latter.
65
 The East Pakistan was soon relegated to the position of 
colonial hinterland of West Pakistan. The mood was well reflected as early as 1948 
even in the constituent Assembly of Pakistan that feeling is growing among the 
Eastern Pakistanis that, “Eastern Pakistan is being neglected and treated merely as 
colony of West Pakistan”.66 After partition there were great expectations as Badruddin 
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Umar points out that, people were taught to visualize Pakistan as a dreamland, where 
milk and honey would flow, everyone would get education and suitable job, heath 
care would be a routine matter, and there would be a flourishing of the culture 
espoused during the Pakistan movement. What really happened was that the Muslims 
of East Bengal who constituted the vast majority of the population were quiet 
confused by the dreamland called Pakistan, where they had to go hungry and die of 
famine, where no surplus land was distributed among the poor peasants and 
sharecroppers, where very little new opportunities were opened up for the working 
masses and educated sections of people and life in all aspects remained as tortuous as 
before.
67 
There was of course a large political mismanagement by the Punjabi 
dominated martial law rulers.
68
 
A. Language Movement 
Politics like other fields is mute without language. Though graphics, pictures 
and movies play important role yet they are ineffective, if not mixed with words. 
Language is a force that binds people. It empowers them and makes them conscious of 
their identity and about their culture. Language denied to people is power denied to 
them. The international politics is also worthless without appropriate choice of 
language. In politics, use of proper words is inevitable for achieving political 
objectives and avoiding controversies but sometime language itself becomes a 
political issue. Pakistan faced this problem in early years of its independence when 
language controversy exercised far-reaching effects on subsequent history of the 
country as a whole. Imposition of Urdu as state language was thought unjust by 
Bengali-speaking Eastern wing and they demanded that Bengali should be given equal 
status to that of Urdu. There was a sense of being ignored and exploited by West 
Pakistan and it was thought a rightful demand on part of East Pakistan to have its own 
language. Bengali written in Devanagari was not approved by the central leadership 
and this attitude was resented by the Bengalis who asserted that Bengali was as much 
language of Muslim as that of Urdu. This sense of exploitation resulted in division of 
                                                          
67
  Hiranmay Karlekar, Op.cit, p.39. 
68
  Jaswant Singh and Major General S. P Bhatia, Conflict and Diplomacy, Rupa & Co, New Delhi, 
p.55. 
country into Bangladesh and Pakistan. Language was the major factor that contributed 
and intensified the feeling of mistrust between the two wings. 
The first duty of the rulers of Pakistan was to assure the people of Pakistan for 
their part in the destiny of the new state. The new homeland for the Muslims where 
they could expect an honorable living so far denied by the omission and commission 
in the United India.
69
 Language adopted by the communities gave it aspects of 
solidarity and uniqueness and focused the sentiment of the people residing in the 
North-Eastern quadrant of southern Asia. Bengali speakers are roughly divided 
between India and Bangladesh but it was only in Bangladesh where language has 
played a so effective role.
70
 Historically Bengali is the language of the poor people but 
it is not an ordinary language nor is it under developed. There is a special 
tenaciousness built into the Bengali psyche that suffering is a way of life as well as 
death and to live is to endure hardship.
71
 The first confrontation arose over the issue of 
language between East and West Pakistan. On February 25, 1948, a few months after 
partition Mr. Dhirendra Nath Dutta Bengali member put forward a resolution in the 
constituent assembly that Bengali along with Urdu should be used in the Assembly 
proceedings.
72
 Liquate Ali Khan opposed the motion on the ground that “Pakistan has 
been created because of the demand of a hundred million Muslims in this sub-
continent and the language of a hundred million Muslims is Urdu, therefore, It is 
necessary for a nation to have one language and that language can only be Urdu and 
no other language”.73 It was to be noted that according to census of Pakistan 1951, 
Bengali was the language of 54.6 percent of people of Pakistan while Urdu was the 
language of only 3.2 percent of Pakistan‟s population. The below statistical table 
based on 1951 causes will show the figure.
74
  
Table: 1  
Linguistic Group Percentage 
Bengali 54.4 
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Punjabi 27.6 
Pashtu 6.6 
Sindhi 5.1 
Urdu 3.2 
Baluchi 1.2 
Source. S K Chakrabarti p. 44. 
This being the position of Bengali language East Pakistanis genuinely wanted 
Bengali to be the state language of Pakistan. If Urdu was being spoken by only 3.2 
percent of the West Pakistan people and wanted their language to be one of the state 
languages, the Bengalis would have no objection to it.
75
 The language movement was 
supported by Bengali civil servants, academics, students, and various groups of the 
middle class. Student league which was founded by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman in 
January 1948 was in forefront of the agitation. Students of Dhaka University set up a 
committee of Action in the first week of March 1948 with the objective of achieving 
national status for Bengali.
76
 The working committee of the East Bengal Provincial 
Muslim League also expressed its opinion in favour of Bengali language.
77
 Jinnah 
visited East Pakistan in the third week of March 1948 to address the convocation in 
the University of Dacca. Although Urdu was not a popular language in Bengal yet the 
Quaid-a-Azam declared at the University convocation that Urdu has to be an adopted 
language of the country. Sheikh Mujib along with some students challenged Jinnah‟s 
statement but these students found themselves behind the bars for demanding proper 
status of Bengali language.
 
The prime Minister of Pakistan Khawaja Nazimuddin and 
Chief Minister of East Pakistan Nurul Amin also declared that there would be none 
other than Urdu as the state language of Pakistan. A series of meetings and 
demonstrations finally culminated in a general strike throughout the East Pakistan on 
February 21, 1952. Police firing on the students of Dhaka University resulted in 
killing of four students namely Rafiq, Barket, Jabbar and Salam, who continue to be 
remembered nationally as martyrs of the language movement.
 78
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Procession march held on 21 February 1952 in Dhaka. 
Every year 21
st
 February is celebrated in their honour.
79
 A Shaheed Minar 
(Martyr‟s Monument) was erected at the site of firing as a symbol of Bengali 
resistance to West Pakistan domination.
 
Consequently observing the intensity of 
public feeling the government had to grant East Pakistani demand and to give Bengali 
language same status as that of Urdu. The events of February 21, 1952, changed the 
whole course of East-West relations. First of all it sealed the fate of the Muslim 
League in East Pakistan. The Bengali politics here after became more and more 
regionalist.
80
 
B. Economic Exploitation 
In all the Afro-Asian countries the desire for political freedom has been closely 
linked up with the urge for freedom from economic exploitation and opening up the 
path of developmental opportunities. Independence does not mean political freedom 
only but also includes economic, cultural, linguistic freedom as well. In the post-
independence period, the newly emerging states adopted socio-political programmes 
according to their socio-political ethos and the requirements of their respective 
national interest. So did India and Pakistan. 
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Table: 2. Economic Exploitation: 1948-1971 
Plan West Pakistan East Pakistan Net Spending in terms of 
percentage of total expenditure 
Rupees in crores 
1950/51-54/55 1129 524 20 
1955/56-59/60 1655 524 32 
1960/61-64/65 3355 1404 42 
1965/66-69/70 5195 2141 41 
Total 12834 4300 34 
Reports of the Advisory Panels for the Fourth Five Year Plan 1970-75, Vol. I, published by the 
Planning Commission of Pakistan 
From the very beginning there had been a gap between the people of West and East 
Pakistan which resulted in an alien feeling among the East people in general and Elite 
in particular.
81
 The 24 year oppression of East Pakistan by the West Pakistan was 
considered as more brutal than the British occupation. While British occupation was 
thought of as a time of enlightenment, the rule by West Pakistan was brutal and 
oppressive.  Economic exploitation was at its peak in the latter. Of the total aid 
received by Pakistan, 80% went to West Pakistan. Representation in government 
services was a mere 15% for Bengalis. Only 10% people from East Pakistan were in 
Armed force. The above table shows the range of discrimination against East 
Pakistan.  The areas in West Pakistan were busy in establishing various industries and 
the result was that West Pakistan began to show more and more revenues and 
contributed more and more to the national exchequer. Pakistan government spent 
nearly 250 corers on industrial complexes in the west as compared to only 70 corers 
in East.
82
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Table: 3  
 Department W. Pak% E. Pak% 
i. Armed forces and Police 91.9 8.1 
ii. Presidents Secretariat 81.0 19.0 
iii. Health 81.0 19.0 
iv. Central Public Services commission 85.5 14.4 
v. Agriculture 79.0 14.5 
vi Home 79.0 21.0 
vii. Education 72.7 27.3 
viii. Industries 74.3 25.7 
ix. Law 65.0 35.0 
x Imports 75.0 25.0 
xi. Atta per maund R.s 15% 30% 
xii. 
 
Revenue expenditure during last 
twenty years 
R.s 5000% cr R.s 1500% cr 
Source: S. K Chakrabarti, p. 91. 
Throughout the history of undivided Pakistan jute was its main foreign exchange. But 
foreign exchange earnings from East Bengali‟s jute and tea were mostly spent for the 
industrial development of West Pakistan.
83
 A particular region cannot expect to 
industrialize itself unless its earnings from exports are ploughed back. The followings 
table shows the West Pakistan‟s attitude towards East Pakistan in this regard. 
Table: 4 
Period Region Exports Imports Exports in excess of 
imports 
1952 East Bengal 39,69,766 21,59,552 +18,10,214 
1957 West Pakistan 34,40,371 51,05,093 -16,64,722 
Source: S K Chakrabarti, p.91. (The table clearly shows that the export surplus was spent to benefit 
West Pakistan.)
 84
 
  The Finance Department and other Economic Ministry of the Central 
Government of Pakistan were always dominated by the Punjabi people.
85
 The 
situation became such that East Bengal became a supplier of raw materials to the 
industries and industrialists of West Pakistan. The result was that East Bengal people 
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had to purchase essential consumer goods from the same industries to which they 
supplied essential raw materials.
 
Communication, education, and health etc. remained 
neglected in East Pakistan. Nobody was there to address the grievances of the people.
 
Ayoub Khan, the President of Pakistan gave some stability to the country. He 
improved agriculture as well as industry in West Pakistan. But East Pakistan did not 
get any relief with the result poverty increased and disparity grew.
86
 Pakistani rulers 
could not realize this fact that East Pakistan being a border area could have trans-
impact socially and politically instead; they always looked down upon Bengalis. 
Many proud zamindars of west Punjab declared that Bengalis were not Muslims but 
Bengalis. K.R. Malkani, Editor of Motherland, has given figures of growing disparity 
between the two wings. According to Malkani Industrial production in East Pakistan 
was worth Rs 12 crores in 1949-50, it was 18 corers in West Pakistan. There was a 
vivid gap of 50%. At the time of conflict with India in 1965, West Pakistan was 
producing industrial goods worth 302 crores and East Pakistan only 80 crores.
87
 
According to the Pakistan Planning Commission in 1959-60 West Pakistan per-capita 
income was 32% higher than the per capita income of East-Pakistan. In 1969-70 it 
was 61% higher than the per-capita income of East Pakistan.
88
 According to the 
figures presented by a group of scholars in Vienna West Pakistan per capita income 
which was Rs 355 in 1960 rose to Rs 492 in 1970. During the same period East 
Pakistan per-capita income registered a meager rise from Rs. 269 to Rs 308. Thus the 
per-capita income shows the clear difference between the two wings. All this shows a 
lopsided nature of the Pakistan economy and especially the blatant discrimination 
practiced against East Bengal.
89
 
There was no serious attempt from the government mechanization or bringing 
improvement in agriculture. For agriculture, West Pakistan got almost 22 lakhs every 
year and the East Pakistan less than one and a half lakh.
90
 The East Bengal people had 
not only to face these manmade difficulties but also had nature against them.
91
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Available figures show that East Pakistan had to suffer a loss of about 100 crores in 
the floods of 1962, 120 crores in 1966 and almost double that figure in 1968.
92
  
The government of Pakistan followed agricultural policy discriminately. 
Usually the decisions regarding agricultural inputs, in terms of tractors, seeds 
fertilizers, insecticides, tube wells etc. were taken and implemented in the wheat-
growing areas of West Pakistan particularly in Punjab.
93
  
The following table regarding distribution of agricultural inputs between East 
and West would give the reader a fair idea of the discrimination practiced by the 
central government of Pakistan against East Pakistan.
94
 
Table: 5 
 West Pakistan East Pakistan 
Fertilizer distribution during 
1964-68, in 000 nutrient tons. 
739 66% 371 33% 
Improved seed distribution 
during 1964-69, in 000 tons. 
342 89% 40 11% 
Wheel type (numbers)  
other large (number) 
20.069 
 
2.000 
 
91% 
 
1,825 
 
350 
 
9% 
 
Source: S. K Chakrabarty, p.99. 
This glaring economic disparity between West and East Pakistan with its 
concomitant concentration wealth in one region of the country was by itself extremely 
dangerous for the process of nation-building in Pakistan. The enormous concentration 
of economic power in a small group formed a sinister nexus depriving East Pakistan 
even of the barest minimum share in the economy of West Pakistan which proved a 
primary cause for the disintegration of the country.
 95
 
C.    Political Alienation 
Politically speaking there was a great division between the two wings of 
Pakistan. The West Pakistan was at a higher stage of political development than the 
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East Pakistan. It is important to be noted that the Lahore Resolution of the Muslim 
League passed on March 23, 1940, clearly states that there should be two 
“Independent” and “Sovereign” Muslim states in the Indian sub-continent one- West 
Pakistan and the East Pakistan. The East Pakistanis were demanding the 
implementation of this resolution. But this was belied and the state of Pakistan was 
made a centralized state. The Chief Minister of the East-Pakistan Hassan Shaheed 
Suhrawardy was not supported by League leadership because of his involvement with 
the independent Bengal movement.
96 
Soon after the achievement of Pakistan, the 
nationalist and leftist resigned from the League and started organizing themselves in 
separate groups.
97
 
 
 
Before the partition of the sub-continent in July 1947, Muslim League workers 
and intelligentsia met in Dhaka in July 1947 and formed the East Pakistan Peoples 
Freedom League with a manifesto of economic emancipation.
98
 Hence forth various 
parties like Democratic Youth League and a very strong and regional based Awami 
Muslim League was formed in Dhaka on June 4, 1949, in reaction to central Muslim 
League‟s claim that it was the only legitimate party in the country. Thereafter the 
word “Muslim” was dropped from Awami Muslim League and it was renamed as 
Awami League Party in 1955. It was a secular party. At first it started to shake the 
foundations of landlordism when it demanded the abolition of Zamandari system, 
nationalization of Jute industries and holding of the general elections.
99
 The president 
of the party Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani declared that the purpose of the 
Awami League was to form an alternate party to the Muslim League and achieve the 
welfare of the people.
100
 As a result Awami League Party soon emerged a well 
organized disciplined opposition party. In July 1953 its council approved the party‟s 
manifesto and unanimously elected Maulana Abdul Hamid Khan Bhashani as 
president and Mujibur Rehman as general secretary of the party. In the manifesto 
charter achievement of provincial autonomy and Bengali as the language of East 
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Pakistan were top priorities. It also believed that only defence, foreign affairs and 
currency should be in the hands of centre. 
The above developments made the centre government to start minimizing the 
Bengali-majority in the Parliament of the country by proposing equal legislative 
representation for all regional units.
101
 They also imposed an Urdu Language as the 
national language, which was spoken by only 3.2 percent of the population in 
Pakistan.
102
 All the parties of East Pakistan Awami league, East Pakistan Student‟s 
League, Leftists, East Pakistan Students Union opposed their attempt through 
processions meetings and demonstrations during 1948-1952.
103
 The Language 
Movement of 1952 made it possible for the Bengali opposition parties to forge a 
United Front composed of the Awami league, Krishak swamik party of Fazlul Haq 
and a number of junior parties to fight the Muslim League in the provincial elections 
of 1954 jointly. The year 1954 witnessed a tremendous change. In the provincial 
elections the Muslim League was practically wiped out by the United Front from the 
East Pakistan.
104
 Inspite of the frictions, jealousies and divergence in ideological 
outlook all the parties of the United Front subscribed to the 21 Point Programme. The 
main points are as follows  
i. Bengali will be declared as the state language. 
ii. Zamandari and all rent-receiving interests will be abolished without    
compensation and all lands will be distributed among the landless peasants. 
iii. The jute industry will be nationalized. A minimum price of jute will be   
established. The scandals of the jute department at the time of the Muslim 
League Ministry will be investigated and guilty persons will be punished. 
iv. Forming on a cooperative basis will be introduced. Cottage industries will be 
encouraged. 
v. A salt factory will be set up here, so that East Pakistan becomes self-sufficient 
in salt. Salt scandals will be investigated. 
vi. Skilled refugee workers will be provided with suitable employment. 
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vii. The irrigation system will be improved to protect the country from floods. 
viii. Steps will be taken for rapid industrialization for East Pakistan. The state shall 
establish all rights, economic and social of the workers. 
ix. Primary education will be compulsory and free. Teachers shall get adequate 
salary and allowance. 
x. The education system will be radically changed. Mother Tongue will be the 
medium of education. 
xi. The universities at Dacca and Rajshahi will become self-governing bodies. 
These universities will be free from “Black Laws”. 
xii. Overall expenditure of the administration will be reduced. Fat salaries of the 
higher officials will be lowered and the small salaries of the low grade 
employees will be increased. 
xiii. Corruption, favoritism and bribery will be wiped out. For this purpose the 
income and expenditure of government officials and private businessmen will 
be minutely checked from 1940 to date.  
xiv. The Safety Act and similar vile ordinances will be repealed. All political 
prisoners shall be set free. People will have complete freedom in organizing 
meetings and expressing their views in the press. 
xv. The executive and judiciary departments will be separated from each other. 
xvi. At the moment, the Burdwan House (Chief Minister‟s Residence) will be used 
as a hostel for the students and later it will become a centre for research work 
on Bengali language and literature. 
xvii. A Shaheed (Martyrs) memorial monument will be erected. Adequate 
compensation will be given to the families of the Shaheed. 
xviii. February 21 will be declared as Shaheed Day (Martyrs Day) and it will be a 
government holiday. 
xix. East Bengal should get complete autonomy according to Lahore Resolution. 
Our defence currency and foreign affairs will be joint subjects with the centre. 
Army headquarters should be in West Pakistan and Naval headquarters should 
be in East Pakistan, so that this wing can become strong enough to safeguard 
her freedom. 
xx. The United Front Ministry will use no pretext to prolong the life of the 
Assembly. The Cabinet will cease to function six months before general 
elections. Elections will be conducted impartially under the supervision of an 
appointed election commissioner. 
xxi. If a vacancy occurs in the Assembly during the United Front Ministry, the seat 
will be filled through a by-election within three months. The Cabinet will 
obligedly resign in the event of three consecutive defeats in by-elections.
105
 
   The 21 Point Programme gained effective popularity. The United Front won 
300 seats out of 309 leaving only nine seats for Muslim League and a government 
was formed under the leadership of Fazlul Haq in April 1954 in the East Pakistan. In 
the centre the Muslim League regime was not happy over the developments in the 
province and dismissed the East Pakistan government on May 30, 1954.
106
 The 
provincial legislature was dissolved and governor‟s rule was imposed because of the  
reasons given for resorting to this extraordinary measure was mainly the ministry‟s 
failure to maintain law and order and consequently Fazlul Haq was called a self-
confessed traitor to Pakistan by the Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Bogra.
107
 The 
dismissal of Fazlul Haq ministry in East Pakistan was of course a blatant step to 
nullify the democratically expressed will of the East Pakistani people because it runs 
counter to the desire of the centre government. The Awami League led by Hassan 
Shaheed Suhrawardy and Krishak Praja Party led by Fazlul Haq which had formed 
the two principal constituents of United Front in East Pakistan were soon at each 
other‟s throats, thanks to the mechanization of the Civilian Junta then ruling Pakistan. 
The period of Governor‟s rule was utilized in order to divide the two major partners in 
the United Front. The Krishak Praja Party was first to fall prey and was followed by 
Awami League. Fazlul Haq accused as a traitor a few months earlier, was inducted 
into the central government as minister for interior affairs (i.e. Home Minister) and 
his nominee Abu Hassan Sarkar was appointed Chief Minister of East Pakistan when 
Governor‟s rule was lifted on June 2, 1955.  Meanwhile at the centre the ascendency 
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of General Iskander Mirza
108
 forced Ghulam Mohammad to resign as Governor 
General of Pakistan and became himself as the Governor General of Pakistan. On 
August 7, 1955, the Muslim League Parliamentary Party dominated by the Punjab 
contingent, elected Choudary Mohammad Ali as its leader. With the result, Choudary 
Mohammad Ali formed his cabinet. Fazlul Haq the leader of Krishak Praja Party also 
joined the central cabinet.  It was during this period that the constitution of Pakistan 
1956 was passed and it was based on equal status between East and West Pakistan. 
This constitution was mostly supported by East Pakistan people. Soon there arose a 
difference between Prime Minister Choudary Mohammad Ali and General Iskander 
Mirza over the selection of Dr Khan Sahib for the post of Chief Minister of West 
Pakistan. When he differed from the Parliamentary Party on this issue he was voted 
out as the leader of the party and consequently resigned. Chaudari Mohammad Ali 
was replaced by East Pakistan Awami League leader Hassan Shaheed Suhrawardy as 
Prime Minister of Pakistan. Suhrawardy finally found his place in the central power 
structure. An uncomprosing critic of  the Muslim League and the bureaucratic 
establishment, it was one of the ironies of the history that Suhrawardy agreed to form 
coalition with president Iskander Mirza‟s party and Muslim League. He like other 
Bengali leaders was chosen by the central government to serve as the symbol of unity. 
This was the only Awami League tenure in East West Pakistan relations which was 
free from bitterness between the two wings. On October 7, 1958, President of 
Pakistan Iskander Mirza issued a proclamation abrogating the constitution of 1956 
and dismissed the National and Provincial governments and banned all political 
parties and appointed General Ayoub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator. The 
army chief later on dismissed President Mirza and with this began an army rule in 
Pakistan. Ayoub Khan prepared a heavy political economic and social agenda for 
rebuilding Pakistan.
109
 His first preference, as one would expect, was to demolish the 
old political order and humiliate its practioners. Simultaneously, a number of 
politicians were detained and charged under security law and martial law 
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regulation.
110
 In East Pakistan the former central and provincial minister‟s and 
members of the assemblies and several other leaders and workers of Awami League 
were detained. Meanwhile president Ayoub was also busy in drafting a constitution 
for the country where the executive would enjoy more powers and legislature would 
play a secondary role.
111
 The parties were initially banned as General Ayoub‟s aim 
was to establish a party-less system. However, pressures made him to allow the 
operation of political parties within a restrictive framework as he himself became the 
leader and presidential nominee in the election of 1965.
112
 
In the civil services the discriminatory attitude of the central government 
could be gauged while seeing the representation from East Pakistan i.e. out of 
nineteen (19) Secretaries there was none from East Pakistan, out of 46 Joint 
Secretaries only 7 were from the East Pakistan and out of 124 Deputy Secretaries only 
24 were from East Pakistan.
 
The martial law could not completely down the spirit of 
protest of East Bengal.
113 
With the removal of ban on political parties, the substantial 
effort by the political parties of the Bengali elite entered into the central system during 
the presidential and Legislative elections of 1964. The Awami League of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rehman and National Awami Party under Maulana Bhashani joined hands 
with Jamiat-e-Islami and National Democratic Front. This electoral alliance was 
formed on July 21, 1964, and was designated as the Combined Opposite Parties 
(COP) and Fatima Jinnah was nominated as presidential candidate to fight against the 
Ayoub Khan in the election.
 114
 General Ayoub revived the Muslim League and 
became the presidential candidate of 1965, election. Nevertheless election ensured the 
continuance in power of the Ayoub regime. The Combined Opposite Parties failed to 
win the presidential and legislative election.
115
 Following the opposition‟s failure to 
defeat Ayoub in 1965, elections the Bengali elite realized that the attempt to hobnob 
in and outside the system was useless. Therefore, they concentrated on their anti-
system activities by strongly emphasizing their radical, regional autonomist 
programmes. The 1965 war with India exposed the helplessness of East Bengal and a 
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deep frustration resulted.
116
 The 1965 war affected the legitimacy not only of the 
Ayoub government but of the entire Pakistan political system including East Pakistan. 
Sheikh Mujib, the Awami league leader and his lieutenants correctly felt the pulse of 
the Bengali population and in 1966 came out openly with their manifesto called Six-
Point programme.
117
 
 
 Meanwhile the West Pakistan opposition parties also convened 
a joint conference in Lahore. The purpose of the meeting was to form a collective 
strategy to try and force President Ayoub‟s regime out of office. Except Mujibur 
Rehman nobody attend the conference.
118
  Mujib wanted the support of West Pakistan 
opposition parties for the Six-Point programme, in return for which he would pledge 
Awami League Assistance in bringing down Ayoub Khan‟s regime. 119 Six points 
programme announced by Sheikh are as under:- 
i. The constitution should provide for a federation of Pakistan in its true sense on 
the basis of the Lahore resolution and Parliamentary form of government with 
supremacy of legislature directly elected on the basis of universal adult 
franchise; 
ii. Federal government should deal with only two subjects, viz Defence and 
Foreign Affairs, and all other residuary subject shall vest in the federating 
state; 
iii. There shall be two separate currencies mutually or freely convertible in each 
wing for each region or in the alternative, a single currency, subject to the 
established Federal Reserve System in which there will be regional Federal 
Reserve banks which shall devise measures to prevent the transfer of resources 
and flight of capital from one region to another; 
iv. Power of taxation and revenue collections to be vested in the federating units, 
the centre to be financed by allocation of a share in the states taxes; 
v. Separate foreign exchange accounts to be kept for East and West Pakistan, the 
requirement of the federal government to be met by the two wings in 
proportion or any other fixed basis as may be agreed upon; 
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vi. The government of the federating units shall be empowered to maintain a 
militia or Para-military force in order to contribute effectively towards 
national security; 
120
 
The West Pakistan opposition leaders rejected Mujib‟s plan and termed it as a 
secessionist device.
121
 Mujib was arrested while returning to East Pakistan. The Six-
Point programme was condemned forcefully from one end of West Pakistan to other. 
Nevertheless, everyone doubted and believed that it was an Indian plot aimed at the 
destruction of Pakistan.
122
 In 1967 government came up with the “Agartala 
Conspiracy” case in which 28 Bengalis including Sheikh Mujibur Rahman were 
accused of having participated in a conspiracy to bring about the secession of 
Pakistan, with Indian help.
 This conspiracy never degraded Sheikh Mujibur Rehman‟s 
political stature instead it boasted the stature of Mujib among the people.
123
 
The Awami league and National Awami Party jointly gave the call for a 
general strike on December 14, 1968 and it was this day that national movement day 
has been facilitated throughout the East Pakistan. From that day onwards, the whole 
of East Pakistan was engulfed in a great movement. Students, workers, people without 
jobs, slum dwellers, beggars, vendors and boys polishing shoes in the streets all joined 
the historic movement in East Pakistan which slowly spread to rural areas and all 
categories of peasants came forward to bring an end to the Ayoub regime.
124
 A 
“Peasants Demands Day” was observed on December 29, 1968 at Maulana 
Bhashani‟s call. There were mass demonstrations and a few died as a result of firing 
by police.
125
 As a result in late 1968 and early 1969 anti-government civil 
disturbances rocked both wings of the Pakistan. In West Pakistan the movement was 
simply anti-regime. In East Pakistan the system was denounced as “a vehicle of west 
Pakistan domination”.126 But Ayoub had already started to demobilize Bengali armed 
strength. The following steps were taken to crush the movement 
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i. To disarm the Bengali officials and other ranks gradually; 
ii. All the Bengali officers in key post in the army, navy and air force to be 
scattered to distant places; 
iii. All the Bengalis in administration were to be replaced by West Pakistanis. 127 
         Public pressure was mounting every day. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman was 
released in February 1969, and was invited to join a round table conference convened 
by President Ayoub in a bid to end the agitation.
 
 
  During this round table conference Mujib stuck to his demand that East 
Pakistan be granted regional autonomy on the basis of six point programme and 
people be given proportional representation in the central legislature. President Ayoub 
refused to fulfill these demands.  President Ayoub resigned, handing over power to 
the Commander-in-Chief of the army General Yuhya Khan on March 25, 1969.
 
Yuhya Khan became the Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA) and commander 
of all the armed forces of martial law.
128
  General Yuhya Khan declared that the new 
administration would follow the same policies and programmes of Ayoub Khan and 
none should have any doubts about the effectiveness of the military Junta of 
Pakistan.
129
 But General Yuhya prepared the ground for a political solution to the 
east-west problem in Pakistan by arranging in December 1971 an election to both 
constituent Assembly as well as National Legislature.
130
 The Awami League party 
conducted its election campaign on the basis of six point programme. Sheikh Mujib 
told the Bengali electorates that elections “should be treated as a referendum on the 
autonomy issue”. However, at the same time Bhashani declared that his party (NAP) 
would boycott the elections.
131
 However, General Yuhya made it clear that no 
constitution would come into existence without the agreement between the East and 
West parties. Yuhya Khan was not unaware of the fact that such an agreement could 
never be reached in view of the different commitments and programmes of various 
parties.
132
 Yuhya Khan was under the misimpression that Awami League and Mujib 
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would not be able to win a majority. General Yuhya ordered elections and it was a 
great day for the people of Pakistan.
133
 In December 1970 elections to the National 
Assembly Awami league scored a landslide victory winning 167 seats in a house of 
313 members. In West-Pakistan it was Zulfkar Ali Bhutto‟s Pakistan People‟s Party 
which won 87 seats and was at the second number.
134
 The friction was already in the 
air between the Pakistan People‟s Party and Awami League. Sheikh Mujib had 
declared during an election campaign that “there can be no constitution except one 
which is based on the six-point programme”. Zulfkar Ali Bhutto, the chairman of 
Pakistan People‟s Party declared the very next day that, “no constitution could be 
framed nor could any government at the centre be run without the cooperation of the 
people‟s party”. Nonetheless the Peoples Party was not prepared to occupy the 
opposition benches.
135
 
The polarization between the two wings of Pakistan threatened the country‟s 
fragile fabric of unity. In the beginning ruling Generals of Pakistan had not a great 
deal of reservation about Pakistan Peoples Party‟s victory because of Bhutto‟s 
pronounced anti-establishment leanings. The ruling junta had done their utmost to 
keep the people‟s party success under reasonable limit that is why the old stalwarts 
like Khan Abdul Quyoom Khan and the rightist parties like Jamaat-e-Islami received 
all but open support of the regime in their fight against People‟s Party, but once the 
People‟s Party had emerged as the strongest force in West Pakistan and with a clear 
majority of West seats in the National Assembly, the ruling regime was not slow to 
change its strategy. The emergence of Pakistan People‟s Party under Z.A. Bhutto as 
the strongest party in West Pakistan with commanding position in the two most 
populous provinces of the West wing proved to be rather tragic as for as East Pakistan 
was concerned. A politically splintered West Pakistan unsure of itself would not have 
been able to resist East Pakistan demands, wills, the degree of arrogance and 
stubbornness that it could do now. Above all army would not have been able to 
exploit such a situation to its advantage to the extent it did as a result of the 
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emergence of Pakistan People‟s Party with a mandate which in effect neutralized the 
Awami League‟s victory in East Pakistan. 
The emergence of a strong West Pakistan Party with a flamboyant and strong 
willed leader like Bhutto and with the right to speak for almost two-thirds majority of 
West Pakistan seriously curtailed the Awami League freedom to manoeuvre the 
changes in the political environment in West Pakistan made it almost impossible that 
the Awami League could be met to its satisfaction. All the elements of a deadlock 
were inbuilt into the situation. 
The army occupied the most pivotal position in the Awami League-Army-
Peoples Party triangle. Because of the impending showdown between the two major 
political parties, the army seemed to hold the balance to Pakistan‟s constitutional 
future. As a result of this peculiar set of circumstances, it was clear that the dice was 
heavily loaded against the Awami League and East Pakistan. While General Yuhya 
Khan, on his visit to Dacca in mid-January 1971, had called Sheikh Mujibur Rahman 
“the future Prime Minister of the country”,136 three days later he explicitly accepted 
the „‟Two Majority Parties Theory” „the Awami League in East Pakistan‟ and the 
„Pakistan People‟s Party in West Pakistan‟ propounded by Bhutto. Talking to 
newsmen in the Bhutto‟s home-town of Larkana in Sind President Yuhya Khan went 
on record to state that, “the people have given their decision in favor of the majority 
parties”. The Awami League autonomy programme threatened to alter the inter-wing 
equation and cut the army down to size primarily by transferring control over 
economic resources to the provinces. Such a state of affairs was clearly unacceptable 
both to the army junta and to Zulfkar Ali Bhutto. The convergence of interests 
between Bhutto and the army was therefore complete in this first stage of 
confrontation with East Pakistan. All this could be prevented only by granting the PPP 
right of veto over every proposed constitutional formula. This was exactly what 
President proceeded to do in an attempt to neutralize the Awami League‟s absolute 
majority in the National Assembly. Talks between Mujib and Bhutto over the future 
constitutional and political setup of the country got really underway only during the 
last week of January 1971 when the Pakistan People‟s Party leaders visited Dacca. 
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There had been certain initial contacts between the two parties before the delegation 
had visited Dacca. The Mujib-Bhutto talks ended without any success. The wide gulf 
between the two parties on vital constitutional question was brought into sharp focus. 
While Bhutto accepted the first and sixth point of Awami League‟s Six Point 
programme, he also expressed his inability to accept the other four especially the two 
points concerning the transfer of control over taxation and foreign exchange earnings 
to the provinces.  
President Yuhya Khan‟s decision to postpone the holding of March session of 
the National Assembly acted as the proverbial last straw which broke the East 
Pakistani camel‟s back. On the other hand Awami League leadership had been under 
constant pressure both from within the party and outside not to compromise with the 
military junta. Sheikh Mujib‟s relatively conciliatory posture began to lose ground 
under the pressure of events. By postponing the National Assembly session, President 
Yuhya Khan- representing the military-bureaucratic establishment- had made it clear 
that East Pakistani‟s would not be allowed to rule from Islamabad.137 The incident 
also demonstrated that in this venture President Yuhya Khan had the whole-hearted 
support of the new West Pakistani political elite represented by Bhutto. The Awami 
League‟s stand that, as the largest party in Pakistan with an absolute majority in the 
National Assembly it had the right to mould the future constitutional and political 
setup according to its policy and programme was thus blown to pieces. The foremost 
advocates and the self styled defenders of Pakistan‟s unity and integrity dealt the 
death blow to the very concept of Pakistan by refusing to accord the Awami League 
the status of the majority party in an all-Pakistan context. On March 1, 1971 the Six-
Point Programme of the Awami League passed into history. 
After having been denied the right to rule from Islamabad, the Awami 
League‟s strategy shifted beyond the six-point programme to an even more loosely 
knit confederation where it would be really immaterial as to who ruled at the centre. 
The formal unity of Pakistan was still to be maintained. The concept of Pakistan had 
not been completely discarded by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman even on March 1, 1971.  
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Finally, Sheikh Mujib started an unprecedentedly successful non- cooperation 
movement against the centre. All East Pakistanis including High court judges, top 
civil servants, and police joined in the Civil Disobedience Movement from March 1-
25, 1971.
138
 General Yuhya and his associates held talks with the East Pakistani 
leaders from March 16, 1971 to March 25, 1971 but could not reach to an agreeable 
solution.  While all this was going on, president Yuhya khan dissolved his civilian 
cabinet which was made on August 5, 1969, and presided over a meeting of military 
governors; MLAs and the Air force and Navy chiefs in Rawalpindi and it became 
clear that General Yuhya Khan had prepared the ground for “operation genocide”.139  
Sheikh Mujib while addressing the pressmen declared, “Only for the sake of a 
minority party disagreement, the democratic process of constitution making had been 
obstructed and the National Assembly session had been postponed by the suppression 
of majority party and we cannot allow it to go unchallenged”. 140   
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Rayerbazar killing field photographed immediately after the war, showing dead bodies of intellectuals 
(Image courtesy: Rashid Talukdar, 1971). 
 It was the intervening night of 24-25 March when Yuhya Khan put an end to his so-
called efforts for a settlement of the political impasse. In the early hours “Operation 
Genocide” had begun and troops had started ransacking homes of peaceful and 
unarmed civilians. First, they had given some attention to disarming, humiliating and 
killing men of the East Bengal Regiment, East Pakistan Rifles, and East Pakistan 
Police.
141
 The foreign news men were ordered to leave East Pakistan as soon as 
possible so that the news of happenings in East Bengal did not reach outside. Lt. Gen. 
Tika Khan has reported to have told an army group, “we are not interested in people, 
what we want is land”.142  Dhaka University was a special target for the mass killings 
where in a single day, the army killed over 50 top professors and other senior 
teachers.
 
The army demolished schools, colleges, mosques, temples, hostels and 
industrial areas. Maulana Bhashani in a statement said that; 
―Yuhya, who is a Muslim himself, in the name of religion, is mercilessly 
killing lakhs of Muslims, Hindus, Christians and Buddhists. His 
soldiers, who say they are Muslims, are raping women, including 
Muslim women. Though Muslims themselves, they are destroying 
mosques; they kill Muslims who are offering prayers, what will Muslim 
world do about this? Will they support the un-Islamic, anti-humanity, 
abominable policy of Yuhya? Or will they support the cause of truth, 
justice and love preached by Islam?‖ 143 
  It was here that an open Indian involvement emerged which formed an 
important factor within the East Pakistani political scenario. India put her support 
behind the resistance movement and assisted in the organization, training, sanctuary 
and supply of the arms to the Mukti Bahini or Bangladesh Liberation Army.
144
 By 
early April 1971, except Sheikh Mujib and his constitutional advisor Dr. Kamal 
Husain, most of the central leaders of Awami league including Syed Nazrul Islam, 
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Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmad and General M.A.G Usmani were in India.
145
 These 
leaders felt the need for a provisional government in order to draw the international 
sympathy and support. On April 8-9, 1971 there was a meeting at Agartala of these 
leaders. On April 10, 1971 with the acquiescence of the Indian government, it 
announced the formation of a provisional government of the independent, “Peoples 
Republic of Bangladesh”. Sheikh Mujib was proclaimed as president while Syed 
Nazrul Islam and Tajuddin Ahmad were respectively appointed as Acting President 
and Prime Minister.
146
 The provisional government of Bangladesh was sworn in on 
April 10, 1971 at a brief ceremony. Prime Minister Tajuddin Ahmad said,  
―Pakistan is dead, murdered by Yuhya Khan - and independent 
Bangladesh is a reality sustained by the indestructible will and courage 
of 75 million Bengalis‖.  
Towards the end of the Oct 1971, the Mukti Bahini under the commandership 
of Gen. Usmani had intensified their operations inside East Pakistan and on its 
borders.
 147
 On November 21, 1971 Pakistan army launched an attack against the 
infiltrators around Boyra; the Indian army which was already waiting for the signal 
launched an attack against Jessore sector, on the night of November 20-21, 1971.  
This was the first time where an Indian army launched a direct and open attack on the 
Pakistan army.
148
 On November 24, Mrs. Gandhi told parliament that the Indian 
armed forces had been instructed to enter East Pakistan in “self defense”.  This 
considerably raised the morale of “Mukti Bahini‟. On 23 Nov president Yuhya issued 
a proclamation of emergency.
149
 On December 3, 1971 the dice was cast with the 
Pakistan pre- emptive firing on thirteen major North Indian airports. President Yuhya 
Khan made a public statement on November 25, 1971 that he would launch a war 
against India “within ten days”. Strategically the situation was hopeless for Pakistan 
which faced a war on two fronts. Indian troops attacked from all points of the 
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compass, the guerrillas took possession of the north and East.
150
  Within nine months 
from the start of this operation about 10 million people crossed into India who came 
at the rate of about 40,000 per day. As the Time Magazine noted, “Pakistan military 
crackdown took a terrible toll: Perhaps 1,000,000 dead, 10 million refugees, untold 
thousands homeless, hungry and sick”. When the war between India and Pakistan on 
Bangladesh broke out the guerrillas had already liberated about one-fourth of the East 
Pakistan territory.
151 
 
Thereafter India recognized Bangladesh on December 6, 1971. The Indian 
troops finally entered Dacca and General A. A. K Niaizi, the commander- in-Chief of 
the Pakistan army in East Pakistan offered his unconditional surrender to Lt. General 
Jagit Singh Arora, the Indian Army Chief in charge of operation in the Eastern 
Theater, on 16 December 1971. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lieutenant General A. A. K. Niazi (right) signing the Instrument of Surrender while surrendering to 
Lieutenant General Jagjit Singh Arora of the Indian Army (left). 
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The war of 1971 lasted for only 14 days.
152
 This historic event brought an end 
to the rule of West Pakistan over East Pakistan (Bangladesh). The government and the 
people of Bangladesh proclaimed independence on March 26, 1971, and decided to 
observe December 16 every year as Independence Day.
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Chapter 2 
outh Asia or Southern Asia is the Southern region of the Asian continent which 
comprises the sub-Himalayan countries; includes the adjoining countries on the 
west and east. It is vast area which comprises of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Nepal, Maldives and Sri Lanka. South Asia is the land of great ethnic, religious, 
cultural and linguistic diversities. India‟s multi dimensional outlook is acting an 
embryo for all neighboring countries and each country possesses a well recognized 
share in India. Bangladesh, which lies on the extreme east side of India has a greater 
share of Muslim population, occupies a visible corner of the South Asian map and 
shares an amicable and decent history with India. The Muslim population plus the 
friendly relation between the two countries since the inception of Bangladesh has, 
therefore, cultivated a good understanding among the political leadership which gave 
fillip to both countries to forward their future plans.
154
  
The Indian National Congress came into existence in 1885 and formally led 
the freedom struggle of India. From its very beginning the Congress party took a very 
deep interest and based its position on certain fundamental principles which 
ultimately shaped the future foreign policy of India. Since its very beginning congress 
objected the use of Indian soil as a base for political manoeuring or military moves 
against its surrounding areas such as Tibet, Afghanistan and Persia.
155
 
The period between 1920 -1947 should be considered the time when the 
fundamental terms of reference for independent India‟s foreign policy were 
formulated. Since then India has been in the process of consolidating its new national 
identity amidst of its various diversities. There may be different interpretations about 
the politico-territorial identity of India during British times, but it is the first time in 
the recorded history that the people of the sub-continent India have welded 
themselves into a nation state in 1946-47.  
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In 1920, a foreign policy department was established under the veteran leader 
and statesman Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru. In 1921, at Delhi All India Congress 
Committee passed a resolution on foreign policy which included a statement that, “the 
present government of India in no way represent Indian opinion.”156  In late 1930‟s 
the Congress condemned the aggressive acts of Nazis and Fascists and it also declared 
that it would not be party to imperialist war. In 1939, in Tripura session the congress 
strongly disapproved the British foreign policy and disassociated itself from the 
war.
157
  During World War II, Congress totally disapproved the war and pursued her 
path of peace and freedom. Jawaharlal Nehru was the first prime minister and first 
foreign minister of India from 1947 till his death in 1964. The foundations of India‟s 
foreign policy were firmly laid by him. Like any other foreign policy maker Nehru 
underlined India‟s national interest as the basic guiding principle. Nehru declared as 
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early as September 7, 1946, principle objectives of India‟s foreign policy. In a 
broadcast to the nation he said, 
 ―We shall take full part in international conferences as a free nation 
with our own policy and not merely as a satellite of another nation. We 
hope to develop close and direct contacts with nations and to 
cooperate with them in the furtherance of world peace and 
freedom……. We are particularly interested in the emancipation of 
colonial and dependent countries and peoples and in the recognition in 
theory and practice of equal opportunities for all races‖.158 
Foreign policy makers of India set out certain objectives before they proceed 
to lay down basic principles and formulate the policy. Several of these objectives are 
common though the degree of emphasis always vary. A former foreign secretary of 
India Muchkund Dubey says, 
 
    “The primary purpose of any country‘s foreign policy is to promote its 
national interest, to ensure its security, safeguard its security, 
contribute to its growth and prosperity and generally enhance its 
stature, should also be able to serve the broader purpose of promoting 
peace, disarmament and development and of establishing a stable, fair 
and equitable global order‖.159   
The purpose of peace, disarmament and an equitable global order may at times 
be in conflict with national security, sovereignty and development. As Dubey says in 
the medium and long run the former may also serve the national interest. The goals of 
Indian foreign policy are simple and straight forward. The primary and overriding 
goal has always been the maintenance and promotion of international peace and 
security.
 160
 The ideals and objectives of domestic as well as foreign policy have been 
enshrined in the constitution. To promote world peace has always been at the centre of 
India‟s foreign policy. When the foreign policy of India was formulated after 
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independence the world circumstances at that time were volatile and so it was in this 
situation that India decided that world peace would be a cardinal feature of India‟s 
foreign policy.
161
  
The other related objectives of India‟s foreign policy were to root out other 
causes of war by measures such as liberation of subjected people and elimination of 
racial discrimination. In order to achieve this goal India decided to follow an 
independent foreign policy without being any big power‟s camp follower. It would 
also require total faith in and support to the United Nations. 
Another objective of India‟s foreign policy is elimination of want, disease, and 
illiteracy.
162
 These were and are ills not only of Indian society but also of most of the 
developing countries of Asia and Africa. Because of this India choose to cooperate 
with various international agencies so that it could make its contribution in fighting 
diseases, starvation, poverty, illiteracy and famine in various underdeveloped 
countries. Organizations like World Health Organization (WHO), Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), The United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF), 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) not only 
benefited India but India also wanted to use these institutions to help the entire 
mankind.
163
  
Lastly India‟s objective has been to maintain friendly relations with all, avoid 
military alliances follow the policy of non-alignment as a moral principle, seek 
peaceful settlement of international disputes and promote universal brotherhood and 
humanism by following and advocating the five principles contained in Panchsheel. 
India has tried to faithfully observe the ideals of non-interference and peaceful co-
existence. All the objectives have been sought to be achieved through these principles 
of India‟s foreign policy. Although wars were fought with Pakistan and China, but 
India has remained committed to pacific settlement of disputes between the nations. 
India has been seeking to pursue friendly relations with all the countries particularly 
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with the immediate neighbours like Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, Bhutan, Nepal, 
Bhutan and Sri Lanka etc.
164
 
Principles of Indian Foreign Policy 
The major principles of India‟s foreign policy can be traced to policies pursued 
by Indian National Congress during the pre-independence period. Shortly after 
independence Indian National Congress met at Jaipure session and made it clear that, 
―The foreign policy of India must necessarily be based on the principles 
that have guided the Congress in the past years. These principles are 
promotion of world peace, the freedom of all nations, racial equality 
and ending of imperialism and colonialism. It should be the constant of 
the foreign policy of India to maintain friendly and cooperative 
relations with all nations and to avoid entanglement in military or 
similar alliances which tend to divide up the world in rival groups and 
thus endanger the world”.165 
The principles of Indian foreign policy are as follows: 
1. Non-alignment:  
The policy of non-alignment is the most important contribution of India to 
international community. Non-alignment means a fundamental principle of foreign 
policy under which a nation while keeping herself away from cold war and military 
alliances actively participates in international relations on the basis of both its prudent 
national interests and the demands of international objectives of peace and security.
166
 
It is the principle of foreign policy which stands for keeping out of alliances in 
general and military pacts in particular. Immediately after the end of Second World 
War, a new and unprecedented tension developed between the erstwhile friends and 
allies. The acute state of tension came to known as cold war.
167
 The world got divided 
into two blocs led by the United States of America and former Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR), respectively. India made up its mind not to join any of 
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the power blocs. Indian decision to follow an independent foreign policy was dictated 
essentially by its national interest and also by its belief in moral values attached to the 
ideal of friendship among all and pursuit of world peace.
168
 India had decided to 
devote its energies to its economic development. India made it clear that it would 
reserve the right to freely express its opinion on international problems. India‟s 
geographical position and its location at the junction of south East Asia and Middle 
East and its strategic position in the Indian Ocean and as a neighbour of communist 
china in the North–made it imperative to keep away from military alliances. The 
policy of non-alignment is in accordance with the Indian philosophy and tradition.
169
 
 
2. Panchsheel and Peaceful Co-existence: 
Peaceful co-existence of nations of diverse ideologies and interests is an 
important principle of Indian foreign policy. It means that nations inhabited by 
peoples belonging to different religions and having different social systems can co-
exist, live together in peace while each follows its own system. This basic Indian 
philosophy was formally recognized when in 1954 India and china signed the famous 
declaration of five principles or Panchsheel as the basis of their mutual relationship.
170
 
These five principles are:- 
i. Mutual respect for each other‟s territorial integrity and sovereignty; 
ii. Mutual non-aggression; 
iii. Mutual non-interference in each other‟s internal affairs; 
iv. Peaceful Co-existence;  
v. Equality and mutual benefit;171  
3. Anti-imperialism: 
Anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism have been a matter of faith with India‟s 
foreign policy makers. Having been a victim of British imperialism for a long time, 
India decided to oppose all forms of colonialism and imperialism. Therefore it 
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decided to extend full support to the cause of freedom of dependent peoples of Asia 
and Africa.
172
 One of the first decisions that Nehru‟s Interim Government took was to 
recall the Indian troops sent by the British to suppress the freedom struggles in the 
Dutch and French colonies.
173
 India fully supported the freedom struggles in Asian 
and African countries such as Malaya, Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia etc. India 
considered denial of freedom to colonial peoples as a violation of fundamental human 
rights and a source of international conflict.
174
 
 
4. Opposition to Racial Discrimination:  
India firmly believes in equality of all human beings. Its policy has been 
aimed at opposition to all forms of racial discrimination. South Africa was the worst 
example of discrimination against and exploitation of the colored people‟s including 
the people of Indian origin. India has consistently supported the establishment of an 
egalitarian human society in which discrimination based on color, race, class etc. does 
not exist.
175
 India firmly believes that racialism is one of the sources of conflict in the 
world and therefore a threat to international peace and security. India gave a full 
support to the cause of victims of racial discrimination in South Africa. India had not 
only cut off diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1949, but also used her 
influence in application of comphrenssive sanctions against the white minority racist 
regime of South Africa. It was only in early 1994 that apartheid was finally given up 
and a majority government was elected and installed under the leadership of Nelson 
Mandela.
176 
5. Support to the United Nations:  
India is one the founding members of the United Nations Organisation and 
many of its specialized agencies. It has full faith in the international organizations and 
agencies. India firmly believes in international peace and security. India does not 
                                                          
172
  Ibid. p.35. 
173
  V. N Khanna, Op.cit, p.32. 
174
  M. S Rajan, Studies on India‘s Foreign Policy, ABC Publishing House, New Delhi,  1993, p.288.  
175
  Ibid. p.289.  
176
  T. Ramakrishna Reddy, India‘s Policy in the United Nations, Farleigh Dickinson University press, 
p.29. 
support the nuclear weapons, wants their elimination and considerable reduction of 
conventional weapons and armed forces. India has continuously supported the efforts 
for universalisation of the United Nations.
177 
6. Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes:  
Disputes among nations are unavoidable but solutions are to be amicable. 
There can be only two methods of settling the international disputes: war, or peaceful 
settlement. India‟s foreign policy goal is pacific (peaceful) settlement of all disputes – 
here the emphasis is on “peaceful” rather than “settlement”. Prof. M.S. Rajan says 
that, “this is of course a corollary to the major and primary objective of promoting 
international peace and security”.178 India does not believe in negotiation through 
strength because that is illogical. India has made it a matter of faith to help and seek 
peaceful settlement of disputes. Although India herself had to face wars imposed upon 
her but its faith in pacific means is not shaken.
179
  
The civil war which broke out in the East Pakistan since 1969 resulted in the 
widening gap between the two wings of Pakistan.  India became very much worried at 
the ongoing events in East Pakistan which bordered India. She decided to adopt a very 
cautious approach to the crisis and Prime Minister of India Mrs. Indra Gandhi 
indicated that there was no question of closing her borders with Pakistan and decided 
to render humanitarian assistance to the refugees who were pouring in India, as it 
seemed her that things went beyond the control with the repressive measures of the 
West Pakistan over the East Pakistan.
180
 The crisis ensued debates and discussions 
throughout the country and in parliament, Sardar Swaran Sing the then External 
Affairs Minister told the Lok Sabha that the government viewed the developments in 
East Pakistan with grave concern.
181
 The civil war had created gigantic problems of 
refugees for India. On May 24, 1971, Mrs. Indra Gandhi admitted the same in the Lok 
Sabha and warned of the grave situation created by the influx of refugees and urged 
for the political solution of the problem.
182
 India raised the issue in all the world 
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forums particularly in the United Nations, Afro-Asia Conferences and in the Geneva 
Convention.  
Though India was one of the prime supporters in the successful emergence of 
Bangladesh as an independent state but traces of its involvement and encouragement 
in its inception differs widely. Some Pakistanis have maintained that India had been 
working towards this goal since 1947, in collaboration with anti-Pakistan elements in 
East Pakistan. This was for instance, the basis for the Agartala Conspiracy Case 
against Sheikh Mujibur Rahman manufactured by President Ayoub Khan of Pakistan 
in 1968.
183 
The existence of dissatisfaction and dissidence in East Pakistan on account of 
the discriminatory and repressive policies of the West Pakistan wing was not lost on 
India. This can be substantiated by taking into consideration the attitude of India 
towards internal problems of East Pakistan. The student demonstrations in Dacca in 
1948 and 1952 against the imposition of Urdu as the national language served as 
reaffirmation of India's belief in the fallacy of the "two-nation" theory. Developments 
like this always gave a vicarious satisfaction to India and whetted the desire of some 
elements in India to contribute to the sharpening of Pakistan's internal contradictions. 
Such sentiments occasionally found expression in the Government of India's 
publicity. Official media not infrequently would succumb to the temptation of 
projecting the essential cultural affinity between people of East Bengal and West 
Bengal, emphasizing the conflict of interests between East Pakistan and West 
Pakistan. This could be regarded as a manifestation of an Indian attitude in regard to 
the secessionist potentialities of East Pakistan, even though it was a rather instinctive 
and unconscious attitude, and is not necessarily evidence of an active secessionist 
policy. India had strong inhibitions in following such a policy, partly because this 
went against India's declared policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other 
countries, and partly because of extremely inadequate resources for pursuing such a 
policy.
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Another school of thought believes that India has always been neutral to 
Pakistan's internal contradictions, and became involved in the crisis only when ten 
million refugees flooded into India in the wake of the Pakistan army's repression in 
East Pakistan. The truth seems to lie somewhere in between, for it would be giving 
less than due credit to India if it is suggested that it was completely oblivious to its 
national interest as affected by developments in the neighborhood. Similarly, there is 
little substantive evidence to indicate that India consistently worked for Pakistan's 
disintegration since 1947.
185 
However, the question whether India should pursue an active secessionist 
policy towards East Pakistan was debated from time to time, particularly when 
Pakistan's political system was under severe strains. One such occasion was March 
1969, when President Ayoub Khan had to resign in response to a mass agitation 
against him.
186
  On an occasion like this, India was naturally seized with the problem 
of formulating its response. It is, therefore, probable that some sensitive government 
departments concerned with processing and analyzing strategic information examined 
the extent of internal decay in Pakistan's political system and the likely shape of 
things to come. Obviously, such an examination would include an analysis of whether 
East Pakistan's discontent was strong enough to carry within itself the germs of 
secession, and whether it was desirable or even feasible for India to lend a helping 
hand to secessionist forces. An equally relevant subject would have been whether or 
not an independent East Pakistan would be a viable state. But judging by New Delhi's 
reactions to the various measures undertaken by President Yuhya Khan to erect a 
democratic political system, it can be safely inferred that India did not pursue its 
analysis of the secessionist potentialities of East Pakistan beyond an examination 
stage. In fact, there was increasing evidence of hope in governmental and intellectual 
circles that East Pakistan could be integrated into the political structure of Pakistan if 
free and fair elections were held by Yuhya Khan. No one in India expected that the 
Awami League headed by Sheikh Mujibur would get an overwhelming majority of 
seats as it did in both the National Assembly of Pakistan and the Provincial Assembly 
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of East Pakistan. What was regarded as fairly certain, however, was that the Awami 
League would get a comfortable majority in the Provincial Assembly, and enough 
seats in the National Assembly to form a government with the support of like-minded 
parties such as the National Awami Party at the centre.
187 
This hope was strengthened after the election results came out. The Awami 
League secured 288 of 300 general seats in the Provincial Assembly and 160 of 300 
general seats in the National Assembly. There was, thus, no further justification for 
giving any serious thought to supporting a secessionist policy in East Pakistan. India 
watched the Pakistani situation with a mixture of hope and suspicion. The hope was 
that Sheikh Mujibur would be allowed to become the Prime Minister of Pakistan and 
would bring about a basic change in Pakistan's attitude towards India. India's 
optimism on this was strengthened by Yuhya Khan's statement in Dacca on January 
14, 1971 that Mujibur Rahman was going to be the future Prime Minister of the 
country. It was accompanied by the suspicion that vested interests of West Pakistan 
would not allow Mujibur to become the Prime Minister. There was also the fear that 
in this event any resistance in East Pakistan would be crushed by Yuhya Khan leading 
to the reestablishment of military control.
188
  
India for the first time accepted the necessity of having an active policy with 
respect to East Pakistan only after March 25, 1971, when the spontaneous resistance 
of the people of East Pakistan to the repression by the Pakistani army had lasted for at 
least a week. As it turned out, the first phase of resistance of the people of East 
Pakistan led by the East Bengal Regiment and the East Pakistan Armed Police 
continued up to the end of April. From here onwards, the shaping of India's response 
to the developing situation in East Pakistan went through various stages.
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The first stage was marked by a general sense of solidarity on the part of the 
people of India with the victims of the Pakistani army's brutalities, and a vague 
realization by India that it had a long term and fundamental identity of interests with 
the people of East Pakistan. This sense of solidarity and identity of interests found 
expression in the Indian Parliament's unanimous resolution of March 31, 1971 in 
which the Parliament assured the people of East Pakistan that their struggle and 
sacrifices would receive "the wholehearted sympathy and support of the people of 
India." There was, however, considerable wishful thinking on the part of India, 
reflected in exaggerated stories in the Indian press about the achievements of the 
"freedom fighters" in East Pakistan.
190
  
The next stage in the shaping of India's response lasted from April to June 
1971. During this period, India became increasingly aware of the economic and 
political implications of the flood of refugees pouring in from East Pakistan. The 
inflow of refugees reached 100,000 by the middle of April, and assumed the 
proportion of 60,000 per day by the beginning of June. While the government was 
grappling with the refugee problem, some sort of contingency planning was 
presumably started by the government during this period to meet a situation of 
sustained confrontation between the people of East Pakistan and the Pakistani army, 
with its inevitable repercussions on India. Therefore, the attitude of the Government 
of India based on an assessment of the social, economic, political, and security 
implications of a continuing influx of refugees can be described as follows:  
i. Pakistan should be persuaded to behave in such a way that the migration of 
refugees from East Pakistan stopped; 
ii. Conditions should be created in East Pakistan so that refugees who had 
already crossed into India felt secure enough to return to their homes; and 
iii. The refugees who had come to India should not be regarded as the permanent 
responsibility of India. As long as they were in India, the responsibility for 
their maintenance should be shared by the international community.
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The Foreign Minister of India undertook a tour of six foreign countries from 
June 6-22, 1971 in an attempt to appraise the world of the prevailing situation in East 
Pakistan and India's attitude thereto along the lines mentioned above. The places 
visited by the Foreign Minister were Moscow, Bonn, Paris, Ottawa, New York, 
Washington and London. While this visit gave India an opportunity to explain its 
viewpoint and assess the reaction of important foreign powers, it also enabled India to 
crystallize its attitude a little more precisely in the light of the viewpoints of various 
countries.
192
 The Foreign Minister enunciated India's position at the end of his visit in 
the course of a statement made in the Parliament on June 25, 1971. India's position, as 
stated on this occasion, can be summed up as follows.  
First, there could be no military solution to the East Pakistan problem, and all 
military action must immediately stop.  
Second, the flow of refugees into India from East Pakistan must immediately 
stop.  
Third, conditions must be created in East Pakistan enabling the refugees to 
return to their homes in peace and security.  
Fourth, a political solution acceptable to the East Pakistanis was the only way 
of ensuring a return to normalcy.  
Finally, the present situation was grave, and fraught with serious dangers for 
the peace and security of the region.
193
  
It may be noted at this time that India was primarily concerned with the grave 
implications of the inflow of refugees on peace and security in the region. So far, the 
thought that India might have to defend itself militarily against a Pakistani attack had 
not occurred to India. The primary question was how to stop military action, and find 
a political solution to the problem so that refugees could go home and East Pakistan 
could continue to live happily as an integral part of Pakistan. The emergence of 
Bangladesh as a separate state as a consequence of the struggle going on at that time 
had not yet been perceived as a serious possibility in India. 
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But certain other developments occurred at the same time have somehow 
changed the attitude of India
194
. These developments and their effect on the shaping of 
India's response to the East Pakistan situation can be traced in the news as originated 
in Washington on June 22, 1971, that two Pakistani ships had left the U.S. with 
American arms and military equipment for Pakistan. Even though the news was 
categorically denied by a spokesman of the U.S. Government, it seriously disturbed 
India's policy makers who thought it to be a deliberate effort to influence the South 
Asian situation in favor of Pakistan.
195
  
  The next important development was President Yuhya Khan's harsh 
constitutional plan on June 28, 1971. Under this plan, Yuhya Khan announced that 
members of both the Provincial Assembly and the National Assembly who had 
participated in "anti-state" activities would be disqualified from membership in their  
respective Assemblies, and that by-elections for their seats would he held. Besides the 
amendment of Legal Framework Order 1970, under which the general elections were 
held would be duly amended, and the national and provincial governments would 
continue to operate under Martial Law for an additional period of time. These steps 
predictably evoked a strong reaction in East Pakistan. On July 6-7, 1971, over 300 
elected representatives from East Pakistan, including members of the national and 
provincial assemblies, met somewhere in East Pakistan and reaffirmed their 
determination to carry on the liberation struggle. They ruled out any political 
compromise with the Pakistan government and decided to continue the guerrilla 
struggle against the Pakistani Army. They also appealed to the UN Secretary General 
to make efforts to stop the "genocide" in East Pakistan and seek the release of Sheikh 
Mujibur Rehman. This decision of the representatives of the people of East Pakistan 
not to compromise with the Pakistan Government but to carry forward the liberation 
struggle had an inevitable impact on the attitude of the Government of India.
196
 
The other significant development was the visit of Henry Kissinger to New 
Delhi. New Delhi‟s visit became the occasion for a rather tense dialogue between the 
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United States and India on the question of the supply of arms to Pakistan. However, 
what lent particular significance to Kissinger's visit to the sub-continent was that 
during this visit he made a secret dash from Rawalpindi to Peking to commence the 
process of detente between the U.S. and China.
197
 This was, of course, a crucial and 
unexpected development in international politics and one that was likely to have 
serious repercussions on the politics of the sub- continent. It therefore became 
necessary for India to assess the emerging situation for itself. A considered statement 
on this subject was made by the Foreign Minister in Parliament on July 20, in the 
course of his reply to the debate on budget demands. Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran 
Singh said,  
―I sincerely hope that any Sino-American detente will not be at the 
expense of other countries, particularly in this region. However, we 
cannot at present totally rule out such a possibility. It can have 
repercussions on the situation in this sub-continent, as well as in this 
region. We have, therefore, for some time been considering ways and 
means of preventing such a situation from arising, and meeting it if it 
should arise. In this, we are not alone, and there are other countries, 
both big and small, who may be more perturbed than we are. We are in 
touch with the countries concerned and shall see to it that any Sino-
American detente does not affect us or the other countries in this region 
adversely.
198
     
This statement clearly indicates that India had started formulating its response 
in consultation with friendly countries in the event that the Sino-American detente 
proving harmful to its interests in the sub-continent. With the benefit of hindsight, one 
could speculate now that the Indo-Soviet treaty which was signed on August 9, 1971 
was then in the making from the Foreign Minister's statement that India had been 
"considering ways and means of preventing such a situation from arising, and meeting 
it if it would arise," and also that India was "not alone" in this respect. One can, 
therefore, infer that the visit of Henry Kissinger to Peking via Rawalpindi constituted 
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in itself an important stage in the evolution and formulation of India's attitude towards 
the East Pakistan question, for this visit set in motion a series of steps by India to 
strengthen its security against a possible Pakistani attack, either by itself or with the 
acquiescence of the U.S. and China. One of these steps was the signing of the Indo-
Soviet Friendship Treaty.
199
 
While Kissinger was visiting the sub-continent, reports of further supplies of 
arms by the U.S. to Pakistan kept pouring in. One such report stating that fresh arms 
worth $35 million had been dispatched to Pakistan originated with Senator Church on 
July 7, 1971. Moreover, shortly after Kissinger's visit to Pakistan, President Yuhya 
Khan gave further evidence of intransigence and arrogance on the East Pakistan 
question. Talking to a correspondent of the Financial Times of London on July 19, 
1971 President Yuhya Khan said that he would declare war on India "if India made 
any attempt to seize any part of East Pakistan. Any such attempt would be treated as 
an attack on Pakistan. I shall declare war, let the world note." To this Yuhya Khan 
added, "Nor will Pakistan be alone." This show of arrogance and the claim that 
Pakistan was not alone was believed in India to be directly attributable to Kissinger's 
visit to Rawalpindi in the first week of July.
200
 He gave further cause of provocation 
to the people of East Pakistan when he told the Financial Times correspondent on July 
20, 1971 that Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, would shortly be tried for treason which was 
punishable by death. By the end of July, 3,500,000 refugees had come to India from 
East Pakistan since May 20 1971, when Yuhya Khan had made a statement inviting 
all bonafide citizens of Pakistan to return. In other words, the political situation in 
East Pakistan was worsening in every sense and was making it incumbent on India to 
reconsider and reformulate its attitude.
201
 
The Indian Foreign Minister's budget speech on July 20, 1971 in the lower 
house gave many hints of a reformulated attitude on the East Pakistan question. This 
could perhaps be regarded as the consequence of a reaction and response to the 
developments noted above. The various elements of the reformulated response can be 
summarized as follows:  
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i. The Foreign Minister put on record the fact that the activities of freedom 
fighters had now assumed tangible proportions by saying, "it is the 
determination and the effectiveness of these freedom fighters which appear to 
have rattled President Yuhya Khan, and he is now trying to find excuses by 
saying that if any area is liberated, then he would declare war. It is obvious 
that he feels the pressure of the activities of the freedom fighters, he has tried 
to divert the attention of the international community in another direction."  
ii. The Foreign Minister for the first time admitted that India was helping the 
freedom fighters in Bangladesh by saying that, "this parliament has 
unanimously adopted a resolution pledging sympathy and support, and we are 
pursuing that resolution in the best possible manner, and we are doing 
everything possible to lend support to the freedom fighters." 
iii. The Foreign Minister categorically declared that India was ready to defend 
itself and said that, "if the Mukti Fauj succeeds in liberating the territory in 
Bangladesh, and Pakistan uses it as a pre-text for an attack on us, and then I 
must make it clear that we are ready to defend ourselves."
202
 
  These three elements taken together constitute an advance over the Indian 
attitude a month earlier, for it meant that India was no longer thinking of a purely 
political solution of the East Pakistan question but was also preparing for a military 
response if the situation demanded. A few days later, the Foreign Minister gave 
further expression to India's readiness to resort to military action if it was provoked. 
While commenting on President Yuhya Khan's threat that Sheikh Mujibur would be 
court martialled and might be executed the Indian Foreign Minister said,  
"Should any harm be caused to the person of Sheikh Mujibur Rehman 
or his family and colleagues, the present situation in Bangladesh 
would be immeasurably aggravated and the present Pakistani rulers 
will be solely responsible for the consequences……. We express our 
condemnation of the proposed action and warn the Government of 
Pakistan of its serious consequences."
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A comphrenssive exposition of India‟s views was made by its External Affairs 
Minister Swaran Singh during the plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 27 
September 1971. He made the following points:  
i. The consequences of the influx of refugees were grave and multidimensional 
for India; 
ii. It was not just another problem for Indo-Pakistan relations: India was in no 
way responsible for the happenings in the eastern wing of Pakistan; 
iii. The problem of East Pakistan was a matter of concern for the international 
community; 
iv. The problem of refugees was indeed a secondary problem arising from the 
other basic problems;  
v. The real cause was political, it was the alienation of East Pakistan from the 
mainstream politics and administration;  
vi. A political settlement acceptable to the elected representatives of the people 
was the only way to resolve the conflict and get the refugees back to their 
homes; 
vii. A beginning towards the political solution should be made with the release of 
Sheikh Mujibur Rehman who was then in West Pakistan.
204
 
While giving and analyzing a preliminary report about the Indian strategic 
diplomatic attitude following elements could be deduced.  
First, India was trying to put pressure on Yuhya Khan through various friendly 
Governments to release Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, stop military action in East 
Pakistan and hold consultation with the elected representatives from East 
Pakistan.  
Second, India would not hesitate in continuing to strengthen the Mukti Bhani 
“Liberation Forces”.  
Third, while stating categorically that India wanted to avoid war and that the 
East Pakistan refugees should return to their homes, India was preparing 
herself for an all out war with Pakistan if the need arose. 
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Finally India had started sounding out other friendly governments and not as 
friendly as to how they would react if war would come.      
On the other hand the Pakistani representative Mohammad Ali raised the 
following points: 
i. The figures of the refugees crossing over from East Pakistan had been 
exaggerated by India; 
ii. India was guilty of a clandestine war against Pakistan;  
iii. Whatever Pakistan was doing in East Pakistan it was doing on its own 
territory, it was therefore, an internal affair of Pakistan, and India was nobody 
to bring it up in the United Nations.
205
 
The government of Pakistan also issued a White Paper on the East Pakistan 
crisis on August 5, 1971 and alleged that India was interfering in the internal affairs. 
It further recalled the historical perspectives and reported that the top ranking Indian 
leaders never accepted the establishment of Pakistan. The White Paper implicated 
India in the East Pakistan crisis. To support anti-state elements in East Pakistan India 
moved its troops in civilian clothes to the East Pakistan frontiers and assisted the 
rebels with jeeps and other vehicles.
206
  
In the midst of these indications of Pakistan's intentions, Prime Minister Indira 
Gandhi of India undertook a visit to Moscow towards the end of September. This was 
a crucial visit in the evolution of Indian policy on the East Pakistan question. While 
the Prime Minister tried to gauge the latest assessment of the Soviet leaders in regard 
to the South Asian situation, she left them in no doubt that she was not at all satisfied 
with the attitude of the big powers. Speaking at a Luncheon in Moscow on September 
28, Mrs. Gandhi said,  
―The international response has fallen short of the scale which a grim 
tragedy of this magnitude demands.... The growing agony of the people 
of East Bengal does not seem to have moved many Governments. Our 
restraint has been appreciated only in words. The basic issues involved, 
                                                          
205
  Government of India, India Speaks, Publication Division, New Delhi, 1971, p.3. 
206
  White Paper on the Crisis in East Pakistan, Govt. of Pakistan, August 5, 1971, p.23. 
and the real threat to peace and stability in Asia are being largely 
ignored‖.207  
On her return, Mrs. Gandhi found increasing evidence of a concentration of 
Pakistani troops on India's borders in both Western and Eastern sectors. In a last bid to 
avoid war with Pakistan, Mrs. Gandhi undertook a visit to some Western capitals to 
plead with the host governments to persuade Yuhya Khan to see reason. From some 
of her statements on the eve of her visit and during the visit abroad, one gets a very 
clear picture of the working of her mind at that time. She had almost lost hope that 
Pakistan would be prepared to resolve the East Pakistan question through political 
means. In a broadcast to the nation on the on October 24, she said,  
―It is a time for alertness not only of our defence forces but of all our 
people. In the last few months the world has witnessed the courage, 
dignity and self-restraint with which we have faced this challenge. I am 
sure that you will meet all future dangers in the same spirit. We need 
unity and discipline. I sincerely hope that political parties of all 
persuasions will stand with US”.208    
During her visit to London, Mrs. Gandhi, in an address to the India League on 
October 31, 1971 gave vent to her disgust feelings and suggested to the leaders to 
prevail upon Yuhya Khan to resolve the problem through peaceful means. She 
implied that India had long since exhausted its patience: 
―Everybody today is busy telling us that we must show restraint. I do 
not think any people or any Government could have shown greater 
restraint than we have in the face of such tremendous provocation and 
threat to our safety and to our stability. But where has the restraint 
taken us? With all our restraint we are not getting any nearer to a 
solution. On the contrary, the military confrontations, as the other 
confrontations which I mentioned, political, economic, social, 
administrative, are steadily getting worse. People have asked me how 
long can India manage? Actually that date has long since passed. I feel 
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I am sitting on the top of a volcano and I honestly do not know when it 
is going to erupt‖.209 
Mrs. Gandhi's disillusionment with the international community was further 
expressed in her reply to the October 21, 1971 letter of UN Secretary- General U 
Thant. In her reply of November 16, 1971 Mrs. Gandhi tried to explain the root cause 
of the problem and said: "this is what must be kept in mind, instead of the present 
attempt to save the military regime." Mrs. Gandhi told U Thant that she would 
welcome his efforts to bring about political settlement in East Pakistan, and said "if 
you are prepared to view the problem in perspective, you will have our support in 
your initiatives."
210
 India felt left with no option but to respond with full vigor to a 
situation which was gradually being created for it by Pakistan and its allies. In the last 
week of November, sudden developments further convinced India that the hour of 
reckoning had come and it might be called upon at any moment to give account of its 
capability to defend itself. On November 19, the Chinese Representative at the UN, 
Fu Hao stated that China's sympathies on the East Pakistan problem lay with Pakistan. 
Without mentioning New Delhi by name, Fu Hao blamed India's alleged intervention 
in Pakistan's internal affairs for the existing situation on the sub-continent.
211
 On 
November 22, 1971, four Pakistani Sabre Jets intruded three kilometers into Indian air 
space over the Boyra region of West Bengal. The Indian Air Force Gnats, in the 
process of chasing them away, shot down three jets and captured two Pakistani pilots. 
President Yuhya Khan then gave sufficient indications of coming events by declaring 
a state of emergency throughout Pakistan on November 23 on the grounds that "a 
grave emergency exists in which Pakistan is threatened by aggression."
212
 
On November 24, 1971, Mrs. Indira Gandhi told the parliament that 13 
Pakistani Chaffe Tanks had been destroyed on November 21, 1971 when Indian 
forces crossed the borders to repulse a Pakistani offensive in the Mukti Bahini 
liberated area around Boyra, during which Indian Territory had been shelled. The 
Pakistan government promulgated on that same day the Defence of Pakistan 
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Ordinance, 1971, and enforced the Defence of Pakistan Rules. On November 25, 
while inaugurating a Chinese aided heavy machinery complex at Taxila, President 
Yuhya Khan said that Pakistan's relations with India were nearing a point of no return. 
He told newsmen in Rawalpindi on that day that in ten days time he might be away 
from Rawalpindi, fighting a war.
 
Finally, on December 3, 1971, Pakistan launched an 
air attack against India on the western borders. The fact that at the time of the air 
attack the Prime Minister as well as the Defence Minister of India were outside Delhi 
and yet the Indian armed forces handled the attack very competently which clearly 
suggest that India was prepared for the eventuality. However, the gathering storm of 
the last few weeks and months had broken into a thunderous confrontation and India 
was left with no option but to respond in a befitting manner.
213
 India recognized the 
Republic of Bangladesh on December 6, 1971, and acceded to its request for military 
intervention.
214 
 
It is obvious from the account of the evolution of India's attitude stated above 
that even though India might have thought from time to time of a policy in respect to 
East Pakistan, it had never been a policy planned in advance to achieve Pakistan's 
breakup through military support to the East Pakistanis. India's response to the East 
Pakistan situation in 1971 was in the nature of a day-to-day response to the 
developing situation. It could be characterized as an adhoc response. Otherwise, it 
need not have taken nine months to achieve the objectives, if the objective had been 
clear in advance and preparations for its realization had been made in advance.
215
  
In fact, it would be fair to conjecture that the results would have been quite 
different if any of a number of events had not occurred the way they did. For instance, 
the situation might have taken a different turn if the Indo-Soviet Treaty had not been 
signed, which might have been the case if Kissinger had not made a secret dash to 
Peking in July 1971. Similarly, if as a result of pressure from world statesmen, Yuhya 
Khan had released Sheikh Mujibur, developments could have taken a different turn. 
Therefore, one would conclude that India's policy in regard to East Pakistan which 
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ultimately led to the secession of East Pakistan from Pakistan with the help of India's 
armed intervention was not the culmination of any grand design by India against 
Pakistan, but was the inevitable consequence of a developing situation in which India 
responded to various events as they occurred. India's first preference, as has been 
clearly brought out, was for a political solution of the East Pakistan question within 
the framework of a united Pakistan. India's armed intervention was the inevitable 
response of a nation that felt obliged to defend itself against what it perceived to be 
first demographic, and then military, aggression by its neighbor.
216
 
India‟s help and cooperation in liberation of Bangladesh was bound to develop 
in very cordial political and economic ties.  In the post-liberation period Bangladesh 
witnessed many problems and it was not able to deal with them without any assistance 
from outside.
217
 India being the liberator of the Bangladesh shouldered many of these 
responsibilities in the initial years.  It was also due to the inspiration from the India 
Union that the Mujib government adopted parliamentary form of government and 
included secularism in the constitution of the country.
218
 But this warm and cordial 
relationship unfortunately did not last long. In the course of time cordiality waned and 
the relations between the two countries not only declined but became hostile many a 
times. The later governments of Bangladesh adopted different ideologies than their 
predecessor Mujib-ur-Rehman and included Islamic principles in their constitution.
219
 
1. India’s relation with Bangladesh during Indra Gandhi’s time: 
India‟s active assistance in the liberation war of Bangladesh attested to a warm 
start in Indo-Bangladesh relations. The two countries geared up the services rendered 
at the official level and what became extra-ordinary path for cultivating a sense of 
good relation was to look beyond and above religious concerns.  Indo-Bangladesh 
relations during the period 1972-1975 were very cordial and close. India wanted 
Bangladesh to become strong and prosperous neighbor because it was not in India‟s 
interest to have a week and dependent neighbor.
220
 On the other hand, Bangladesh 
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needed Indian support in international forums to consolidate and safeguard its 
national sovereignty. Therefore, both Bangladesh and India wanted to come closer to 
each other keeping in view their integrity and respective national interests. Since 
Bangladesh was economically very week, India assumed the responsibility of helping 
the Bangladesh in reconstruction of its socio-economic structure and political setup. 
They signed certain treaties, agreements and joint declarations with it, to lay a durable 
framework for bilateral relationship. 
The Bangladesh political system was modeled on the very principles of the 
Indian constitution. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman‟s devotion to the principles of 
parliamentary democracy, socialism, secularism and non-alignment strengthened the 
potentialities of Bangladesh‟s cooperation with India. This ethos provided basis for 
the future relations between Indian union and the government of Bangladesh.
221
 After 
coming to power on 1972 Sheikh Mujibur Rehman paid the first state visit to India on 
February 18, 1972 in response to the invitation extended to him by the Indian Prime 
Minister. At the end of his three day official visit Mujib reaffirmed the, “eternal 
friendship” between the two countries. Both the prime Ministers expressed their 
determination for cooperation between Governments and the people of the two 
countries inspired by a vision of lasting peace, amity and good neighbourliness.
222
 In 
his speech Prime Minister Mujibur Rehman stressed the need for amicable 
relationship with India. He stated that,  
―Friendship between India and Bangladesh will be everlasting. No 
power on earth will be able to make any crake in this friendship. No 
more games of imperialists will be allowed in India and Bangladesh‖. 
223
     
The Indian Prime Minister Indra Gandhi also paid an official visit to 
Bangladesh on March 17, 1972 to lubricate the relations and envisage the future 
policy of the two countries. The Indian Prime Minister was accompanied by the 
Foreign Minister Sardar Swaran Sing, Professor S. Chakravarty member of the 
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Planning Commission, Mr. T. N Kaul Foreign Secretary, Mr. P. N Dhar secretary to 
the Prime Minister and other officials.
224
 She clearly indicated India‟s attitude towards 
the immediate neighbouring countries particularly towards Bangladesh. While 
addressing a public gathering in Dhaka during the course of her first visit Indra 
Gandhi unequivocally stated, 
―Whatever help India had extended to Bangladesh was in pursuance for 
its own ideals and not because of any ulterior motives it had in mind. 
India wanted Bangladesh to become strong and prosperous since it was in 
its own interests to have such a neighbour. If we are helping you, it is not 
because we want to influence you. We are doing so in the spirit of real 
friendship and brotherliness on the high principles both of us cherish‖.225   
The two Prime Ministers were fully satisfied at the progress made and the 
concrete results achieved during their talks at Dacca and express the hope that these 
understandings and agreements could constitute a sound and durable basis for 
cooperation between India and Bangladesh for the mutual benefit and prosperity of 
the peoples of the two countries. The two Prime Ministers also express the conviction 
that the bonds of fraternity and friendship forged during the freedom struggle of 
Bangladesh and cemented by the sacrifices made by the peoples of both the countries 
would continue to grow and become a vital factor in strengthening the forces of peace 
and progress in Asia and the world. At the end of the visit, a joint declaration was 
issued which provided for:  
i. Holding regular consultations between the officials of the Ministers of Foreign 
Affairs, Planning Commissions, Defense and the Ministries and departments 
dealing with commercial, cultural, economic and technical affairs of the two 
governments to strengthen the cooperation between the two countries; 
ii. Establishing a Joint Rivers Commission comprising of the experts of both the 
countries on permanent basis to carry out a comprehensive survey of the river 
systems shared by both the countries;   
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iii. Directing the experts and officials of the two countries to hold consultations 
and information in the field of science and technology to increase economic 
and social development in the region; 
iv. Revival of Transit Trade and Agreement on Border Trade must be regularized; 
v. Strengthening the cultural relations between the two countries.226 
The net result of all these efforts laid the solid foundation for good relations 
between the countries. They paid official visits to each other‟s countries. Finally it led 
the signing of friendship treaty where both the countries agreed in different fields to 
solve their regional bias amicably.
227
 
Indo-Bangladesh Treaty of Friendship Cooperation and Peace 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
Indira Gandhi (left) and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman (right) busy in signing the Treaty of Friendship, 
Peace and Cooperation.  
Indra Gandhi- Prime Minister of India determined to maintain fraternal and 
good neighborly relations with Bangladesh, signed with her counterpart, Sheikh 
Mujib, a 25 year “Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace” on 19 March 1972. It 
was a very important and strategic treaty which had to last for twenty five years. The 
treaty covered socio-economic and political plethora of their respective policies and 
relations. This treaty committed the two countries to the basic tenets of non-
alignment, peaceful co-existence, mutual cooperation and non-interference in the 
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internal affairs of each other and to respects the territorial integrity and sovereignty. 
The twelve-article Treaty was determined to strengthen the existing relations between 
two countries which had its impacts and influences not only for the two nations but 
also for the other neighbours in the area.
228
 
The twelve articles incorporated in the treaty are as follows: 
i. The contracting parties solemnly declare that there shall be lasting peace and 
friendship between the two countries and each side shall respect the 
independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the other and refrain 
from interfering in the internal affairs of the other side; 
ii. The contracting parties condemn colonialism and racialism of all forms and 
reaffirm their determination to strive for their final and complete elimination; 
iii. The contracting parties reaffirm their faith in the policy of non-alignment and 
peaceful co-existence as important factor for easing tension in the world, 
maintaining international peace and security and strengthening national 
sovereignty and independence; 
iv. The contracting parties shall maintain regular contacts and exchange views 
with each other on major international problems affecting the interests of both 
the states; 
v. The contracting parties shall continue to strengthen and widen their mutually 
advantageous and all round cooperation in the economic, scientific, and 
technical fields, and shall develop mutual cooperation in the fields of trade, 
transport and communication on the basis of the principle of the equality and 
mutual benefit;  
vi. The contracting parties agree to make joint studies and to take joint action in 
the field of flood control, river basin development and development of hydro-
electric power and irrigation projects; 
vii. Both the parties shall promote relations in the field of arts, literature, 
education, culture, sports and health; 
viii. In accordance with the ties of friendship existing between the two countries, 
each of the contracting parties solemnly declare that it shall not enter into or 
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participate in any military alliance directed against the other party. Each of the 
parties shall refrain from any aggression against the other party and shall not 
allow the use of its territory for committing any act that may cause military 
damage to or continue to threat to the security of the other contracting parties; 
ix. Each of the contracting parties shall refrain from giving any assistance to any 
third party taking part in an armed conflict against the other party. In case if 
either party is attacked or threatened to attack, the contracting shall 
immediately enter into mutual consultations in order to take necessary 
measures to eliminate the threat and thus ensure the peace and security of their 
countries; 
x. Each of the parties solemnly declares that it shall not undertake any 
commitment secret or open towards one or more states which may be 
incompatible with the present treaty; 
xi. The present treaty is signed for a term of twenty-five years, and shall be 
renewed by mutual agreement; 
xii. Any difference over the interpretation of any article of the treaty shall be 
settled on the bilateral basis by peaceful means in a spirit of mutual respect 
and understanding and the Articles were soaked with required nourishment 
that would promise and facilitate the sovereignty and integrity of the said 
countries.
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After signing the treaty Prime Minister Indra Gandhi stated in the Indian 
parliament that in order to maintain the relationship which were, “cemented through 
blood and sacrifice”, that the two governments signed a Treaty of Friendship Peace 
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internal matters of each other; elimination of racialism and  colonialism; faith in non-
alignment; elimination of international problems; cooperation in economic, scientific and technical 
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and Cooperation.
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 The treaty received mixed reactions in Bangladesh. The ruling 
Awami League Government whole-heartedly welcomed the treaty officially and 
stated that, “friendship with India is a cornerstone of the foreign policy of 
Bangladesh”.231 At the same time the treaty was vehemently criticized by the leftists 
under the leadership of Maulana Bhashani. They considered Mujib to be a puppet in 
the hands of the Indian government and demanded the annulations of the treaty. In 
order to sustain this view, the critics, quoting article 9 and 10 of the treaty which 
stated that Bangladesh would not be able in future to enter into friendly relations with 
other countries without the consent of India.
232
 In order to evacuate the rumors and 
dubious atmosphere about the treaty and to prevent it from any hasty decision, the 
treaty was then only signed under the narrow investigation which ultimately 
motivated Mrs. Indra Gandhi to buy time with a view to cultivate assurance of trust 
among the people and silences those voices that rose against it.
233
 
However, as is evident in the 25 years of its existence the Treaty did not evoke 
any of the speculative apprehensions put forward by scholars and politicians nor did it 
restrain Bangladesh from pursuing an independent foreign policy.
234
 One of the 
reasons for suspicion could be that the Treaty came up for discussion in the Jatiyo 
Sangsad of Bangladesh only on April 13, 1973.
235
 The haste in which the treaty was 
signed gave rise to misgivings but there was no doubt that given the internal and 
external circumstances Bangladesh‟s „special relation‟ with India was thought to be 
beneficial.
236
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  S. M Ali, Op.cit, p. 158. Though some scholars maintain that signing of this treaty made many 
countries suspicious about the degree of independence that Bangladesh enjoys but countries like 
China, and the Muslim world had their own logic to delay the recognition. Their approach to 
Some Bangladeshi scholars also believe that it was this treaty which prevented 
many countries from giving recognition to Bangladesh because they doubted the 
extent to which the country was independent. However, according to Dr. Kamal 
Hossain- Foreign Minister during Mujib‟s regime, it was Pakistan which had a role in 
preventing these countries from giving recognition.
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This treaty affirmed India‟s respect for the sovereignty, equality and territorial 
integrity of Bangladesh and set at rest the western and Pakistani propaganda that India 
had an eye over Bangladesh. The treaty observed „The Patriot‟, which was the first 
formal and certainly unique step taken by two important Asian countries for the 
stabilization of peace in this sub-continent. It cemented the growing Indo-Bangladesh 
friendship and laid solid foundations for the extension of bilateral cooperation 
between the two countries. It was neither a defense pact nor a security pact designed 
against any other country. Like the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace Friendship and 
Cooperation, the Indo-Bangladesh treaty was a bilateral treaty for positive bilateral 
cooperation. It was a solemn treaty solemnly signed for strengthening both world 
peace and bilateral relations. Indeed this treaty was a welcome and fruitful way of 
ushering Indo-Bangladesh relations into an era of enduring peace friendship and 
cooperation. This gave credence to the two nations to remain cordial to each other in 
other fields as well and to bring to light unsettled issues in particular water which 
matter a lot to the conflicting situation. 
However the two governments declined to renegotiate or renew the treaty 
when it was for expiry in 1997.
 
Although initially received enthusiastically by both 
nations, the treaty with India became subject of resentment and controversy in 
Bangladesh, which saw it as unequal and an imposition of excessive Indian 
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influence.
238
 Issues such as the dispute over water resources of the Farakka Barrage 
and India's perceived delay in the withdrawal of troops began to diminish the spirit of 
friendship. Sheikh Mujib's pro-India policies antagonized many in politics and 
the military.
 
Mujib's killing in 1975 led to the establishment of military regimes that 
sought to distance the country from India.
239
 
The 1972 Treaty remained a mere paper agreement throughout the 25 Years 
and it never came in force. The security clauses of the Treaty created an immense 
political controversy and raised doubts about the nature of Indo-Bangladesh relations. 
It needs to be mentioned here that Bangladesh faced various challenges after 
independence. However, the Treaty was signed in a gloomy atmosphere and 
Bangladesh was not recognized by many countries most importantly Pakistan and it 
even referred Bangladesh as a part of 1973 Constitution. In the post-independence era 
defense of the country became major source of trouble. In this context, the Indo-
Bangladesh Treaty provided the much-needed security umbrella to the infant state. It 
should also be underlined that the Treaty did not restrict the diversification of 
Bangladesh‟s foreign policy.240 From the Indian perspective, the 1972 Treaty was a 
formal recognition of the fact that India would not like any intervention by external 
powers in its neighborhood, which could affect its security. The circumstances in 
which Bangladesh was born necessitated such an explicit acknowledgement. 
 
Mujib’s visit to India  
The Prime Minister of Bangladesh sheikh Mujibur Rehman paid an official 
visit to India from February 6-8, 1972 on the invitation of Indian government. He was 
given a grand welcome in Calcutta city. While addressing a huge gathering Mujibur 
Rehman expressed his gratitude on behalf of the Bangladesh government as well as 
the people of his country to the Indian government and its people particularly the 
north-east states such as west Bengal, Assam, Tripura, and Meghalaya for their 
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cooperation and assistance rendered to Bangladeshi citizens during the war period.
241
 
The Indian Prime Minister Indra Gandhi and Bangladesh Prime Minister Mujibur 
Rehman held several meetings and public gatherings. It was an expression of 
adherence dedication and courage India had provided to the people of Bangladesh. At 
the first instance they had jointly agreed for the withdrawal of Indian armed forces 
from the soil of Bangladesh by March 25, 1972. Both the countries agreed to 
cooperate in the development and utilization of resources to the benefits of the people 
of India and Bangladesh. They also decided to promote trade between the two 
countries on state to state basis. Both the leaders were determined to promote 
cooperation in every possible manner between the two governments and among the 
people of both the countries inspired by the vision of lasting amity, good 
neighbourliness and peace. They further agreed to improve economic relations, 
besides to resolve outstanding Farakka barrage dispute and stop smuggling across the 
border. Since the liberation of Bangladesh, India wanted to strengthen the economic 
and political conditions of her neighbour because it was in her interest to have a 
politically and economically stable neighbour. The Indian armed forces were 
supposed to leave by March 25, 1972 but they withdrew her forces from Bangladesh 
on March 12, 1972 i.e. thirteen days earlier of the scheduled date which showed that 
India did not want to occupy even an inch of Bangladeshi territory. This impressed 
Mujibur Rehman and he emphatically declared that, 
  
 ―The friendship between the two countries would remain forever and 
no power on earth would be strong enough to destroy such 
friendship‖.242 
After two years gap Sheikh Mujibur Rehman paid his second visit to India on 
May 12, 1974. During his visit to India an agreement was signed which provided for 
the checking of smuggling, controlling and regulating the border trade between the 
two countries. There are 111 Indian enclaves in the territory of Bangladesh and 51 
Bangladeshi enclaves in the Indian Territory. People in these enclaves lead inhuman 
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lives. The sufferings are immeasurable as people barely have access to medical 
facilities, education, sanitation, safe water, legal services and relief facilities. The 
issue has turned into a humanitarian one and needs to be resolved immediately. It is 
the prime responsibility of the state to provide security to its citizens. If it cannot do it, 
it fails to meet basic rights of the citizens.
243
 During this visit of Mujibur Rehman the 
transfer of an enclave Tin Bigha corridor to Bangladesh was agreed. The corridor was 
important to Bangladesh because it connects the two enclaves of Bangladesh 
Dahagram and Angorpota with the mainland of Bangladesh. This step was welcomed 
and appreciated by the Bangladeshi government as well as by the people and media. 
But inside India the opposition parties criticized the government for the transfer of 
corridor. In fact this step had a good impact on the overall relations of the two 
countries.
244
 The problem of sharing Ganges water was also discussed in the meeting 
held between the two leaders. India agreed that it won‟t commission the Farakka 
barrage unless a water sharing schedule was decided between the two nations even 
though the Farakka had been completed by 1971.
 245
   
For economic and trade cooperation an important decision was taken by the 
two leaders during the Mujib‟s visit. The two countries decided to constitute a Joint 
Commission for jute trading which was an important turning point between the two 
countries in the field of economic relations. Jute is one of the most important natural 
fibers after cotton in terms of cultivation and usage. This fertile geographic region is 
shared by both Bangladesh and India (West Bengal).
246
 
The land boundary agreement was also signed between the two countries. The 
problem inherited by India following the Rad Cliffe award of August 17, 1947 and the 
subsequent Algot Bagge tribunal which was made in 1949 to settle the Indo-Pak 
Boundary Dispute with Justice Algot Bagge of the Sweden Supreme Court as the 
Chairman of the tribunal had to be sorted out with Bangladesh. There was eagerness 
on the part of both India and Bangladesh to find amicable solution to the border 
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problem because of the apprehensions in their bilateral relations. Both the leaders 
were eager to complete the demarcation of the land more accurately and exactly. It 
was in this context that the Land Boundary Agreement was signed by the two 
governments of Bangladesh and India on May 16, 1974 in New Delhi during the 
course of the visit of Mujibur Rehman to India.
247
 The Indian press praised the 
agreement and read it as, 
―The series of agreements …marks a new stage in the relation between 
the two countries. Sentimentality has given place to mature friendship 
and purposeful cooperation as between equals‖.248  
Even the Bangladeshi press also described the agreement as, 
―A milestone on the road to subcontinent peace realized on the basis of 
sovereign interests‖.249  
  But anti-India and anti-Mujib section criticized the agreement. The Indo- 
Bangladesh Border agreement inked in 1974 stipulated for expeditious exchange of 
enclaves. The clauses under the 1974 agreement were yet to be implemented by 
India, despite the fact that Bangladesh had taken some steps unilaterally. As per the 
terms of the agreement India got the possession of Berubari but did not deliver the 
Tin Bigha Corridor to Bangladesh. A number of citizens of the region filed a 
petition in the Calcutta High Court against the leasing of Tin Bigha Corridor to 
Bangladesh. Thus the Tin Bigha Corridor issue became bogged down in a protracted 
legal battle which continued until May 5, 1990 when a five member bench of the 
Supreme Court headed by the Chief Justice Ranganath Misra ruled that, 
―There were no legal or constitutional barriers for the Indian government 
to lease out the Tin Bigha Corridor to the Bangladesh‖. 
The Conflict over Water Resources and Establishment of Joint Rivers 
Commission 
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The problem over the Ganges has been typical of conflicting interests of up-
and down-stream riparians. Being the upper riparian of the river Ganges India 
developed plans for water diversion for its own irrigation, navigability and water 
supply interests. Initially Pakistan and later Bangladesh has interests in protecting the 
historic flow of the river for its own down-stream use. The potential clash between 
up-stream development and down-stream historic use set the stage for attempts at 
conflict management.
250 
The historicity of the water problem dates back to 1950‟s itself. The 
government of Pakistan from October 29, 1951 officially called Indian government‟s 
attention to reports of Indian plans to built a barrage at Farakka, about 17 kilometers 
from the border. The barrage would reportedly divert 40,000 cusecs or cubic feet per 
second in order to provide silt-free flow into Calcutta Bay, which would improve 
navigability for the Calcutta city‟s port during dry months. On March 8, 1952 the 
Indian government responded that the project was only under preliminary 
investigation and that the concern was hypothetical. In 1957 and in 1958 Pakistan 
proposed the advisory and technical service of United Nations body be secured to 
assist in planning for the cooperative development of the eastern river system. India 
turned down these proposals although it was agreed that water recourses experts 
should” exchange data on projects of mutual interests”. These expert-level meetings 
commenced from June 28, 1960. The first round of expert level of meeting between 
India and Pakistan was held in New Delhi from June 28, July 3, 1960 with three more 
to follow by 1962. While the meetings were still in progress India informed Pakistan 
on January 30, 1961 that construction had begun on the Farakka barrage. A series of 
attempts by Pakistan to arrange a meeting at the level of minister was rebuffed with 
the Indian claim that such a meeting would not be useful, “until full data are 
available”. In 1963 the two sides agreed to have one more expert level meeting to 
determine what data was relevant and necessary for convening of a ministerial-level 
meeting. The meeting at which data needs were to be determined, the fifth round at 
the expert level was not held until May 13, 1968.
251
 After that the Pakistan concluded 
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that agreement on data and on the conclusion which could be drawn was not possible, 
but that enough data was nevertheless available for substantive talks at the level of 
minister. India agreed only to a series of meeting at the level of secretary, in advance 
of a ministerial-level meeting. The secretary level meetings commenced from 1968 
and a total of five were held in alternative capitals where the different strategies 
became apparent. Little of practicality came out of these secretary level meetings and 
India completed the construction of the Farakka barrage in 1970.
252 
In 1972 through the Treaty of Friendship Peace and Cooperation both the 
countries showed a keen desire to collaborate over water issue in the GBM (Ganges-
Brahmaputra-Meghna/Barak Basin) basin‟. The agreement established the Joint 
Rivers Commission and over the years the JRC has become a prominent body active 
in the facilitation of interim agreements between the two riparian states.
253
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure: Map of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Megna basin. 
The Joint Rivers Commission was established on March 19, 1972 in Dhaka 
with the declaration of Prime Ministers of India and Bangladesh signed by Mujibur 
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Rehman and Mrs. Indra Gandhi. It started functioning from June 1972. According to 
the statute the functions of the JRC are as follows; 
i. To maintain liaison between the two countries in order ensure the most 
effective joint efforts in maximizing the benefits from common river system to 
both the countries. 
ii. To formulate flood control and to recommend flood control works and to 
recommend implementation of joint works. 
iii. To formulate detailed proposals on advance flood warnings, flood forecasting 
and cyclone warnings. 
iv. To study flood control and irrigation projects so that the water resources of the 
region can be utilized on an equitable basis for the mutual benefit of the 
peoples of two countries. 
v. The commission shall also perform such functions as the two governments 
may by mutual agreement direct it to do.  
The experts suggested that the JRC has been instrumental in the cooperative 
framework between the two countries. It required more authority in identifying and 
implementing effective solutions. It should engage in regular collection and sharing of 
data and should be extended in scope to include other water issues that have emerged 
overtime.
254
  
However in August 1975, after Sheikh Mujibur Rehman‟s assassination a 
military regime took over the power of the country and the relations between India 
and Bangladesh cooled especially following the allegations regarding the overuse of 
its sharing of the Ganges water. India reacted by unilateraly withdrawing water at 
Farakka. In turn Bangladesh adopted different strategy i.e. internationalizes the issue 
on water Farakka issue and raised it in various international forums including the 
United Nations General Assembly.        
Anti-India Movement 
Sheikh Mujibur Rehman assumed office on January 10, 1972 and declared 
Bangladesh a secular state. The political parties with Islamic leanings were banned. 
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Since then opposition leaders in Bangladesh considered the ban and adoption of 
secular principles in the Bangladesh constitution as India‟s ploy to retain her influence 
in and around the Bangladesh. Though Bangladesh became a secular state officially 
but a large number of people continuously stressed for Islamic identity. Islamic 
identity acted as a powerful tool in the hands of opposition leaders against Sheikh 
Mujib as well as India. In 1973, an anti-India campaign was started by the right wing 
Islamic forces. On the one hand, these elements were trying to malign India and take 
the Bangladesh away from her influence and policies. On the other hand, the 
government of Bangladesh was trying hard to curb this campaign. Sheikh Mujibur 
Rehman, while addressing students of Dhaka University on May 8, 1973 charged the 
ultra-revolutionary and reactionary elements with conspiring against Bangladesh‟s 
friendship with India. He said that, “India is our real friend and had rendered a 
valuable service to Bangladesh at the time of need. He warned these elements and 
threatened to launch another movement against anti-national elements.”255 Moreover, 
like their predecessors (Pakistan) the Bengalis also found a scapegoat in form of India 
for all their follies and miseries. The pro-Islamic forces were able to convince the 
Bangladeshi masses particularly teachers, students, civil servants and politicians that 
the root cause of their miseries and food shortage smuggling etc., was India and thus 
became successful in arousing anti-India feeling among them.
256
 Another major 
reason which enraged the anti-India feeling in the Bangladesh was the crucial issue of 
the construction of Farakka Barrage, a dam on river Ganga which was 7,229 feet long 
and 108 spans proposed to divert 40,000 cusecs of water from Ganga into the Indian 
Bhagirathi-Hooghly River (a branch of Ganga in India) during the lean months. The 
Bangladeshis had feared that if water would be diverted in such a huge quantum then 
it would adversely affect the water supply in the entire lower riparian area during the 
dry season and further result in ruining the irrigation, agriculture and navigation of 
Bangladesh.
257
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The Mujib government adopted several measures to stop the anti-India 
campaign within the country but it was not able to bring under-control as a result of 
which the tensions between the two countries were growing. Moreover, the 
Bangladesh press and mass media helped the anti-India elements to arouse and 
severely held India responsible for all the miseries and economic deterioration of 
Bangladesh‟s economy and development. Mujib‟s own personality was also 
responsible for this confused situation as one can analyze him as a good freedom 
fighter and not as a good administrator. Though Mujib government took certain 
measures to curb the propaganda but it was too late to control such scenario and 
internal stability was torn by leftists and rightist party‟s demands for the abolition of 
secular ideology and declared the country as Islamic Republic of Bangladesh.
258
 The 
following main points were responsible for the anti-India movement in Bangladesh; 
i. Existence of pro-Pakistan elements in Bangladesh; 
ii. Internal opposition to sheikh Mujib‟s policies particularly to the centralization 
of the power in his own hands; 
iii. The Pakistani and Chinese propaganda that India was having imperialistic 
designs over Bangladesh; 
iv. The difference over Farakka issue; 
v. Rise of communalism in Bangladesh; 
vi. The strong dissatisfaction over the increased corruption, shortage of essential 
commodities and uncontrolled smuggling;
259
 
Father of the Nation was blinded with the perception that he could do no 
wrong and the people would follow his policies with blind faith and confidence. He 
failed to understand the realities of Bangladesh‟s domestic conditions after the post-
liberation era. The political instability during Mujib‟s rule was a result of his own 
authoritarian attitude and of drawing himself close to his relatives and friends and 
maintaining distance with other sections of the society. The suspension of 
parliamentary system, banning of political parties, suppression of civil liberties and 
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faviourtism to family members aroused much discontent and dissatisfaction among 
the people against Mujib government. All these factors became the main cause 
resulting in his assassination along with his family members in 1975 August coup.
260
  
The 1975 August Coup and its Impact   
Mujibur Rehman was assassinated along with his family members by the army 
officers on August 15, 1975. India strongly reacted to the brutal assassination of 
Mujib and his family members and expressed great concern over the fall out of the 
putsch.  In a strongly worded statement on 6 November 1975 India characterized the 
political murders as brutal and dastardly. It said,” India shared the grief of the friendly 
neighbour over the loss of the flower of their political leadership”. The news of 
Sheikh Mujib's assassination came as a shock to India, as well as it did bring burden 
on India's economy because fearing violence a large number of Bangladeshi nationals 
crossed the border and entered into India. Besides this, some of the Bangladeshis 
sought political asylum in India. Regarding these developments in Bangladesh, a 
spokesman of External Affairs Ministry commented that the government of India was 
carefully studying the reports and watching the developments because India could not 
remain unaffected by the political developments in her neighboring state no doubt 
these have been the domestic affairs of the Bangladesh.
261
 
After eliminating the „Sheikh Dynasty‟ a small rebel force occupied the radio 
station at Dhaka and announced the killing of Mujibur Rehman and “end of the era of 
tyranny”. After this coup Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmad a commerce minister in 
sheikh Mujib‟s cabinet and a pro-west leader informed the nation that the army had 
taken over the country and that in response to historic necessity he had assumed the 
office of presidentship of the country.
262
 Khondakar Mushtaque Ahamad declared that 
his governments policy would be, “friendship with all and malice towards none”, and 
it would honour all the existing agreements and obligations.
263
 But political 
uncertainty continued in Bangladesh consequent to frequent military coups. 
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Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmad‟s government was toppled on November 3, 1975 in 
another coup staged by several senior officers under the leadership of Brigadier 
Khalid Mosharraf.
264
 After this Khalid Mosharraf was promoted to the rank of Major 
General and appointed Chief of the Army Staff in lieu of Major General Ziaur 
Rehman who was placed under house arrest by the troops loyal to Khalid 
Mosharraf.
265
 However, the news about Brigadier Khalid Mosharraf that he was a 
paid agent of the Indian government swept across the Dhaka cantonment by Jatiyo 
Samaj Tantric Dal. A sepoy revolution was organized by the jawans who were loyal 
to Zia against Khalid Mosharraf and his associates. In the course of the revolt 
Mosharraf was killed and Ziaur Rehman who was put under house arrest was 
released. After the sepoy mutiny the coup leaders were greeted by many people from 
all strata of society, shouting, “Bangladesh Zindabad, General Zia Zindabad, sepoy 
revolution Zindabad”. Finally the president transferred the power to Ziaur Rehman.266 
The coups in Bangladesh made a serious impact on the balance of power in the 
Sub-continent to India‟s disadvantage. The political combination formed by United 
States, China and Pakistan fully endorsed the coup and gave it a kind of legitimacy 
providing political and financial support. This enabled the post-Mujib regimes to 
assert that Bangladesh‟s survival dependent on its ability to come out of the Indo-
Soviet orbit. Beijing and Islamabad grasped the opportunity and sent warm greetings 
to the new government.
267
 The Chinese government expressed the conviction that the 
existence of Bangladesh defending her sovereignty and national independence 
pursued a genuine non-aligned foreign policy, will surely be conducive to 
safeguarding peace and security in the whole of Asia particularly in the South Asian 
region. Prime Minister Z. A Bhutto of Pakistan called upon other Muslim nations to 
grant diplomatic recognition to the new regime. On November 5, 1975 the United 
States Secretary of State Henry Kissinger sent a congratulatory message to the new 
Foreign Minister Abu Sayeed Choudary and expressed the hope to work with him, “in 
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continued warm and friendly relations”. The United States also assured the new 
regime of “substantial assistance”.268 
Coups after coup were being perpetuated in the country which destabilizes and 
put the country in various tensions and incursions. India was concerned for such 
developments in the vicinity and was gauging the events taking place one after other. 
But India still hoped that Bangladesh would overcome the present tragedy and realize 
the vision of Sonar Bangla.
269
 Concerned by the situation in Bangladesh on 
September 29, 1975 during his visit to Hungry President Fakruddin Ali Ahmed 
expressed the hope that” outside forces would not try to interfere in the internal affairs 
of Bangladesh”. In a warning to outside nations Defense Minister Swaran Singh 
declared that, 
” we have contributed to the freedom of Bangladesh. We will be happy 
to see it managing its own affairs. But we shall not like any power, be it 
the United States china or Pakistan to make it a base for creating 
problems for India. Diego Garcia is thousands of miles away. But 
Bangladesh is next door. We have a long land border with it‖.270  
The August coup ended the golden era of Indo-Bangladesh relations. 
However, India declaring the coup as internal problem of Bangladesh, even though 
India's fast friend Mujib was assassinated, India tried to become realistic. The 
Newspaper Tribune observed on August 17, 1975 that the first reason for it might be 
due to the fact that the new regime immediately assured India that it would honor all 
the bilateral agreements and obligations with 1ndia. The Paper further analyzed that it 
became apparent for India that it was not going to lose anything and could keep 
fingers crossed into the politics of Bangladesh. Secondly, seeing the anti-India wave 
among the Bangladeshis in the later period of Mujib India might have thought that it 
should acquire a back seat and watch the developments. Thirdly, India itself was 
facing political turmoil due to large scale agitation against Indra Gandhi‟s rule at 
home, so it was pre-occupied with its own problems the paper reported. 
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Moreover, at such a situation, Bangladesh needed India's full and whole-
hearted cooperation to eliminate any threat for India or vice versa. Therefore, the new 
Bangladeshi President in a broadcast said that military takeover in the country was a 
historical necessity and further affirmed that his intention was to promote normal 
relations in the subcontinent.
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Chapter 3 
fter the independence the war ravaged country needed solid leadership with 
political maturity to overcome the seemingly insurmountable problems created 
by nine months long war of liberation and to steer the nation to build a society free 
from corruption, deprivation and exploitation through the means of unity, establishing 
rule of law, strengthening the democratic institutions and creating economic 
opportunities for the people. But unfortunately the overthrow and murder of the father 
of the Nation Sheikh Mujibur Rehman by dissatisfied and disgruntled army officers 
was the most dramatic of the three coups took place in August 15, 1975, November 3, 
1975 and November 7, 1975. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman‟s suspension of democratic 
government in January, his downfall in august and the week of turmoil in November 
from which General Ziaur Rehman emerged as defacto military dictator had 
profoundly altered country‟s political structure. But the causes and consequences of 
these upheavals extended beyond the borders of Bangladesh. General Ziaur Rehman 
eliminated both his moderate rivals such as Khalid Mosharraf and his extremist rivals 
like the junior officers of the Bangladesh army.
272
  
Similarly in 1975 India also experienced its worst political crisis since her 
independence. Because of the domestic compulsions Indra Gandhi suspended 
democracy and declared emergency.
273
 Mrs. Gandhi‟s cry of Grabi Hatao (out with 
poverty) still resounded in Delhi and could also be seen resounded in Mujib‟s promise 
to his people for economic improvement within three years in his country. In fact 
Bangladesh was less a reflection of India than the caricature of it. Bad as had been 
India‟s problems over population, agricultural production, industrial growth and 
political stability while those of the Bangladesh had been for worse. India had severe 
malnutrition, Bangladesh had plain starvation. India was having industrial stagnation 
at least in 1970‟s and 80‟s Bangladesh lacked industry and was totally depended on 
jute exports.
274
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A 
The new government under the leadership of General Ziaur Rehman gradually 
undertook large number of measures to restore law and order in the country, to bring 
back discipline in economic sector, to lift ban on national news papers and political 
parties, to increase budgetary allocation for the defence purposes of the country etc. 
The new government also took several measures in her foreign policy in order to 
bring the country closer towards western and eastern powers which could prove 
beneficial to its domestic as well as of foreign policy. India considered it a balance 
shift in the policies of Bangladesh thereto natural changes commenced in the 
strategies of South Asian politics particularly by bringing the China and USA at the 
door steps of India. Bangladesh was strategically important for India and served as a 
„corridor‟ in the South Asian region.275 The military-civil bureaucratic government 
knowing the domestic and international environment began to be viewed as anti-India 
and anti-Soviet and pro-US, pro-West, pro-Pakistan or pro-Islamic in its foreign 
policy, therefore, the assassination of Mujibur Rehman marked a qualitative change in 
Indo-Bangladesh relations. The successive regimes established good relations with 
Pakistan and other Islamic countries at the cost of its good relations with India. 
Countries like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia which were reluctant to open trade with 
Bangladesh during Mujib‟s regime now established both diplomatic and trade 
relations.
276
 With the result, within this changed context Bangladesh adopted 
“outward” looking foreign policy which was based on a new pragmatism. 
Islamic perspectives were introduced in the foreign policy of Bangladesh to 
endeavor, to consolidate, preserve and strengthen fraternal relations among Muslim 
countries based on Islamic solidarity, fraternity and brotherhood. Through his policy 
of upholding Islamic principles Ziaur Rehman secured the support of the Islamic 
Revivalist sections with whom the Awami League was at loggerheads. The president 
was praised in and outside for introducing Islam in the constitution of Bangladesh.
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The Era of Ziaur Rehman 
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Ziaur Rehman first came to power in Bangladesh in November 1975, after the 
third of three bloody military coups that started with the killing of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rahman. During the first 18 months of his regime, Zia governed solely as a military 
man through a rather severe Martial Law Administration.  Ziaur Rehman acted as a 
defacto head of the government in the post coup period and A.S.M. Sayem
278
 
continued to hold the post of president of Bangladesh. Sayem announced the 
dissolution of parliament and holding of elections before February 1977. The 
elections were later postponed indefinitely on the request of the political supporters of 
the then regime, notably Maulana Bhashani, who since October 1976 started 
demanding the postponement of parliamentary elections scheduled to be held in 
February 1977 on the grounds of economic crisis and national emergency in the 
country. 
279
 
Initially Zia remained in the army but in a civilian form and consolidate the 
political power by curbing the mutinies of the army in various cantonments around 
the country because the fear of further coups and domestic political uprisings were 
intensifying the pressure on the Army of Bangladesh. The Army of Bangladesh since 
1971 crisis had been involved in politics through their participation in the liberation 
struggle but Mujib‟s government and his successors underestimated the contribution 
of armed forces and relegated them to the background. With the result armed forces 
were dissatisfied and considered themselves the actual participators as well as the 
liberators of their mother land, were denied of their dues, whereas, those who were 
staying in Pakistan prisons and others who were enjoying the luxurious hotels of 
Calcutta secured good positions and all kinds of favors. General Zia keeping the 
situation in mind publicly accused the Awami League government for the total 
negligence of the professional armed forces of Bangladesh. He was the defacto head 
of the government but did not take the reins of the government all of a sudden in his 
hands.
280
  Political instability however prevailed in Bangladesh till Ziaur Rehman, the 
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Chief of the Army Staff and the Chief Martial Law Administrator was sworn in as the 
President of Bangladesh.
281
  
The fall of Mujibur Rehman marked the watershed in Indo-Bangladesh 
relations and the growth of religious fanaticism and Bangladesh‟s change of stance in 
foreign policy seriously impaired the relations.
282
 Zia‟s animosity to Mujib and 
Mujib‟s cordiality to India made the former suspicious of New Delhi. Shortly after 
Ziaur Rehman‟s consolidation of power there was a deterioration in indo-Bangladesh 
relations which was symbolized by the strong stand adopted by India in response to 
the attempted assassination of Indian High Commissioner in Dhaka. The growing 
mistrust was multiplied by the promptitude of Pakistan in recognizing the government 
of Ziaur Rehman. Although, Pakistan had recognized Bangladesh in 1974 the 
relations between the two countries during the Mujib period were not buoyant. After 
coming to power Ziaur Rehman adopted every possible measure to follow an 
independent internal as well as external policy and to get the country out of the 
position of dependence on India.  Ziaur Rehman wanted to develop the quality of life 
of the people of Bangladesh which according to him was not likely to be raised by the 
schemes and ideals of the previous governments hatched between the civilian 
politicians and their henchmen, nor by what increasing became regarded in 
Bangladesh as a fawning servility to India on the part of the Awami League 
Government. Zia was fully aware of the fact that Bangladesh required proper 
planning, discipline, public demonstrable uprightness and the political will to 
succeed.
283
  
In view of this Ziaur Rehman planned his own strategy to bring Bangladesh 
out of Indo-Soviet camp and lessen her dependence on India. He followed his own 
way of undoing the reforms introduced by his predecessors and added newer 
dimension to the country‟s political system. He concentrated on two spheres where 
the Awami League Government had fared badly and faced defame during the end of 
Mujibur Rehman‟s rule. He wanted to ensure political stability and economic growth. 
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Ziaur Rehman civilized military regime in two stages. First, five years after his 
assumption of the presidency on May 30, 1977 Ziaur Rehman claimed electoral 
legitimacy for the first time when 98.88 percent of those voting in national 
referendum were officially reported to have answered “Yes” to the question “Do you 
have confidence in President Major General Ziaur Rehman and in the policies 
enunciated by him”. Second, thirteen months after the referendum in June 1978 Ziaur 
Rehman was elected President for a five year term securing 76 percent of the total 
vote against nine rivals.
284
 Finally, the Parliamentary elections were held in 1979 and 
the party launched by Ziaur Rehman Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) bagged 207 
seats out of 300 general seats. After consolidating and legitimizing his regime Zia 
went in for significant constitutional changes. He repealed the unpopular changes 
implemented by the previous regime through the fourth amendment in January 1975. 
Knowing fully the public pulse and how to influence the people, Ziaur Rehman 
instituted some concrete steps to fulfill his ambition. He strived to establish a strong 
government that would be able to deliver the goods, a Government that would be 
acceptable to the majority of the people, the Islamic world, the international aid 
agencies and perhaps the military.
285
 
Ideological Transformation                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          
President Zia made some amendments in the constitution in 1977 which 
brought significant changes in the four principles of the country‟s Constitution i.e., 
nationalism, democracy, socialism and secularism which were installed by the former 
Prime Minister, Sheikh Mujib in 1972 Constitution. Ziaur Rehman restored Islam by 
dropping secularism from the constitution and expressed his commitment to the rest 
of the principles. Thus, Bangladesh ceased to be a secular state and in place of 
secularism it was asserted, “absolute trust and faith in Almighty Allah".286 It further 
stressed that "the state shall make an effort to consolidate, preserve and strengthen 
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fraternal relations among Muslim countries based on Islamic solidarity”.287 Further 
known as 'Bangladeshis' and not as 'Bengalese' as provided by the 1972 Constitution, 
by changing the term President Zia wanted to give a territorial rather than an ethnic-
linguistic identification.  Moreover, the term Bangladeshi also differentiated the 
citizens of Bangladesh from the 'Bengalis' of India.
288
 It was an attempt by the Zia 
regime to bring his country closer to the Islamic world for recognition as well as for 
assistance. He became successful in pleasing the Islamic countries and received their 
aid in large amount. Besides this, it was considered an attempt of the Bangladesh 
government to distance itself from India. Zia government used Islam as a tool to bring 
unity among the people and various factions in the society who were earlier 
dissatisfied with the secular policy of the Mujib government and wanted Bangladesh 
to be declared an Islamic state. Another important step to digress the earlier pro-India 
policy, the post-Mujib regimes followed a strategy of weed out Hindus from the army, 
police and civil services. This led to an exodus of the Hindus from the Bangladesh to 
India. New Delhi provided asylum to them and prevented them from going back to 
the Bangladesh.
 289
 The three coups and their aftermath events made a serious impact 
on Indo-Bangladesh relationship. The combination of political power formed by the 
United States, China and Pakistan, fully endorsed these measures of the Bangladesh 
government and provide political and economic support to the government.
290
 By 
providing Islamic leanings to the internal as well as external policies brought 
Bangladesh government closer to Pakistan. After establishing diplomatic ties with 
Bangladesh in October 1976 Pakistan stressed upon other Muslim countries especially 
Saudi Arabia to grant recognition to Ziaur Rehman‟s regime.291 
Besides this there were four major issues which generated controversies 
between India and Bangladesh during Zia-ur Rehman‟s regime. Of these two were 
inherited from Pakistan viz; water sharing from the river Ganges and dispute over 
exchange of enclaves and the other two were New Moore Island dispute and the 
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problem of illegal migration. Immediately after independence, Bangladesh entered 
into negotiations with India on water sharing from the river Ganges and the Joint 
River Commission was formed in 1972 with a view to work together in harnessing 
benefits of the rivers common to both the countries for the development of the people 
of the two countries.
292
  As a result of the cordial relations during Mujib era, 
temporary agreement was reached on this issue. After the political changes in 1975, 
Zia regime found it difficult to reach an agreement with India on water sharing at 
Farakka. The previous agreement of 1974 expired in May 1975 and until 1977 there 
was no agreement on this issue.
293
  Anti-India feelings were in its full swing since 
1975-77. The press of Bangladesh played a significant role in arousing anti-India 
feelings among the people. The most of the people in Bangladesh were of the view 
that the Indra government was apparently determined to erode General Ziaur 
Rehman‟s position and policies by assisting the clandestine elements.294 
When successive attempts failed to reach a consensus, Bangladesh 
government internationalized the dispute and raised it before the Organization of 
Islamic Countries (OIC), Foreign Ministers Conference in Istanbul in May 1976 and 
before the Non-alignment movement (NAM) summit at Colombo. Subsequently the 
issue was placed before the 31
st
 session of the UN General Assembly in November 
1976.
295
 
Indian government opposed the internationalization of the Farakka Barrage 
issue on the grounds that it was essentially a bilateral issue and the 
internationalization of the issue would only complicate the situation, delay solution 
and would worsen the relations between the two countries. India had also maintained 
that the question of water usage was a legal and technical problem which could not 
lend itself to political discussion.
296
 New Delhi‟s reaction was unambiguously 
expressed in the special political committee of the United Nations by India‟s Foreign 
Secretary Jagat. S. Mehta who said on November 1976 that, 
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 ―It was not India‘s aim to use any more water from the Ganga than 
was necessary to save the port of Calcutta‖.   
According to him India was legally and morally entitled to withdraw waters 
within her jurisdiction for her needs.
297
 After narrating the whole facts of Farakka 
issue in the United Nations committee, India‟s Foreign Secretary said that, “the 
allegations made by Bangladesh were far-fetched and unfounded”.  Recalling, the 
rationale of the Farakka Barrage issue Jagat. S. Mehta suggested that the special 
political committee could best serve the interests of the two countries by urging them 
to resume bilateral negotiations in the spirit of mutual trust and cooperation.
298
 
Further India‟s permanent representative to the United Nations Rikhi Jaipal 
maintained that,  
―Bangladeshi attempt to present it in multilateral context cannot be 
regarded as promoting negotiations in good faith between 
neighbouring states‖.  
Y.B Chavan India‟s Minister for External Affairs and leader of the Indian 
delegation to United Nations General Assembly session elaborating the problem and 
commented that most of the countries including the great powers and Arab nations 
who attended the General Assembly meeting felt that Farakka barrage issue is 
bilateral in nature and could be solved through a direct dialogue between India and 
Bangladesh. Consequently Bangladesh‟s attempt to internationalize the dispute with 
India further deteriorated the relations between the two countries. Thus, the 
Bangladeshi move to internationalize the Farakka barrage issue ended in a failure but 
paved the way for bilateral negotiations between the two countries.
299
 
With a view to settle the issue bilaterally, New Delhi resumed negotiations 
and three rounds of ministerial level talks were held in the same year. However no 
resolution was made till the change of Government New Delhi from Congress Party 
to Janata Party in March in 1977.  
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Indo-Bangladesh Relations during the Era of Janata Government 
Perhaps no single year since 1947 had been as momentous in the political 
annals of India as 1977. It had been momentous for the unexpected but epoch making 
political change that occurred with fall of Mrs. Gandhi‟s emergency regime through 
the ballot box. Once Indra Gandhi said that elections would be held in March 1977, 
the ball was in the people‟s courtyard and their determination to play it their own way 
particularly to avenge the wrongs done to them during 19 months of emergency, was 
never so strong and unwavering as in the wake of the elections. The elections struck 
the final blow to the dominant Congress Party rule which was already disintegrating 
under the weight of its internal contradictions. Janata party and its allies won 328 out 
of the 542 seats in parliament as against 153 for Congress. It was clear that the Janata 
victory was not simply the consequence of a consolidation of the opposition vote, but 
a substantial shift away from the Congress party.
300
 Whatever the future brings, 
however, it was clear that India have experienced a remarkable democratic change 
that is no less a revolution because it happened through an extraordinary election 
rather than through a violent upheaval. The election itself was a unique instance of an 
authoritarian regime testing its popularity in a wholly free election destroys the 
credibility of authoritarian leaders in all third world and Communist countries who 
claim that their government rests on popular support, particularly from the poorest 
elements of the society.
301
  
The change of government in India in 1977 had particularly influenced 
creation of trust among her small neighbours in particularly with Bangladesh. The 
Junta Government based her policy on beneficial bilateralism which created favorable 
response from Bangladesh. The Janata government brought certain changes in her 
foreign policy and followed the, “Policy of Genuine Non-alignment and Beneficial 
Bilateralism”. The execution of the policy of, “beneficial bilateralism” had three 
important dimensions namely Personal Rapport, Economic Accommodation, Political 
Neutrality and Non-interference in internal affairs.
302
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The junta government changed the previous governments policy of support to 
Bangladeshi rebels and it also realized that the Congress government‟s policy towards 
neighbours suffered from a duality i.e., “of using „good neighbourliness‟ as a cliché 
on the one hand and adoption of a superior and imperious tone on the other”. 
Therefore, the Junta government dedicated itself to remove this duality and restore 
credibility through beneficial bilateralism and genuine non-alignment.
303
 The 
significance of Junta government‟s policy towards neighbours was clearly stated by 
Foreign Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in a university seminar where he stated that, 
―The junta governments from the first day of its existence, set out 
deliberating to clear the cobwebs of suspicion, removes 
misunderstanding and banish the fear of interference. We have not only 
professed strict non-interference in the affairs of its neighbours, but 
also practiced often in the face of great temptation to do the contrary. 
In seeking cooperation from and offering it to our neighbours we have 
never imposed ourselves upon them. We have gently tried to explain to 
them the mutuality of advantage in bilateralism and allowed the 
irresistable logic of geography to assert itself…. We have conducted 
and are conducting an open policy of friendship, mutually 
advantageous cooperation and equal and beneficial bilateralism with 
our neighbours……‖304 
The Junta government had certain similarities with the Zia regime in 
Bangladesh. Under Indra Gandhi and Sheikh Mujibur Rehman India and Bangladesh 
did not cultivate cordial relations with the United States and kept at bay to China also. 
But both Ziaur Rehman and Morarji Desai brought their respective countries closer to 
the United States. Through the personnel contacts with the Indian prime minister, 
Ziaur Rehman could make his country‟s interests accommodative with the interests of 
India and vice versa. In 1979 Bangladesh even persuaded New Delhi to agree to 
involve Kathmandu in discussion on sharing of Ganges water. Zia also was eager to 
improve the relations with India. In the meantime, India had begun to improve her 
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relations with USA as well as China which Bangladesh had already fostered. Hence, 
there was no point of hostility/rivalry to arise among the relations of both the 
countries.
 305
 
The Desai regime wanted to cooperate in every way with her small neighbours 
so that political stability, peace and order could be maintained in the region and 
cordial relations be maintained. The Junta government expressed her belief that even 
the smallest neighbour was important for her and emphasized on maintaining cordial 
relations with the neieghbours. The change of the governments in the two countries 
paved the way towards strengthening and stabilizing of the political and economic ties 
among the two countries.
306
 The Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai and the 
Bangladeshi President Ziaur Rehman met for the first time in London at the heads of 
the Commonwealth Nations meeting on June 10, 1977 where both the leaders agreed 
to sort out their differences. It was there that India agreed not to allow the 
Bangladeshis on Indian side of the border to carry on with the hostile activities against 
Zia government in Bangladesh.
307
  As a result of this understanding, more than 900 of 
such dissidents were sent to Bangladesh. This understanding resulted in the 
cooperation of Border Security Forces (BSF) and Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) in 
fighting against the insurgents. At the end of the meeting the two leaders indicated 
that, “every attempt would be made to strengthen the relations between the two 
countries which began to deteriorate since the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur 
Rehman”. In 1977, when the Zia government provided political stability in the 
country and Desai government was also able to give new directions to foreign policy 
in promoting friendly relations with the immediate neighbours, an agreement was 
reached on November 5, 1977 on the sharing of Ganga water during the lean season.  
Ganges Water Agreement 1977 
The Junta government the first non-congress government under the leadership 
of Morarji Desai assumed office in the last week of March 1977 at the centre. The 
new government adopted a policy of close relations with neighbouring countries 
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under the rubric “beneficial bilateralism”. In its eagerness to promote good 
neighbourly relations with Bangladesh the Junta government started its exercise of 
resuming talks with the government Bangladesh on Farakka and other issues.
308
  
Before the 1977 agreement there were three rounds of official level talks between the 
leaders of the two countries held from September 20 to 30, 1977. The agreement was 
finally negotiated and signed at the ministerial level in Dhaka by Shri Surjeet Singh 
Burnala for the Government of the Republic of India and Rear Admiral Mosharraf 
Hussain Khan for the Government of the People‟s Republic of Bangladesh. The 
agreement was divided into three parts consisted of 15 articles, a schedule and a Side 
letter.
309
 
Sharing of Ganges water at Farakka Between (1 January and 31 may every year) 
Table 6 
Period Flows reaching Farakka (based 
on 75% availability From 
observed data 1948-73) 
Withdrawal 
by India 
Release to 
Bangladesh 
 Cusecs Cusecs Cusecs 
Jan 1-10 98,500 40,000 58,500 
11-20 89,750 38,500 51,250 
21-31 82,500 45,000 47,500 
Feb  1-10 79,250 33,000 46,250 
11-20 74,000 31,500 42,500 
21-28/29 70,000 30,750 39,250 
Mar 1-10 65,250 26,750 38,500 
11-20 63,500 25,500 38,000 
21-31 62,000 25,000 36,000 
Apr 1-10 59,000 24,000 35,000 
11-20 55,500 20,750 34,750 
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21-30 55,000 20,500 34,500 
May 1-10 56,500 21,500 35,500 
11-20 59,250 24,000 35,250 
21-31 65,500 26,750 38,750 
Source: Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. XXII, November 1977, No. 11, p.218. 
 
 
Articles of the Treaty 
Article 1:  The quantum of waters agreed to be released would be at Farakka 
Article II: 
i. The dry season availability of the historical flows was established from the 
recorded flow of the Ganges from 1948 to 1973 on the basis of 75% 
availability. The shares of India and Bangladesh of the Ganges flows at 10-day 
periods are fixed, the shares in the last 10-day periods of April (the leanest)  
being 20,500 and 34,500 cusecs respectively out of 55,000 cusecs availability 
at that period. 
ii. In order to ensure Bangladesh‟s share in the event of any lower availability at 
Farakka Bangladesh share should not fall below80% of the stated share in a 
particular period shown in a schedule annexed to the agreement.                                                                     
                                         
Article III: Only minimum water would be withdrawn between Farakka and 
Bangladesh border. 
Article IV: A committee consisting of representatives nominated by the two 
governments in equal numbers shall be constituted following the signing of 
this treaty. The joint committee shall set up suitable teams at Farakka and 
Hardinge Bridge in order to observe and record at Farakka the daily flows 
below Farakka barrage, in the Feeder Canal and at the Navigation Lock as 
well as the Hardinge Bridge. 
Article V: The joint Committee had to decide its own procedure and method of 
functioning. 
Article VI: The Joint Committee had to submit all data collected and a yearly report 
to both the governments. Following submission of the reports the two 
governments will meet at appropriate levels to decide upon such further 
actions as may be needed. 
Article VII: The Joint Committee was to be responsible for implementing the 
arrangements contained in the treaty and examining any difficulty arising out 
of the implementation of the above arrangements and of the operation of 
Farakka Barrage. Any difference or dispute arising in this regard, if not 
resolved by the Joint Committee, would be referred to the Indo-Bangladesh 
Joint Rivers Commission. If the difference or dispute still remains unresolved 
it would be referred to the two governments which shall meet urgently at the 
appropriate level to resolve it by mutual discussion. 
Article VIII: The two governments recognizing the need to cooperate with each other 
in finding a solution to the long term problem of augmenting the flows of the 
Ganges during the dry season. 
Article IX: Guided by the principles of equity, fairness and no harm to either party 
both the governments agree to conclude water sharing Treaties/Agreements 
with regard to other common rivers. 
Article X: The sharing arrangements under this treaty was to be reviewed by the two 
governments at five years interval or earlier as required by both party and 
needed adjustments based on principles of equity, fairness and no harm to 
either party made thereto if necessary. It was be open to either party to seek 
first review after two years to assess the impact and working of the sharing 
arrangements as contained in this treaty.  
Article XI: For the period of this treaty in the absence of mutual agreement on 
adjustments following reviews as mentioned in Article X India was to release 
downstream of Farakka Barrage water at a rate not less than 90% of 
Bangladesh‟s share according to the formula referred to in Article II, until 
such time as mutually agreed follows as decided upon.  
Article XII: The treaty shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force 
for a period of thirty years and it shall be renewable on the basis of mutual 
consent.
310
  
Through the 1977 agreement India for the first time recognized the 
international character of the water of national River Ganges. Although the agreement 
provided a short term solution for the distribution of waters but it opened the way for 
a long term planning. The short term agreement laid down the quantum of water that 
India was to withdraw below Farakka during the lean session in which flow of Ganges 
comes down to around 55,000 cusecs. In this agreement a highly consideration and 
sympathetic view of Bangladesh needs was taken into consideration. The Indian 
government did not press for securing a large quantum of Ganga water that was 
necessary for the health and safety of Calcutta port but instead it tried to win over the 
friendship and cooperation of Bangladesh by providing to her certain vital 
concessions.
311
 The agreement was severely criticized by the Indian press and people 
because according to them it failed to safeguard the interests of India. Surjeet Singh 
Barmala observed that it reflected, “The spirit of accommodation and the desire for 
cooperation”. Admiral Khan who signed the agreement on behalf of Bangladesh 
government said that, “it was a historic agreement and a meaningful step of far-
reaching importance in the way of finding a lasting solution to the problem”. However 
the main opposition party‟s leader Indra Gandhi while criticizing the agreement said, 
―By accepting a minority share in Ganges waters the Junta 
government was guilty of changing the consistent stand that India has 
been taking prior to 1977. Further that the agreement was designed 
more to reverse the stand taken by the previous congress government 
and less to satisfy the needs and interests of India. It was executed 
without any regard for the opinion of the experts‖.312  
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The Prime Minister of India Morarji Desai while defending the agreement said 
that,” it is a historic agreement of extraordinary significance and the agreement have 
been reached through bilateral negotiations on the mutual goodwill and on the basis of 
accommodation”. He further said that the real importance of the agreement was 
reflected in the approach and spirit which had made it possible. While giving his 
support he said, 
‖ such an approach and spirit if applied to the larger spectrum of our 
relations with Bangladesh can lead to an ever-widening cooperation 
between the two countries both bilaterally and in multi lateral forums 
and it should constitute to furtherance our objective of promoting 
peace and development in the sub-continent and of working together 
towards a better world order‖.   
The opposition parties also launched a severe criticism in the Lok Sabha 
against the agreement. Chitta Basu
313
 moved a resolution which called upon the house 
to disapprove the agreement as being inadequate for supplying the water to Bhagirathi 
so as to save the Calcutta port. The Junta government was however successful in 
getting the agreement passed by the Lok Sabha.
314
  
This agreement enabled the Bangladesh head Ziaur Rehman to continue the 
negotiations for improving relations between the two countries. Accordingly Zia 
visited New Delhi in December 1977 for the talks with Indian Prime Minister Morarji 
Desai as part of the normalization of mutual relations. Both leaders showed a keen 
interest in resolving the New Moore islands dispute and also agreed to expedite 
implementation of land boundary agreement. New Moore is a 5.2 km island on which 
India ascertained her claim after providing Bangladesh with relevant information. 
India erected a number of pillars and hosted the Indian flag on the island on March 
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12, 1980. Since then the Bangladesh government raised anti-India campaign in full 
swing and started collecting data and information to depict her claim over the 
ownership of the island. Bangladesh insisted on joint survey which India declines to 
accept. Regarding the Farakka barrage both leaders stressed the need for a long term 
solution of the water problem. After Zia‟s visit Prime Minister Morarji Desai told a 
press conference that Zia‟s visit to New Delhi has “marked a prominent milestone in 
the process of mending our fences and giving a new turn to the wheels of progress”.315 
The Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai along with Foreign Minister A.P.G 
Vajpayee also visited Dacca in April 17, 1979 as a further breakthrough in the 
renewal of neighborly relations between the two countries. Morarji Desai calls for 
more conferences and communication between the Border Security Forces of 
Bangladesh and the Indian states for sorting out how human border could be better 
regulated. During Desai's visit, Dacca and New Delhi agreed to set up committees, in 
addition to the high-powered Joint Rivers Commission, to work out a formula to 
prevent erosion along the Kushiara River and to share the waters of the Khowai and 
Teesta rivers.
316
 During this visit India agreed to import more items from Bangladesh 
including jute, timber, paper, naptha, rayon, newsprint, pulses, and specialized 
textiles. Another significant development was the decision for wider cooperation 
through joint ventures in the fields of cement, biogas, solar energy, and fertilizer. 
India further offered Dacca 200,000 tons of food grains on an emergency basis, and 
accordingly an agreement was made in May. However, the Dacca-New Delhi 
relationship during 1979 remained tense because of the influx of 20,000 Indian 
Muslims from West Bengal in June, following communal riots. There was also 
sporadic exchange of fire in late 1979 between the border forces of the two countries 
at Hili, Belonia points, and across the Muhuri River.
317
      
 
Indra Gandhi’s Resurgence Phase 
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„It‟s Indra Gandhi All The Way‟ was the lead headline in both The Times of 
India and The Hindustan Times, two of India's leading English dailies, on January 7, 
1980, a day after the last vote had been cast in the country's seventh Parliamentary 
election. It was an outcome whose proportions fooled most experts, both foreign and 
domestic, and probably surprised even Mrs. Gandhi herself. It was not that Mrs. 
Gandhi's party, the Congress (I) was not expected to do well, for it was. Some had 
predicted an absolute majority, which in a parliament of 542 seats meant at least 272, 
and most had believed that Mrs. Gandhi's comeback would at least restore her party's 
fortunes sufficiently to enable Congress (I) to rule India in coalition with one or more 
of the other significant parties.
318
 But in terms of seats won in Parliament the 
Congress (I) triumph was spectacular by any standards. Overall the party of Mrs. 
Gandhi won 351 of 525 seats contested. This is 66.9% of the contested and 64.8'% of 
the total number of seats comprising the Lok Sabha or House of the People. The 351 
seats constitute a two-thirds majority of all declared seats had especially important 
implications in the context of the Indian political system. The Janata party alliances 
could get only 34 seats.  
While assuming the office Indra Gandhi criticized Junta Party for its weak 
foreign policy and alleged that it had ignored national interest.
319
  She had no good 
impression about post-Mujib regimes due to her dislikes for military rule. The Junta 
government‟s accommodative stance with India‟s neighbours was also not liked by 
her whom she viewed as a sellout of Indian interests. Mrs. Gandhi was critical of the 
foreign policy pursued by Desai government particularly in South Asia, yet on 
resuming Prime Minister‟s office in 1980 her policies towards India‟s neighbours 
underwent only marginal changes. The Indra Gandhi‟s approach with regard to 
neighours was little harsh towards the end of her first term.
320
  
The domestic changes in Bangladesh were equally noteworthy as Zia became 
more confident about himself after civilianizing his military rule through the 
parliamentary elections held in 1979. Ziaur Rehman was fully aware of the fact that a 
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policy of conciliation and cooperation with India could bring rich dividends to the 
country.
321
  In order to improve the relations with New Delhi Zia brought about some 
changes within his cabinet. To remove suspicion of India Zia dropped Moudded 
Ahmed Deputy Prime Minister and an influential member of his cabinet who led the 
Bangladesh team in the Ganges Water talks with Delhi during the Junta regime.
322
 Zia 
was the first head of the state to meet Indra Gandhi and convey his greetings. Zia 
hoped his abrupt visit to New Delhi would change India‟s attitude towards him.323 But 
contrary to Zia‟s expectations Awami League supporters distributed sweets to express 
their joy when they heard the news of the massive victory of Indra Gandhi in the 
elections. This led one section of the people of Bangladesh to apprehend that India 
would interfere in Bangladesh once again. However, gradually the relations between 
the two countries showed some signs of improvement.
324
 President Ziaur Rehman 
visited New Delhi on January 20, 1980 to attend the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) conference. During the course of his visit he 
had two rounds of talks with Indra Gandhi. They discussed bilateral issues 
particularly border problems and sharing of Ganga waters at Farakka and decide to 
resolve these issues. The frequent meetings with Indian counterpart to resolve the 
outstanding issues brought optimism to the Bangladesh government and its 
leadership.
325
 
Ziaur Rehman mooted the idea of SAARC (South Asian Association for 
Regional Cooperation) to offer a frame work under which solutions to various 
international disputes of the South Asian region could be sought on multilateral 
basis.
326
  India‟s approach towards solving the issue was on a bilateral basis and not 
multilateral and hence it viewed Zia‟s move with suspicion and distrust. At the 
preliminary meeting of the South Asian Foreign Secretaries held in Colombo in April 
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21-23, 1981 to consider a Bangladesh draft paper on SAARC, India insisted that 
bilateral and contentious issues should be excluded from their deliberations.
327
 
A perusal of Indo-Bangladesh relations during 1975-1981 (post Mujib era) 
reveals that pragmatism replaced the emotional framework and mind-set evolved 
during the liberation war which resulted in stresses and strains in the relationship of 
the two countries. Besides the above developments the New Moore island controversy 
soured the relations between the two countries during this period as there was no 
breakthrough regarding the issue. During this period the relations between the two 
countries had at times been testy with wide spread rumors that New Delhi had been 
adopting unreasonable assertive attitude towards her neighbor. Many of the old issues 
were revived and Dhaka‟s attempt to internationalize issues against India‟s wishes 
caused concern to India. Amidst several attempts to normalize the relations through 
peaceful negotiations the contentious issues remained unresolved. No doubt both the 
governments attempted to find a lasting solution to the issues between the two 
countries at different levels but it seemed that the trust-deficit could not help to 
maintain people to people relations although government to government relations 
were being preserved.
328
 
 
 
General Husain Muhammad Ershad’s Period (1982-1990): 
After the assassination of Ziaur Rehman on May 30, 1981, Abdus Sattar 
assumed power and established a constitutional government in Bangladesh which 
sustained for a short period till it was replaced by a military overthrow led by Husain 
Muhammad Ershad
329
 in March 1982. He assumed the office of the president in 
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330
  
Ershad‟s advent to power was due to the coincidence of his occupying the senior most 
position in the Bangladesh army at the time of the assassination of Ziaur Rehman. He 
also began his tenure as the Chief Martial Law Administrator and head of state with 
the usual pretences about restoring democracy. A prominent Bangladesh social 
scientist and economist, Rehman Sobhan, has aptly stated in his book „Problems of 
Governance- Bangladesh‟ that, “if the initial statements of Field Marshal Ayoub 
Khan, General Ziaur Rehman and H.M. Ershad could be fed into a computer for 
analysis, it would appear that they showed the same intellectual parentage”. 
Since assumption of power by General Ershad like General Zia he also 
emphasized on Islamization of Bangladesh. He emphasized that the cultural life of the 
Bangladeshis was to be based on the Islamic principles. He emphasized to follow the 
Islamic principles in the day-to-day life. He introduced changes in the educational 
policy and introduced Arabic as a compulsory subject in the elementary classes. At 
Tongi, an Islamic University was built where the faculties of Theology, Humanities 
and Social Sciences were set up and the students were expected to be competent in 
Islamic studies.
331
 All efforts to 1slamize education and culture by the government 
and despite people‟s stress on Islamic identity from time to time in post liberation 
period, the dominant force in the socio-cultural ethos of Bangladesh is still secular but 
this process of change in national ideology strained the relations between the two 
countries. There the Bengali language and culture and not Islam remain the unifying 
factor, which played an important role during the liberation struggle of 1971. For 
example in 1952, when Pakistan government decided to make Urdu the sole language 
of the two parts and provided secondary status to Bengali, it was at that time that the 
students protested which resulted in massacre of students, demonstrators and youths 
in large numbers by the United Pakistan police. It was since then that Shaheed Dibas 
(Martyrs Day) was celebrated every year on 21 February. Ershad gave Shaheed Dibas 
                                                                                                                                                                      
doings of the past and asked for forgiveness. The Grand Alliance (Mohajote) won the elections in 
December 2008 and HM Ershad became a Member of Parliament once again. The former Chief of 
Army Staff & President, Lieutenant Hussain Muhammad Ershad is currently a Member of 
Parliament & Chairman of Jatiya Party - the second largest party in Bangladesh's Coalition 
Government known as Grand Alliance (Mohajote) as of January 2009. 
330
  P. S Ghosh," Bangladesh Politics Many Imponderables”, Mainstream, Vol. xxix, 1990, p.3. 
331
  Economic Intelligence Unit, Quarterly Economic Review of Pakistan, Afghanistan and 
Bangladesh, 1985, p.19. 
an Islamic touch by declaring a week before Shaheed Dibas that Quran Khawani 
(recitations from holy Quran) would be held at the Shaheed Minar whereas earlier 
there was no provision for Quran Khawani. This time 1slamization as a domestic 
policy was bringing more resentment than appeasement at home in Bangladesh. The 
inclusion of Arabic as a compulsory subject and celebrating the Shaheed Dibas in an 
Islamic way by Ershad government enraged the secular minded people and 
particularly the students and the intellectuals.
332
 
The Indra Gandhi regime welcomed the installation of Ershad government in 
Bangladesh and hoped to maintain friendly relations with the neighbours and stressed 
for the early settlement of bilateral issues mutually.
333
 To strengthen the relations 
between the two countries ,Narasimah Rao- India‟s Foreign Minister visited 
Bangladesh in May 1982 and promised to supply 1,00,000 tons of wheat to 
Bangladesh in order to meet the food shortage of Bangladesh. President Ershad also 
reciprocated of maintaining good relations with India by visiting New Delhi in 
October 1982. During this October meeting, both the leaders agreed to form, a Joint 
Economic Commission to identify various areas of mutual economic cooperation. 
They discussed the operation of the 1977 Farakka agreement and further extended it 
for two more lean seasons and directed the Joint Rivers Commission to find out ways 
and means and commonly acceptable solution in order to arrive at final agreement. On 
October 7, 1982 a Memorandum of Understanding was signed in New Delhi.         
Sharing of Ganga Water at Farakka 
Between 1
st
 January and 31
st
 May every year 
Table 7 
Period Flows reaching at Farakka 
(Based on 75% availability 
from observed data 1948-73 ) 
Withdrawal by 
India 
Release to 
Bangladesh 
 Cusecs Cusecs Cusecs 
January    
1-10 98,500 40,000 58,500 
11-20 89,750 38,000 51,750 
21-31 89,500 35,500 47,000 
February    
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1-10 79,250 33,000 46,250 
11-20 74,000 31,250 42,750 
21 -28/29 70,000 31,000 39,000 
March    
1-10 65,250 26,500 38,750 
11-20 63,500 25,500 38,000 
21-31 61,000 25,500 35,750 
April    
1-1 o 59,000 24,000 35,000 
11 -20 55,500 20,750 34,750 
21-50 55,000 20,500 34,500 
May    
1-1 o 56,500 21,500 35,000 
11-20 59,250 24,250 35,000 
21-51 65,500 26,500 39,000 
Source: Foreign Affairs Record, Vol. xxviii, 1982, p.255. 
Besides, both the leaders agreed to complete the implementation of the 1974 
Land Boundary Agreement. India further agreed to transfer Tin Bigha Corridor in 
eternity to Bangladesh. They agreed to resolve the issue of maritime boundary dispute 
in a spirit of understanding and good neighborliness. Both the leaders agreed to 
resolve the dispute over the ownership of New Moore Island/South Talpatty. They 
also emphasized the need to stop illegal immigration of people across the borders. The 
Joint Economic Commission which was established soon after the liberation of 
Bangladesh remained active only for a couple of years, and then the commission went 
into a long period of hibernation until it became dead. As a result a new Joint 
Economic Commission was set up in 1982, but could not make any headway in its 
required agenda. Since its establishment it has met only thrice in 1986, 1990 and 
1993.
334
  
Both the governments extended the bilateral trade pact from 1986 to October 
1989. In addition an inland trade and transit protocol allowing Indian vessels to pass 
through Bangladesh, exemplified a maturing cooperative relationship necessitated by 
Bangladeshi‟s geo-political situation. The original protocol was signed in November 
1972, renewed in 1984 and extended in 1986 on a quarterly basis. The agreement was 
later renegotiated and according to its provisions remained effective until October 
1989. By this India agreed to pay transit charges and port fees. The ability of both 
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governments to compromise on economic issues boded well for the possibility of 
future bilateral agreements.
335
 
Indira Gandhi the Prime Minister of India was assassinated on October 31, 
1984. She was killed by two of her Sikh bodyguards, Satwant Singh and Beant Singh, 
to avenge the military attack on the Harmandir Sahib (Sikhism's holiest shrine, also 
called "The Golden Temple") during Operation Blue Star. Her son Rajiv Gandhi
336
 
took office of Prime Ministership at the age of 40 after his mother's assassination and 
became the youngest Prime Minister of India. Rajiv Gandhi led the Congress to a 
major election victory in 1984 soon after, amassing the largest majority ever in Indian 
Parliament. The Congress party won 411 seats out of 542. He began dismantling 
the License Ra -government quotas, tariffs and permit regulations on economic 
activity-modernized the tele-communications industry, the education system, 
expanded science and technology initiatives and improved relations with the United 
States. 
The Prime Minister of India Rajiv Gandhi was trying to play a role of a Big 
Brother with the neighbouring countries.
337
  The foreign policy goals he set himself 
were based on a desire to improve India's relations with its neighbours, as well as the 
super-powers and reaffirmed his faith in Non-alignment principles and United Nations 
Origination. His statements were widely taken to mean in the west, especially in the 
United States, that he would move away from the Soviet Union, which had 
traditionally been close to India. This view was further strengthened by Mr. Gandhi's 
many statements about the need for economic liberalization in his country. His 
ambition was to make India a model industrial power in the developing world. This 
would naturally require large-scale imports of industrial goods as well as the 
sophisticated technology which only the west could offer. The hope, therefore, had 
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been that as India's dependence on the west would increase, so its political ties with 
the Soviet Union would loosen.
338
 
The Bangladeshi President General Ershad paid several visits to New Delhi 
during Rajiv Gandhi‟s rule and the Indian Prime Minister also reciprocated in the 
same manner.
339
  Rajiv Gandhi visited Bangladesh twice in 1985. He was on one day 
visit to Bangladesh in the aftermath of the severe cyclonic devastation in the coastal 
belt on June 2, 1985. He expressed his sympathy and solidarity on behalf of the 
people of India with the people of Bangladesh at the time of crisis. He even visited the 
worst affected island, Urrir Char, and offered material help for the cyclone affected 
people and demonstrated goodwill towards Bangladesh. After Rajiv‟s visit a Special 
Envoy of the Prime Minister of India visited Bangladesh in June 1985. It was hoped 
that the agenda was to find out a lasting solution to the sharing of Gangs Water, which 
had been the bone of contention among the two countries since long.
340
 
Again the two leaders met at Bahamas during the Commonwealth Summit in 
October 1985, and decided to cooperate in each and every way to improve their 
relationship. The cooperative endeavor of the two countries resulted in the signing of 
a Memorandum of Understanding at a Ministerial level on November 22, 1985 on the 
sharing of Gangs Water during the lean season for the next three years (1986-88) with 
a provision to work out a scheme to augment the flow through a joint study of the 
experts of the two countries within a year‟s duration.341 
In July 1986 the Bangladesh President General Ershad visited India and 
conducted wide ranging talks with the Indian leaders. The two countries agreed to 
cooperate in checking cross-border insurgency and resolved to find an amicable 
solution to the river water issue. Bangladesh further agreed to take back all measures 
for enabling the Chakma tribals who have illegally entered Tripura. Prime Minister 
Rajiv Gandhi and President Ershad agreed that negotiations on the maritime boundary 
between the two countries in the Bay of Bengal region be resumed. They also 
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considered steps necessary for giving an imperious to the economic relations as well 
as accepted the need for an early convening of the Joint Economic Commission. India 
further assured Bangladesh of its commitment to transfer Teen Bigha enclave. The 
talks were held in an atmosphere of “cordiality which led to “a greater degree of 
understanding between the two countries and a willingness to cooperate in solving 
bilateral problems”.342 Farakka issue, however, continued to be the major problem of 
Indo-Bangladesh relations. It was hoped that the two countries would be successful in 
resolving the issue through mutual efforts.
343
 
President Ershad again visited India in September 1988 and discussed the 
various aspects of bilateral relations which included occurring of the floods in 
Bangladesh. The Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi assured him to solve the 
problem of floods caused by the Ganga and Brahmaputra jointly and both agreed to 
form a task force to look after the short and long term measures of flood management 
of the Brahmaputra and the Gangs rivers and utilization of surplus waters. The 
agreement was contained in a short communiqué issued at the end of six hour talks 
between the two governments in New Delhi on September 29, 1988.
344
 The Indian 
Prime Minister rejected Bangladesh‟s proposal for the involvement of third country in 
solving the problem and made it clear that there can be no departure from the policy 
of bilateralism on such matters. Bangladeshi President became successful in 
persuading India to have a new look into flood management. On the other hand India 
succeeded in steering Bangladesh away from its efforts to involve other countries in 
the bilateral issues.
345
 The improvement of relations under Indra Gandhi and Rajiv 
Gandhi regimes in India, despite Bangladeshi governments following of all irritants, 
viz; Islamization, relation with Islamic and anti-India powers etc. indicates the fact 
that the Indo-Bangladesh relations depends on the whims of the leaders of both sides 
rather than the objectives circumstances.
346
 The relations between India and 
Bangladesh got tense when India decided to fence the border, due to the large number 
of refugee influx in India from Bangladesh which had aggravated the economic 
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conditions of north-east in India. The Bangladeshis in search of employment and due 
to economic crisis in their own country illegally crossed border and entered into the 
north-eastern states of India, which further caused various problems to the native 
inhabitants of the area. India requested Bangladesh to stop the illegal infiltration of 
the Bangladeshis and deport back those who had entered the Indian Territory. It was 
also during Ershad‟s regime that Bangladesh became more receptive to separatist 
elements from India and the activities of the Inter-Service Agency of Pakistan.
347
  
In 1989 general elections were held in India to elect the members of the Lok 
Sabha. The result was a loss for the Indian National Congress and Rajiv Gandhi, 
because all the opposition parties formed together a minority government under the 
leadership of V.P Singh and the National Front. The National Front was able to secure 
the first minority government since 1947 independence. During the regime of the 
National Front in India the External Affairs Minister I.K Gujral visited Bangladesh in 
February 1990 as part of a new peace offensive to promote good relations with the 
neighboring countries. He persuaded the Bangladesh government to revive the Joint 
Rivers Commission. The two sides decided to work out a long term formula for 
resolving the water sharing issue, discussed the immediate deportation of refugees 
which was causing the economic social and political problem in the north-east states 
and besides this India agreed to transfer the Tin Bigha corridor to Bangladesh. But 
there was a delay in transferring the Teen Bigha enclave to Bangladesh by India 
because of political factors in West Bengal and the issue having become subjudice 
proved a bone of contention. 
Meanwhile in Bangladesh there was also a change of government from 
military to democracy. The democratic wave in Bangladesh shook the foundations of 
the Ershad government amid awful crisis- political, economic and institutional 
fomented by students, gathered momentum in early November 1990. The main stream 
opposition parties issued a joint declaration that Ershad should resign and hand-over 
power to a care-taker government for holding a free and fair parliamentary 
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elections.
348
 The authority of Ershad was challenged by the two party groups, first 
group was led by Begum Khaleda Zia (wife of Late President Ziaur Rehman) who 
was leading the seven party alliances group and the second group of eight party 
alliances which was led by Hasina Wajed (daughter of Late Prime Minister Sheikh 
Mujib).  The Ershad government could not stand against the streams of forceful and 
continuous mass movement knelt down, appointed Shahbudin Ahmed- the Chief 
Justice of Supreme Court, as the Vice-President, resigned and hand over power to him 
as the Acting President. Soon Shahbudin Ahmed formed a Care-taker government and 
holds the elections of Jatiyo Sangsad on February 27, 1990. The Bangladesh 
Nationalist Party (BNP) emerged victorious with single majority in the parliament 
followed by Awami League.
349
 
The content and nature of Indo-Bangladesh relations, therefore, did not shift or 
show any change between 1982 and December 1990. Both Mrs. Gandhi and Rajiv 
Gandhi whose Prime Ministership spanned the Ershad era in Bangladesh were not 
enamored of him given his military background and no role in liberation struggle. 
General Ershad‟s equations were comparatively better with Rajiv Gandhi. His 
equation with the leadership of Pakistan and China was positive by contrast. The 
consequence was a greater proximity in foreign policy and regional security stances 
between him and General Zia-ul-Haq of Pakistan. Bangladesh had very close 
relationship with Pakistan and equally structured relationship with China and USA. 
Her identity as an Islamic state and having good relations with all the Islamic 
countries has been cardinal element in Bangladesh foreign policy but however it must 
be acknowledged that Bangladesh had refrained from supporting any anti-India moves 
of the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC)  and other regional forums.
350
 
Despite having divergent strategic and security outlook India and Bangladesh 
are close neighbours and part of so many regional and international forums and have 
tried to take solid actions to minimize differences to foster understanding and 
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cooperation in various socio-economic and security issues for amicable co-existence 
and regional stability. The broad contours of Bangladesh‟s foreign policy changed 
with the passage of time and within the context of political situation. The initial 
prediction that indo-Bangladesh relations would be a cornerstone for durable stability 
and peace in South Asian region has been weakened. Bangladesh of course attached 
importance to having a friendly, working and normal relationship with India. But in 
broader strategic and political context Bangladesh had developed regional and 
multilateral equations to avoid any excessive influence from India.  
To sun up, bilateral relations between India and Bangladesh, as well as well as 
international relations in the South Asian region in general would always be affected 
by the geopolitical fact that some countries are big, developed and powerful and that 
they would always tend to expand their power and influence and paralellay, by the 
factor of narrow nationalism and psycho-pathological phenomenon of being 
dominated, oppressed, feeling insecure, weak and deprived on account of being small 
in size and deficient in resources. The Indo-Bangladeshi relationship has seen many 
turmoils and transitions during the period 1971-1990. Given the same parameters of 
global and regional politics there is scant possibility of any radical transformation of 
the Indo-Bangladeshi relationship. Meanwhile, bilateral cooperation on a State-to-
State basis in a business like fashion shall go on uninterrupted as is the case in the 
bilateral interactions of India and other small regional States. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
ommon history, economic interactions and geostrategic interests make India and 
Bangladesh vital to each other. As one of the major immediate neighbors 
surrounding Bangladesh, India naturally occupies a pivotal position in its foreign 
policy.
351
 The geostrategic conditions, economic interactions, energy supplies, trade 
links, ethno-cultural proximity and historical linkages provide a plethora of 
opportunities for close cordial and cooperative relations between the two countries.
352
 
India‟s contribution towards Bangladesh‟s war of liberation in 1971 was critical to the 
latter‟s emergence as an independent entity. However, events that followed the 
liberation of Bangladesh did not result in the continuance of cordial relations between 
these two countries as was expected. There are a few fundamental issues between 
India and Bangladesh such as land and maritime boundary demarcation, the sharing of 
water from 54 common rivers, informal trade, transnational crime and interference in 
internal affairs that have adversely affected their relationship. The leaders of both the 
countries need to show sincerity, seriousness and determination in resolving these 
issues because there is no issue which cannot be resolved through dialogue. Both 
nations need to undergo a change in their mindset particularly at the political level. 
There is a need for greater political understanding, dialogue, diplomacy, regional 
cooperation and less interference in each other‟s internal affairs. While it may be easy 
to simply list these issues, however, overcoming them would be difficult mainly due 
to the overall geopolitical compulsions, the historical legacy and the mutual mistrust 
in the region. India and Bangladesh would improve greatly if they recognize the need 
for greater political will to overcome the geopolitical compulsions to appreciate the 
essence of regional cooperation and to realize the benefits of peaceful coexistence.
353
 
India is a big neighbor and is capable of assuming central position in the 
region. Rajen Harshe‟s evaluation may be pertinent here; “It is, thus, as a result of 
India‟s (whether perceived or not) economic and military might, that India‟s smaller 
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neighboring countries regard the South Asian region as an Indo-centric region, with 
India being the core and other South Asian states as the periphery”.354 Again, 
borrowing the idea from Zbigniew Brzezinski- former United States National Security 
Advisor-; “India may be called a geostrategic player while Bangladesh may be called 
a geostrategic pivot. A geostrategic player has the capacity and national will to 
exercise influence beyond its borders in order to alter the existing geopolitical state of 
affairs, while the significance of a geopolitical pivot is derived from how strategically 
it is located and the potential consequences it may bring about as a result of the 
behavior of the geostrategic players”.355 Nonetheless, it is necessary for India, as a 
formidable power in the region, to take along its neighbors, especially the smaller 
nations, in settling any outstanding issues amicably.  A relatively smaller country such 
as Bangladesh has to depend on and share resources like water, energy, maritime, 
trade and technology with its neighbors.   However, when there is contention between 
the two states especially over the sharing of resources, the situation gives rise to 
misunderstandings which then lead to a state of mistrust. India is the largest 
democracy in the world with democratic values and ethos emulated by other nations, 
and similar democratic values and ethos could be the forerunners for better relations 
between the two countries. India definitely enjoys more political stability than 
Bangladesh. However, there remains much room for improvement in the area of 
constitutional liberalism in both countries. There is, therefore, a need to understand 
the varied dynamics of inter-state relations, particularly in light of certain issues that 
are straining the relations of the two countries. In addition, there is already an existing 
history of mistrust between India and Bangladesh, which has been exacerbated by 
these current issues. The overall scenario thus calls for a change in the South Asian 
mindset.
356
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Problem of Illegal Migration 
―The massive illegal immigration poses a grave danger to our security, 
social harmony and economic well-being.  We have compromised on 
all these aspects so far. It is time to say enough is enough.‖  
        (Recommendation of National Security System, Feb. 2001) 
―The long cherished design of Greater Bangladesh, making inroads 
into the strategic land link of Assam with the rest of India, can lead to 
severing the entire land mass of North East from the rest of the 
country‖  
              (Lt. Gen S.K. Sinha Report Mar. 1998)
357
 
One of the agonies of human conditions has been uprooting of people from 
their original abode seeking shelter in foreign countries owing to war, violence, 
persecution, threats to their lives or property and environmental disaster etc. These 
people migrate to other countries when they are isolated and impoverished. In 
international relations refugee movements not only caused tension between states but 
also acted as a catalyst for cultural and ethnic disputes both within and among the 
countries of the region. The exodus of people from their homeland to other countries 
may be politically embarrassing. It also destabilizes the recipient states in several 
ways. Besides, accommodating large number of displaced people may cause a 
considerable financial burden to the country of asylum which in due course is sure to 
effect the economic development and political stability of the country concerned.
358
 
Since 1947, South Asia witnessed massive population movement across the 
border of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal. Myron Weiner has 
classified this event broadly into “rejected people” and “unwanted migrants”. In the 
words of Kurt Waldheim- former United Nations Secretary General-, “Refugees are 
flotsam of all the wars, crises and conflicts of the third world”.359 Genesis of refugee 
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influx into India from Pakistan started since 1947 when there was widespread 
communal violence. According to Government of India records between 1947 and 
1958, a huge 41, 17,000 number of refugees crossed into India and 11, 14,000 moved 
during the communal disturbances between 1964 and 1970.
360
  Ever since the Pakistan 
military forces started systematic massacre of the people of Bangladesh, streams of 
refugees started pouring into India from across the border. Consequent to the military 
atrocities committed by the Pakistan military forces during the genocide of 1971 in 
East Pakistan, almost ten million refugees fled from their dwelling places and sought 
asylum in India especially in the states of west Bengal, Tripura, Assam and 
Meghalaya.
361
 
 
 
Table: 8 
S. No. Name of State No. of 
Refugees 
Percentage of 
Refugees 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
West Bengal 
Tripura 
Meghalaya 
Assam 
Bihar 
7493474 
1416491 
667986 
312713 
8641 
75.7% 
14.3% 
6.75% 
3.15% 
0.08% 
  9899305 99.98% 
Source: Bangladesh Documents, Vol. II, p.81 
 Government of India allowed the entry of refugees from East Pakistan to India 
on humanitarian grounds. New Delhi treated them as foreign nationals and they were 
required to be registered under section 3 of Foreigners Act of 1946. India‘s stand on 
this sensitive issue was officially made clear by V.V Giri the then president of India, 
who in his broadcast to the nation on the eve of Independence Day said,  
―We are holding refugees from Bangladesh temporarily as a trust on 
behalf of the international community. They will all have to go back to 
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their homeland irrespective of their caste and creed as soon as 
favorable conditions are created for their return.‖362 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Location of main Refugee Camps in India, November 1971. 
 The issue of illegal migration has strained the India Bangladesh relations 
right from the beginning. Out of the total 75 million population of East Pakistan in 
1971 nearly 10 million came to India as refugees. In order to understand the problems 
created by the refugees on the government and people of India, a state wise 
examination of the influx in Bengal Tripura Assam and Meghalaya was necessary. 
Because of the complexity of the illegal influx India and Bangladesh decided to have a 
two day conference at the official level to enforce the 1991 agreement on illegal 
immigration. The 1991 agreement stipulated that ‗any person declared by the court as 
a Bangladeshi national staying illegally in India would be accepted by Bangladesh. 
Similarly any Indian staying in Bangladesh illegally and declared so by the court will 
be accepted by India. The Supreme Court of India expressed concern over the 
unabated migration from Bangladesh to various Indian states like Tripura, Assam and 
west Bengal.
363
 The apex court stated that the influx of Bangladesh was posing a 
danger to the region‘s demography and it ordered the governments to deem it as a 
serious matter and requested the concerned states to submit the reply within 8 months. 
                                                          
362
 P. S Nair, Op.cit, pp. 175-76. 
363
 Rogers. M Smith, Citizenship, Borders, and Human Need, University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010, 
p.241. 
In its affidavit, the Assam government submitted that a total of 4, 05,269 illegal 
migrants were detected in the state from 1952 to 1999 of which 3, 47,689 were 
deported. In the recent past there appeared to be a close nexus between illegal 
migrants and fundamentalist organizations on the one hand and fundamentalist 
organizations and Pakistan‘s ISI on the other.364 The Tripura government‘s affidavit 
stated that it had pushed back 1, 43,188 illegal migrants since 1971.  But West Bengal 
government‘s submission was that it had suggested to the Centre for introducing 
changes in the Foreigners Act to strengthen the authority and the procedure for 
deporting Bangladeshis. West Bengal has been the constant sufferer in respect of 
Bangladesh immigrants. This state with the highest population density in India has 
been under heavy strains due to illegal influx. As a result of migration from 
Bangladesh, the Muslim population in west Bengal‘s Murshidabad district has 
increased from 55 percent in 1951 to 61 percent in1991.
365
 Though the soil of 
Bangladesh is very fertile but it has been often subjected to floods, cyclonic storms 
and devastation by the changing course of rivers. The issue of over population and 
hunger compelled the refugees to migrate to better and safer regions. Further the 
situation in Bangladesh deteriorated due to political victimization by the government 
in Dhaka. After 1975 there was total chaos, confusion, coups and counter coups 
everywhere in Bangladesh which too compelled the people to leave their homeland. 
Islamization of Bangladesh by Ziaur Rehman also prompted illegal migration.
366
 
 Refugees have not been passive spectators but have actively tried to influence 
the government of their host country.  This illegal immigration has led to the increase 
of smuggling, security problems and cross border trafficking in the India‘s north 
eastern states. The high population density endemic poverty and vulnerability to the 
vagaries of nature (cyclones, frequent floods) exacerbate the flow of illegal 
immigration to India. India‘s concern over the magnitude of the problem is regularly 
conveyed to Bangladesh including at the highest level. An institutional framework has 
been established to discuss various issues related to border management including the 
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problem of illegal cross border movement through regular meetings of Director 
General of the BSF and Bangladesh Riffles and Home Secretaries of both the 
countries. The two sides revived the Joint Working Group to discuss operational 
matters related to security issues and held a meeting in New Delhi on May 29-30, 
2008.
367
 
 Thus influx of refugees from Bangladesh has been an issue which considerably 
strained Indo-Bangladesh relations with social, political and economic implications. 
The problem has been so serious that it caused political instability in India‘s North 
Eastern Region. This issue was in limelight prior to Sheikh Mujibur Rehman and also 
during his period but became more acute after the downfall of Awami League 
government. Besides in post Mujib period, minorities felt insecure in Bangladesh. 
Insecurity forced them to take shelter in India and still it is going on. The presence of 
illegal Bangladeshi nationals in India has been the most controversial and 
contentious issue on the bilateral agenda.
368
  Dhaka has consistently maintained that 
there are no Bangladeshis in India. Irrespective of internal differences, Bangladeshi 
leaders have been vehemently denying Indian contentions over illegal 
immigrations.
369
  Gen. H.M Ershad's August 1983 statement which aptly testifies this 
trend that, 
“We achieved our independence after supreme sacrifices to belong to 
the country ... Our people are living in complete harmony and peace. 
We have security of life and food to feed our people.... It is therefore out 
of question for our people to leave for any other country illegally as has 
been alleged‖.370 
 From the early days up to the present time the Bangladeshi official position 
remains consistent on this issue. Independent Bangladeshi scholars, however, of late, 
agree with the prevailing Indian position concerning illegal migration. The Indian 
position on the presence of the Bangladeshi migrants has been rather clear and 
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unambiguous and needless to be fortified with well documented evidence. An internal 
note prepared by India's Home Ministry maintained that, 
―According to the figures available (in 1987) with the Government of 
West Bengal, the total number of Bangladeshi infiltrators in the State of 
West Bengal was around 4.4 million. It would be near about five million 
today. In Assam, the estimated figure of infiltrators today is about 2.2 
million. Tripura and Bihar are also seriously affected by infiltration 
from Bangladesh. The infiltrators are now spreading to newer areas of 
Manipur and Nagaland.‖371 
 While a comprehensive estimate is elusive, the following data highlights the 
magnitude of the problem posed by illegal immigrants: 
i. Between 1972 and 1996, as much as 1.2 million Bangladeshis came to West 
Bengal but never went back. 
ii. Bangladeshi Muslims constitute a majority in a five-to-ten kilometer corridor 
in West Bengal along the Indo-Bangladeshi borders. 
iii. In the predominantly Buddhist-populated Arunachal Pradesh, the Muslim 
population increased by 135 per cent during the last decade. 
iv. According to a report prepared by the then Governor of Assam S.K. Sinha in 
1998, there were 5.4 million Bangladeshi migrants in West Bengal, 0.8 
million in Tripura, 0.5 million in Bihar, 0.5 million in Maharashtra, 0.5 
million in Rajasthan and 0.3 million in Delhi.
372
 
 As a result, demographic invasion from across the eastern borders has not 
only endangered the social, cultural and political harmony but has very serious 
implications for the national security. The Indian political parties vary in their 
approach towards this issue. Viewing the illegal migrants as potential supporters and 
vote banks, political parties tend to preserve the status quo of the migrants and are 
not keen to take a stand on the illegal presence of non-Indians. Illegal migrants 
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voting in various elections ranging from Assembly elections to Parliamentary and 
affects the end results whether in West Bengal, Assam or in Delhi, has been a 
common knowledge.
373
 What began as a demographic problem in bordering districts 
of West Bengal and Assam has transformed into a much larger social problem and 
has reached far off areas such as Delhi and Mumbai.  In July 1999 the Supreme 
Court directed the West Bengal Government to detect and deport illegal Bangladeshi 
immigrants from the state. The then Jyoti Basu government argued that this could not 
be implemented because the illegal migrants were too difficult to be identified. 
Furthermore, even if they were identified, the State Government argued, Government 
of Bangladesh had refused to accept the deportees and, consequently, those who were 
pushed back re-entered Indian Territory through clandestine routes.
374
 A number of 
Indian states in the region neighboring Bangladesh are determined not only to 
identify the newcomers but also to evacuate them as illegal migrants. Orissa 
government started the deportation process of about 3,000 migrants without 
differentiating whether they were illegal migrants or refugees.
375
 Far from being an 
issue of individuals moving to greener pastures, migration has been taken over by 
well-organized gangs who organize their travel and settlement in India. The nexus 
between the Bangladeshi migrants and Indian handlers operate in a political climate 
that has been congenial to the whole process.
376
 
 The question of illegal migrations has to be seen in the context of increased 
apprehensions over radicalization of the Bangladeshi society. A report in Far Eastern 
Economic Review warned, 
―….A revolution is taking place in Bangladesh that threatens trouble for 
the region and beyond if left unchallenged. Islamic fundamentalism, 
religious intolerance, militant Muslim groups with links to international 
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terrorist groups, powerful military with ties to the militants, the 
mushrooming of Islamic schools churning out radical students, middle-
class apathy, poverty and lawlessness—all are combining to transform 
the nation….‖377 
 This radicalization has its negative influences also upon the illegal migrants 
with far reaching consequences for India. The cadres of Jamaat-e-Islami of 
Bangladesh have been active in Manipur and the increase in the number of Islamic 
groups and organizations in Assam indirectly linked to the illegal migrants from 
Bangladesh. The mushroom growth of madrasas, in West Bengal and some of the 
north-eastern states is the result of major population changes brought about by illegal 
immigration from Bangladesh. Assam has 2002 madrasas with 20,000 students while 
the small state of Tripura has 229 madrasas with 28,000 students.
378
 It is in this 
context one should examine the recent warning by West Bengal Chief Minister 
Buddhadev Bhattacharya that "some madrasas are indulging in unlawful activities." 
Even though inter-party compulsions and political correctness forced him to 
backtrack, the issue is out in the open. Reports of Pakistani support to radical groups 
in Bangladesh add a new dimension to the problem of insurgency. According to one 
Bangladeshi commentator, the Islamic fundamentalists in Bangladesh allegedly 
getting patronage from Pakistan's ISI even attacked the secular platforms including 
cultural functions and Bangla New Year's celebrations. There are suggestions that the 
Pakistani outfit Harkat-ul-Jihad al- Islami has a branch in Bangladesh and these 
fundamentalists are believed to be active in various Islamic causes including Kashmir 
and in the attack on the American Cultural Centre in Kolkata  on January 22, 2002.
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Ganges Water Dispute at Farakka 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ganges River and major tributaries and cities (Note: The Brahmaputra River is also included in the 
map (south and west into Bangladesh and east through Tibetan China) 
 Few controversial matters of the subcontinent have attracted the attention and 
concern of the world community as intensely as the long standing disputes over the 
sharing of the Ganges water between India and Bangladesh. The construction and 
operation by India the upper riparian of a barrage across the Ganges at a place named 
Farakka about 17 kilometers upstream from the western borders of Bangladesh with 
India. River Ganges flows through China, Nepal, India and Bangladesh.
380
  It receives 
80 percent of its rainfall during the June-September monsoon period till the volume 
of water at Farakka becomes 2.5 million cubic feet. In 1951, India first thought of 
building a dam at Farakka-18 miles upstream from Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) 
designed to divert the Ganges flow during the dry season into Baghirathi-Hoogli 
River to flush out the silt at the port of Calcutta. Concern for the future of East 
Pakistan's agriculture was aroused by this planned barrage. As time passed, the 
Farakka Dam became a dispute between India and Pakistan- second in bitterness only 
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to the Kashmir dispute.
381
 The Dam was commissioned after the independence of 
Bangladesh. It was expected that, given the cordial relations between India and the 
newly created state, the Farakka Dam issue would be dealt with amicably, but it was 
not. India did not consult with Dhaka before operationalzing the barrage. In the years 
that have followed, Bangladesh has been suffering from adverse effects on its 
agriculture, fishery, navigation and forestry due to the reduced flow in the dry season 
when it most needs the Ganges water (Ganges, Brahmaputra and Meghna rivers 
sustain 86 per cent of the total land area in Bangladesh).Anti-India sentiment was 
fuelled by the dispute over the Farakka Dam. In contrast, when India, as the upper 
riparian state, interfered with rivers flowing into Pakistan the dispute was resolved 
through the Indus Water Treaty in 1960.
382
 India and Bangladesh have failed since 
1974 to agree on a strategy of water-flows during the dry season. When Bangladesh 
proposed several storage dams on the tributaries of the Ganges River in the Nepal, 
India objected to it. Instead it proposed a diversion from Brahmaputra through a large 
canal to augment the Ganges waters. This was not acceptable to Bangladesh, which 
feared ecological damage from the canal. After independence of Bangladesh many 
short term agreements and Memorandum of Understandings were signed from time to 
time between the two countries and finally a 30-year agreement on water sharing 
from Farakka in December 1996 was signed but it too does not constitute a long term 
commitment. The 1996 treaty has been attacked by the Awami League's main rival, 
the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which is regarded as hostile to India, but it 
did not renege from the treaty when it came to power in 2001. The BNP and other 
Bangladeshi political factions allege that India is drawing excessive water and the 
amount allocated to Bangladesh is unjust and insufficient. India in turn complains that 
the water allocated to Bangladesh leaves it with less water than necessary for the 
functioning of the Kolkata Port and the National Thermal Power Corporation in 
Farakka.
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Insurgency 
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 India has been accusing Dhaka of facilitating, encouraging and supporting 
various North-east insurgent groups. These groups have been exploiting cross border 
ethnic linkages. A favorable terrain helps various insurgent groups‘ manage seeking 
secure and safe havens in contiguous Bangladeshi territories. The emergence of 
military rule in Bangladesh re-established the old link between Pakistan's ISI and the 
northeast insurgency. Periodically various Bangladeshi governments (while 
maintaining their total non-involvement) have been promising to intervene and close 
these bases. However, in a significant departure from this customary promises, in 
April 2000 Mohammad Nasim, Home Minister in Sheikh Hessian‘s Government, 
admitted that with the help of an unnamed foreign intelligence agency, Indian 
separatists had long been provided training on Bangladeshi soil. Accusing India of 
encouraging and training the Chakmas, Mohammad Nasim declared that after  
Sheikh Hasina came to power in 1996, both countries agreed not to cooperate with 
each other's separatist groups. In early 2002, responding to allegations by West 
Bengal Chief Minister Buddhadev Bhattacharya, Dhaka maintained that Bangladesh 
does not allow its territory to be used by insurgents or terrorists against any other 
country. The remarks of the Chief Minister of West Bengal were unfounded and 
warned that such allegations run counter to fostering better India-Bangladesh 
relations.
384
 The reality however, is rather different. For instance in July 1999, the 
then Chief Minister of Tripura Manik Sarkar pointed out that the porous border 
between India and Bangladesh has been used by the insurgent groups for movement 
to and from their camps.
385
  In June 2001, media reports highlighted the presence of 
a number of camps in Bangladesh operated by National Liberation Front of Tripura 
(NLFT), United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) and National Democratic Front 
of Bodoland (NDFB).
386
 In the following November, twelve Indian nationals were 
arrested in Khagrachhari in Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) on suspicion of being 
members of the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT).
387
 There have been 
reports that ULFA has several lucrative income-generating projects in Bangladesh to 
sustain its insurgency activities in India. The NLFT which has spear-headed the anti-
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Bengali agitation in Tripura has been maintaining bases in the Sajek range of 
CHT.
388
 An insurgent group Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO), comprising of 
Rajbongshi‟s, has been fighting for a separate state of Kamtapur and is operating 
close to the enclaves. KLO has developed strong links with a number of militant 
groups in the Northeast as well as with the ISI.
389
  The position of the Awami League 
and the BNP-over the question of support for Indian insurgents has been somewhat 
different. For long, the presence of a number of key insurgent figures belonging to a 
host of groups such as All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF) and ULFA has been a source 
of irritant in the Indo-Bangladeshi relations. Sheikh Hasina (BAL) and Khaleda Zia 
(BNP) approached the issue rather differently. For example, Sanjeev Deb Barman, a 
senior ATTF member, who was illegally staying in Bangladesh since1993, was 
arrested in 1998 by the Hasina Government. As India was seeking his extradition in 
January 2002, Khaleda Government released him on bail. Taking cue from the new 
climate Sanjeev Deb Barman quickly applied for political asylum. The failure of the 
Bangladeshi Government to block the move was not viewed well by New Delhi. 
Likewise, Anup Chetia, Secretary of ULFA, who was arrested during Sheikh Hasina‘s 
regime, also had sought political asylum.
390
 There are some concluding observations 
regarding the insurgency; 
 
i. Addressing the root causes of insurgencies; 
ii. Enlist support of NGOs to tackle the menace; 
iii. Involve the UN to come out with initiatives to curb this menace; 
iv. Improving political governance, administrative efficiency and policing; 
 While addressing the root causes one must recognize that such conflicts are 
political and demand a political solution. Besides, lack of political will, criminalizing 
politics and creating their own political armies and militias should be addressed.
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Border Problem 
 India and Bangladesh share a land-border of 4,096 kilometers and a maritime 
border of 180 km.
392
 The non-demarcation of a 6.5 km land border along the 
Comilla-Tripura makes the border question unresolved. India's reluctance towards 
this issue is attributed to ―the concerns of the Hindus living in the lands likely to go 
to Bangladesh after demarcation‖.393 Its inability to find an alternative site to 
relocate the Hindu population is the major stumbling block in resolving this issue. As 
long as the question of demarcation is not resolved, India would be unable to ratify 
the Indra-Mujib agreement of 1974
394
 which laid the basis for Indo-Bangladeshi 
friendship.
395
 The river borders pose a different kind of problems because the shifting 
river routes, soil erosion or frequent floods make it difficult to demarcate borders, 
especially when they form numerous islands and chars. River border lines tend to 
change course periodically leading to a host of disputes, associated with the 
difficulties in establishing ownership of the newly created territories, for example in 
the 1980s controversies surrounding sovereignty over New Moore island (South 
Talpatty) dominated Indo-Bangladeshi relations. 
 The Enclave problems form the third component of the border dispute. An 
enclave is a portion of one state completely surrounded by the territory of another 
state. Presently there are about 250 enclaves surviving in the world and they are 
found mainly in three areas Western Europe, the fringes of the former Soviet empire 
and South Asia. But the majority of world‟s enclaves can be found in a small section 
of the indo-Bangladesh border land. 
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The Border Enclaves of India and Bangladesh 
 There are number of enclaves on the Indo-Bangladesh border which are in 
adverse locations. While India has 111 enclaves in Bangladesh (17,258.24 acres), the 
latter has 51 enclaves (7,083.72acres) inside India. Of these, the ownership of 65 
enclaves on the West Bengal-Bangladesh border are disputed and out of them 35 
enclaves are in adverse possession (Indian enclaves in Bangladesh), and 31 in 
reverse possession (Bangladeshi enclaves in India).
396
 The enclaves in the Assam-
Meghalaya-Bangladesh border covering an area of 755 acres of land remain 
unresolved out of these 520 acres are with India and the remaining with Bangladesh. 
In July 2001, after prolonged delays and hesitation, the West Bengal Government 
agreed to grant round-the-clock access for Bangladeshis to Tin Bigha corridor (an 
area between two Bangladeshi enclaves of Dahagram and Angorpota), thus breaking 
the deadlock that existed from 1974.
397
 Non-demarcation of land borders, changing 
nature of the maritime border or the disputes over non-exchange of enclaves are 
serious irritants in Indo-Bangladeshi relations. They also generate a whole range of 
associated disputes and conflicts which make the border question prominent on the 
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agenda of bilateral relations. Bangladesh has a host of demands vis-à-vis India 
concerning the border question and they include:
398
 
i. Ensure free movement of enclave people and permit exchange of enclave 
people; 
ii. Speedy demarcation of the border line; 
iii. Refrain from pushing Bengali-speaking Indian nationals into Bangladesh 
territory; 
iv. Adopt methods to check violation of the border by Indian civilians and BSF 
members and ban smuggling of Phensidyl (an intoxicating chemical) and 
drugs; 
v. Ratify the 1974 Indira-Mujib Agreement to facilitate the demarcation of the 
remaining part of the border.
399
 
 India's indifference to resolve the demarcation and enclaves problems 
provoked Bangladeshi analyst to remark: 
―For India there are only two neighbors- Pakistan and China-the rest of 
us are mere geographic entities deserving very little attention and 
understanding. India really has no time for its smaller neighbors. 
Neither does the Indian media…..‖400 
 Even from India's point of view, the border question poses a number of 
problems between the two countries. Frequent border clashes partly emanate from 
this feeling. In 2001 alone 50 Indians and 41 Bangladeshis were killed in border 
clashes. The clashes between BSF (Border Security Force) and BDR (Bangladesh 
Rifles) in the disputed enclaves in the Assam-Meghalaya-Bangladesh borders in April 
2001 were seen by some as a calculated move by the military to flare up anti-Indian 
sentiments.
401
  The disputes over enclaves raise many questions about the residency 
rights and the statelessness of the inhabitants which often takes the form of 
lawlessness. The porous nature of the land and maritime border are congenial for 
extensive smuggling activities between the two countries. Right from arms and 
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ammunition, a whole range of commodities including jute, rice, cattle as well as 
services and human capital are being smuggled through the borders. Such activities 
have strong economic motives and Jamdani saris form a major component of the 
parallel trade between the two countries. The saris are a prime component of 
Bangladeshi exports but because of the tax concession at home, the Jamdani saris are 
smuggled back into Bangladesh. Likewise, cattle have been a prominent commodity 
in the informal trade with India with the 'export' of 1.7 million cattle annually to 
Bangladesh. Apart from assisting insurgent groups in North-east India, Bangladesh 
is increasingly permitting smuggling of ISI agents into India through its porous 
borders with West Bengal. Against the backdrop of illegal migration, porous borders 
and continuous flow of smuggling activities, India opted in 1987 to build fences along 
the Indo-Bangladesh border.
402
  The hilly terrain of Tripura, Mizoram and 
Meghalaya pose severe logistic problems for fencing operations. There are also 
political fallouts as the Bangladesh Government is not favorable to the idea of 
fencing. As a state encircled by India on all the three sides (with the Bay of Bengal 
being the fourth frontier), Bangladesh sees it as 'an unfair' move. While appreciating 
the problems posed by the presence of insurgents, Sheikh Hasina was unable to rein 
in militants operating against India. Public perception of pro-India leanings 
notwithstanding, it was only after the October 2001 that the Bangladeshi government 
headed by Khaleda Zia categorically stated its opposition against its territory being 
used for any anti-Indian activities. At the same time it is essential to note that number 
of factors such as geography, vested interests do inhibit the government from 
effectively preventing insurgents from operating from Bangladesh.
403
 Though India 
wants to improve its relationship with Bangladesh, it also does not want to 
compromise on its security. It thinks that its internal security would improve 
considerably if it is able to fence its border with Bangladesh. This Indian approach 
was clearly spelt out in the address of Indian President A. P. J Abdul Kalam to the 
joint session of parliament during the start of budget session where he had said that 
security along the country's border with Bangladesh is one of the priorities of our 
government. He said, "Government has accorded top priority to erection of fence 
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along the Indo-Bangladesh border to check infiltration, smuggling and all anti-India 
activities from across the border." Bangladesh, on the other hand does not want to 
see this fencing work being completed. This has resulted into a tricky and tidy 
situation on the borders. India cannot stop fencing, but at the same time it has also to 
take caution so that an unpleasant incident like 2001 could be avoided which had 
resulted into killing of 16 BSF personnel and three Bangladeshi soldiers. Keeping this 
in view, the BSF went for a joint survey with BDR. Simultaneously, India's foreign 
office in Dhaka requested the Bangladesh government to ask the BDR to refrain from 
creating hostile situation on the border.
404
  A number of controversial issues engender 
conflagration on the Indo-Bangladesh border. The problems involved are so complex 
that they defy easy solutions. In this situation, it would be advisable if India starts by 
first solving the border issue and then move to the issue of illegal migration and terror 
camps in Bangladesh. Problems on the Indo-Bangladesh border have persisted also 
because it figures very low on the priority list of the Indian government. A senior 
Home Ministry official reportedly said, “Nobody seems serious about taking up this 
issue. Once the Indian government takes the initiative to resolve the issue, 
Bangladesh would have no option but to fall in line. It is imperative to sort out the 
problem at the earliest in the larger interest of the country‟s security”. Some analysts 
suggest that this indifference of the Indian government has been used by Bangladesh 
to its advantage. They have tried to capture Indian land and given shelter to 
insurgents active in northeastern India. They have also pushed their surplus 
population in the Indian Territory. It is time India pays more attention to its 
northeastern border, before it gets too late.
405
 
Trade 
 Despite periodic frictions, political differences and foreign policy rhetoric, 
geostrategic position and economic compulsions have ensured the continuance of 
trade links between India and Bangladesh. The real problem in the bilateral relations 
lies in the imbalance that Bangladesh finds in its trade relations. Bangladesh is the 
eighth largest export market for Indian goods and if one includes 'informal' trade, it 
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becomes the third largest destination for Indian merchandise. Likewise, both in 
formal and informal trade, India is the largest trading partner for Bangladesh. It 
accounts for 20.8 percent of Bangladesh formal exports and these figures goes up to 
28.3 if one includes the informal trade.
406
 Although India is not the prime exporter to 
Bangladesh, it accounts for the bulk of Bangladeshi global trade deficit.
407
  From 
about $150 million in 1990-91, its trade imbalance had crossed the billion marks in 
2000-01.
408
  Any attempt to remedy the overall trade deficit of that country would 
have to begin with rectifying the imbalance vis-à-vis India. This can be achieved 
either by reducing imports from India or increasing Bangladeshi exports to India. 
Unfortunately, both these approaches have in-built problems. If one looks at the 
former, fabrics and textile yarn constitute bulk of commodities imported from India. 
They are the raw materials for ready-made garments, the principal Bangladeshi 
export commodity. Given this linkage, Bangladesh would not be able to reduce the 
import of textiles and yarn from India, without affecting its overall exports to the 
outside world. Alternatively, India could be encouraged to buy more Bangladeshi 
commodities and Dhaka has been demanding a host of trade concessions from India 
including the reduction or abolition of trade barriers. Such a move would immensely 
benefit Bangladesh as it would formalize a large volume of informal trade that 
deprives Bangladesh of legitimate customs revenue and thereby reduce the trade 
deficit.
409
 Exports to India are dominated by a select group of commodities. For 
example in 1998, four items namely Jamdani saris, chemicals, raw jute and frozen 
fish constituted as much as 85 per cent of Bangladeshi exports to India.
410
 Given this 
extremely narrow export commodity structure, Bangladesh would have to diversify its 
exportable items if it were to bring down the trade deficit. In other words, even if 
India were to completely tear down the trade barriers, Bangladesh would be unable 
to capitalize any benefit from it. Moreover, trade deficit alone does not explain the 
tension between the two countries. Reflecting on this Rehman Sobhan observed, 
―...persistent and growing deficit with India demands attention because of its political 
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as distinct from economic implications‖. Thus, political considerations, as with other 
issues, make trade a contentious issue in the Indo-Bangladesh relations.
411
  
 Disputes over transshipment and transit form another dimension of the 
bilateral dispute. Even though both are used interchangeably, in both cases Indian 
goods pass through Bangladesh to the North-east and vice-versa. Under the Indo-
Bangladesh agreement transshipment means that Indian goods are transferred to a 
Bangladeshi carrier at the Indo-Bangladesh border and are re-transferred to an 
Indian carrier when the goods reach the Bangladesh-North-East borders. 
Exploitation of the geographic proximity would be immensely beneficial to both 
countries. It would be economically advantageous for India if the north-eastern states 
were to use Chittagong port rather than Kolkata port for trade. Instead of using the 
Chittagong port which is just 70-74 km away, exports from southern Tripura had to 
use long route to Kolkata through the Siliguri corridor.
412
 Movement of goods to and 
in North-east India overland through Bangladesh would take a shorter route and 
would be highly advantageous to India. Both sides principally agreed on a 
Transshipment Agreement on July 28, 1999 and it came into effect in January 2002 
but was discontinued after a while.
413
 Transshipment of Indian goods offers direct 
economic advantages as well as employment opportunities to Bangladesh. Besides 
the cost of transportation, Bangladesh would be able to levy a 10 per cent value-
addition charge. Moreover, transshipment would accrue additional revenues in the 
form of repair, energy supplies, banking and insurance.
414
  According to one 
estimate, the transit and transshipment facilities could earn for Bangladesh over 
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4,000 million rupees annually.
415
The issue of transshipment has been highly 
politicized. While the economic considerations generate a favorable response from 
the business communities, political compulsions drive the politicians to oppose the 
idea.
416
 Khaleda Zia, the leader of the Opposition warned that transshipment would 
be a direct threat to the national sovereignty. The opposition termed it as ―suicidal 
and against the national interests‖. India has clubbed the trade and transit issue 
while as Bangladesh tends to separate the two and seek trade concessions without 
making any reciprocal concessions over transit facilities. 
Closely related to the trade question is the possible export of gas to India.
417
 It has 
become a controversial domestic issue. Both Sheikh Hasina and Khaleda Zia tend to 
agree on the need to use gas reserves for domestic needs before contemplating 
exports.
418
 There are strong domestic pressures against squandering precious 
indigenous commercial source of energy for temporary gains. Awami League Party 
often demands that gas exports should be considered after securing and catering gas 
needs of Bangladesh for at least fifty years. At the existing level of consumption, this 
means Bangladesh should have a gas reserve of 62 TCF (trillion cubic feet).
419
 But 
existing estimates are inaccurate and range from 11 TCF to 100 TCF.
420
 However, 
after October 2001victory, the BNP was showing signs of a shift in its gas policy and 
shortly after assuming office Finance Minister M. Saifur Rehman indicated that 
Bangladesh should be prepared to export gas if there are enough reserves to meet 
nation's needs for 25- 30 years.
421
 The question of gas export cropped up when 
Bangladesh was seeking trade concessions from India. Local media suggested that in 
return for granting duty free status to 25 commodities, India was seeking assurances 
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over gas exports. In October 2001 a delegation from the Metropolitican Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry (MCCI) of Bangladesh urged its government to link gas 
exports to tariff concessions from the Indian government. Domestic pressures, 
however, compelled Khaleda to deny vehemently any such linkage. According to the 
final report submitted at the end of August by the two committees namely, National 
Gas Utilization Committee and National Gas Resources Committee which were set up 
in January, there is no scope presently for export of gas given the present domestic 
demand and the proven reserves of 16 trillion cubic feet (TCF).
422
 At the same time 
various western donors including Asian Development Bank have been consistently 
urging Bangladesh to go for gas export.
423
 
Chakma Problem 
 In terms of ethnic composition Bangladesh is the most homogeneous state of 
South Asia. Almost 98 percent of the population is made up of Bengalese. 
Nonetheless, since its independence in 1971, the country faced considerable problems 
in integrating its ethnic minorities to the national mainstream. These minorities 
primarily but not exclusively Chakmas constitute less than 1 percent of the total 
population and are concentrated in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) a hilly sylvan 
territory covering about a percent of total area of Bangladesh.
424
 
 However complex web of reasons like relative exposure of the tribal people to 
education, modernization and political turmoil during the last years of Pakistani rule, 
their failure to support the liberation war en masse and its aftermath, disturbances in 
the traditional mode of agriculture production and the fear of loss of identity 
generated an upsurge in their political consciousness and besides sense of deprivation. 
Indian involvement in the ethnic turmoil in CHT has largely been clandestine. Tribal 
people who fled to India found shelter in the refugee camps. While providing the 
Shanti Bhani insurgents with sanctuary training and military assistance, India did it 
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covertly. New Delhi confessed only its humanitarian assistance to the refugees while 
persistently denying any assistance rendered to the insurgents. Nonetheless trained 
and armed insurgents were infiltrating into Bangladesh from Indian Territory getting 
involved in sporadic clashes with the members of law enforcing agencies. As a 
consequence, ethnic problem in CHT area right from its violent manifestation had 
been a serious bone of contention in Indo-Bangladesh relations particularly since 
1981.
425
 
 The impact of the influx of Chakma refugees in Tripura (the North Eastern 
Region of India) has been two fold. Firstly, the region has to live with the problem of 
intermittent influx of refugees who fled to India in search of security and secondly, 
the disturbed atmosphere on the border has encouraged its own extremist elements 
more particularly Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) to carry on their nefarious 
activities with impunity from their hideouts across the border. India drew the 
attention of Bangladesh to the point that by 1981 there were 40,000 refugees from the 
CHT living in Indian border state.
426
  Bangladesh refused the allegations and lodged a 
counter charge against India alleging that nearly 500 armed Indian miscreants had 
created a reign of terror inside the CHT. The problem of Chakma refugees cropped up 
again in 1986. N D Tiwari, External Affairs Minister discussed the Chakma problem 
with his Bangladesh counterpart and an agreement was reached according to which 
Bangladesh agreed to repatriate 24000 of the refugees. But the repatriation process 
could not take place because of the conflict between BSF and Shanti Bhani
427
, which 
resulted in postponement of the process and the government of Bangladesh alleged 
that India did not show sufficient interest in the repatriation process. 
 Repatriation talks were held again between Bangladesh, India and Chakma 
leaders and as a result of the discussion among them, Dhaka agreed to receive back 
Chakma refugees. A repatriation process was finalized in January 1999 according to 
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which all of the remaining refugees who had been lodged in camps since 1986 would 
be sent back to their ancestral homeland by February 1999.
428
 
Security perception  
 It is usually believed that a sense of security is an essential requirement for the 
development in a nation. The South Asian regional problems and conflicts have their 
own dynamics and most if not all of these are created within the region by its history, 
its geo-politics, its economics and ecology. Many of these inter-state dilemmas of the 
region of South Asia, its endemic tensions, mistrusts and occasional hostilities are the 
product of the contradiction of India‟s security perception with that of the countries of 
the region. India, being the bigger country of the region having vast economic 
resources and being militarily most powerful in the region of South Asia, is generally 
looked upon by its neighbors not as a source of strength but as a threat. Within this 
context Iftekharuzzaman observed that, “India‟s neighbors tend to perceive threats to 
their security coming primarily from India which for its part considers its neighbors 
as an integral part of its own security system”. The perception regarding securities of 
India and Bangladesh have had an important impact on their bilateral relations which 
sometimes brought the two countries closer and sometimes made the relations acidic. 
India‟s supremacy in the region was justified in 1971 when it helped Bangladesh to 
gain liberation and was further strengthened in 1974 when India became successful in 
its nuclear test.
429
 
 India‟s pre-eminence in the region rendered by geography, demography, 
ecology and economics is accepted by her neighbors but the problem arises when 
India‟s neighbors try to view pre-eminence as predominance over them. Thus the fear 
psyche of smaller nations in the region forces them to unite with USA or China so 
that they can reduce their apprehension and fear of being dominated by India. 
Bangladesh being surrounded by India on three sides (east, west, north) economically 
and geographically being no match to India has been undergoing fear psychosis and 
suspicious of the activities of India as a result of which sometimes it considers India 
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to be a potential threat to the security of Bangladesh.
430
 This anxiety resulted in the 
continuous increase of the military expenditure of Bangladesh after 1975.  However, 
least was spent on the military preparedness of the country during Mujibur Rehman‟s 
period because he considered India to be a close friend that could defend Bangladesh 
from all external threats.
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 In order to mitigate this fear of Indian dominance Bangladesh established 
close relations with Muslim countries as well as with USA and China. Moreover the 
security perception of Bangladesh forces her to maintain a friendly relation with china 
which is just 120km away from Bangladesh border. China since 1975 onwards has 
been providing economic and military support to Bangladesh. On the other hand 
China‟s strategy in the region has been to bring smaller nations of the South Asian 
region closer to her and persuade them to maintain only formal relation with India so 
that India is left isolated in the region. The Bangladesh leaders also take advantage of 
the Sino-India animosity and receive military support from china. Besides this factor 
Bangladesh also feels economic pressure since the construction of the Farakka 
barrage and diversion of Ganga waters by India. Bangladeshi‟s anxiety arose when 
India put her claim to the acquisition of New Moore Island and denounced to hold 
joint survey to meet the claim. The fencing issue further increased the fear psyche of 
a smaller neighbor and with this Bangladesh raised the issues at different international 
forums. For Indian leaders the political developments in Bangladesh have been a 
matter of close watch and great concern due to the geographical location of 
Bangladesh which is surrounded by many sensitive Indian states, viz;- Assam, 
Meghalaya, Tripura, West Bengal, Manipur, Mizoram and Nagaland though there has 
been no apparent military threat to India from Bangladesh. Being close to the north-
east Indian states and having adjacent borders it results in refugee infiltration into 
India whenever there is political instability or economic problem in Bangladesh. In 
such circumstances the growing friendship of Bangladesh with China, Pakistan and 
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the USA became a matter of concern for India for they have often adopted anti-India 
attitude in the operation of their policies.
432
 
 Thus the factors involving security perception of the two countries have been 
of high magnitude and could only be resolved mutually through negotiations. In this 
regard, India‟s responsibility being a vast and powerful country in the South Asia is 
more to clear all the doubts and fear from the minds of her smaller and less developed 
neighbors in the region and work for the development of the region through mutual 
cooperation. There has been change in the world scenario due to the disintegration of 
USSR which almost ended the super power rivalry from the world. Consequently 
there was a shift in the foreign policy of India in order to maintain cordial relations 
with the United States of America. The changed scenario in the international relations 
brought US closer to India in South Asia. India's tilt towards US is also reflected in 
the liberalization of Indian economy to foreign investment, aid and technology. 
Besides US, India‟s relation with China has also improved. This trend started taking 
place during the Rajiv Gandhi‟s period when he visited China in 1985 and the two 
countries decided to improve their relations. After this the Chinese Premier visited 
New Delhi in 1991 and both sides decided to withdrew troops from each other‟s 
borders so that south Asia could commence towards better development and 
cooperation. Thus the renewed triangle of India, US and China has reduced any 
emergent security threat to India from these countries and hence efforts can be made 
by India and Bangladesh to eliminate the security threat perception from each other 
and work in cooperation for the development of the sub-continent. Removal of fear 
psychosis and development of mutual trust will enable them to set up joint ventures 
with the buy-back facility for mutual gains and economic development. It would also 
enhance the trade and transportation among the two countries. But this all demands 
resolution of the remaining bilateral issues amicably.
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Future Prospects- Looking Ahead  
 Disputing minds are as impregnable as they are difficult to break out of. Long 
years of deliberately keeping people across the broad spectrum of society apart from 
each other have only served to reinforce these self-created prisons that have remained 
hostage to what has been described as a tenacious and unrelenting security syndrome.  
Both the countries need to determinedly break themselves from this psychological 
self-incarceration. Without promoting the socializing of contacts across the length 
and breadth of our respective societies we cannot ever hope to make real progress in 
rediscovering each other. Only then the liberation and independence acquire real 
meaning and substance.
434
  Improving connectivity therefore not only in the 
infrastructure for flow of goods and services but also totally free and unencumbered 
people-to-people contacts should be a high priority. People from Bangladesh come to 
India for numerous purposes such as medical treatment, education, cultural exchange, 
visiting relatives, tourism and Indians also do go there but no doubt at low level. Both 
the countries need to exponentially exercise this interactive flow of people between 
the two countries.
435
 
 Majority of people in Bangladesh look at India the larger and resourceful 
neighbor with admiration and apprehension. Admiration is felt because the neighbor 
having common bonds of history and geography has been emerging as a global 
political and economic power and apprehensions emanates from stress when 
neighbors are not sure of their positions in the new geopolitical environment. In 
Bangladesh foreign policy “Indian factor” looms large because of above mentioned 
unresolved issues, some of them affecting people in Bangladesh directly. It cannot be 
denied that a negative image of India in the country does exist because of its alleged 
non-cooperative attitude towards Bangladesh in resolving the bilateral issues. All the 
pending bilateral issues could not be resolved mainly because of lack of confidence 
and mistrust. The overall relationship between Bangladesh and India has often been 
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affected by the varying complexion of respective governments in two countries. In 
settling the disputes Bangladesh gains do not have to come at India‟s expense, or vice 
versa.  It is easy and pointless to spend endless amounts of time in a dialogue of the 
deaf discussing how one country has never done the right thing by the other. It is of 
no use to play the “blame game” with each other.  Both the countries must look 
forward with constructive spirit to develop sustained friendly and cooperative 
bilateral relations.
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  However, the installation of Awami League and Congress party to power with 
the large mandate from people in the two countries has created a congenial ambience 
to settle the long standing issues through productive negotiations because of the 
historic links between the two parties since the 1971 Bangladesh liberation war. 
Against this background the visits and dialogues can serve strong bridges between the 
two countries.  Bangladesh Foreign Minister Dipu Moni‟s four day visit to New Delhi 
September 7 to 10, 2009 has been very much productive.
437
 The Prime Minister of 
Bangladesh Mrs. Sheikh Hasina also made her visit to India and signed five 
agreements with her counterpart Dr. Manmohan Singh which too was a good and 
productive visit. The Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasian‟s vision to turn 
Bangladesh into, “An Engine of Economic Growth” in cooperation with neighbours 
has found resonance in other countries. Sheikh Hasina has emphasized the need for 
interconnectivity within the region and Bangladesh became a party to the Asian 
Highway Network proposed by the United Nations Economic and Social Commission 
for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). She also proposes a deep seaport near Con‟s 
Bazaar, a gateway to the Bay of Bengal, which may be used by all neighbors and 
china. After researching and analyzing various relevant materials this study proposes 
that the overall relationship between the two neighbors may proceed within the 
following framework. 
 First, as an aspiring regional and global power India has the responsibility to 
understand and respect the sensitivity of a smaller neighbor such as 
Bangladesh. 
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 Second, the gains in each and every case are unlikely to be equal for both 
countries. Bangladesh may gain more than India in some areas and the reverse 
might be the case in other areas for India. It would be a challenge to the skill 
in negotiations to make it a, “win-win situation” for both the countries. 
 Third, a comprehensive or sector-wise approach to all bilateral issues may be 
considered, rather than addressing an issue on piecemeal basis. In the past 
India sought to negotiate a single issue on a bilateral basis without 
appreciating that it is interconnected with other issues and does not admit any 
easy solution.  
 Fourth, if India reciprocally pursues its policy in terms of, “Gujral Doctrine” 
goodwill will emerge between the neighbors.
438
 
 Finally the study proposes that India may adopt a regional or sub-regional 
policy approach where all its smaller neighbors are on board for commonality 
of interests. A sub-regional unit comprising Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and 
North Eastern states of India could be made a pivotal centre for economic 
growth because there are many opportunities to explore and exploit natural 
and human resources to mutual benefits. Later the sub-region may extend its 
links with ASEAN and China.   
 Bangladesh on the other hand has to live with a reality that she cannot remain 
insulated from developments in India. It must explore the advantages of its 
geographical position for its benefits. There is a great saying that one can choose 
friends but not neighbors. Both the countries cannot change their geography, 
therefore, two countries are destined to live next to each other and must establish a 
broad framework in which political, economic and social and environmental concerns 
can be sorted out amicably to the mutual satisfaction. India needs Bangladesh as 
much as Bangladesh needs India in the current regional and global environment. Let 
the Indo-Bangladesh relations move on and develop peacefully given the right spirit 
and the desire to live together with constructive relations for mutual national benefits 
and for larger interests of the people of South Asia.     
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion  
he independence movement pleaded under the banner of All India Congress 
was, firstly, aimed at establishing undivided India and secondly, making 
eviction of British rule but natural. However, the degeneration of Hindu-Muslim 
relation into hostility and the demand of Muslim League for a separate state for the 
Muslims of the region thwarted the dream of an independent undivided India and 
made the partition of subcontinent a reality. Thus the two countries Pakistan and India 
came into existence respectively on 14
th
 and 15
th
 August 1947. 
There might be different interpretations about the politico-territorial identity of 
India in pre-British times, but there have been no fundamental differences on the point 
that it was for the first time in recorded history that the people of the sub-continent 
welded themselves into a nation state in 1946-47. India was in the process of 
consolidating its new national identity amidst tense diversities and tensions, of 
centrifugal aspirations of characteristic different segments of the society.  Fifty odd 
years might not be sufficient period in the life of a country for arriving at a holistic or 
historical evaluation of the perspectives and policies which characterized different 
activities related to the governance of the concerned society of state. Obviously the 
national movement in India consistently sympathized with national aspirations of the 
people whether in Asia, Africa or Europe during and after her liberation movement 
because India realized that her emancipation was related with the outcome of other 
movements in Asia, Africa which in turn their movements also influenced and 
supported the cause of Indian national movement. In this way the emotional affinity 
clearly reflected the independent India‟s attitude towards those countries that had 
been at the verge of acquiring their independence. These perspectives and perceptions 
and her policy principles shaped the broad outlines of free India‟s foreign policy 
towards the countries in general and Bangladesh in particular. In the beginning free 
India was circumscribed by her own national and international strings but it corporate 
in different liberation movements fought in different parts of the world. Comparably 
this gave Indian diplomacy and foreign relations major influence than other Afro-
T 
Asian countries which could not be explained in terms of power potential and 
resources. 
The important factor in the pursuit of her foreign policy is to stand on basic 
principles i.e., Non-alignment, Panchsheel and Peaceful Co-existence, Anti-
imperialism, opposition to Racial discrimination, Support to the United Nations 
Organization and Peaceful settlement of international disputes which contexted her 
attitude in the processing of her foreign policy. India was committed to the hypothesis 
that freedom brings responsibility which defines her future policy viz-a-viz 
oppression suppression maintenance of freedom and identified her struggle with all 
subjugated countries and championed their causes. Its commitments and sympathizes 
for oppressed people in Burma, Ceylon and West Asian countries were the sufficient 
proof for the role against oppression and suppression and adherence to her principles. 
Within this context Bangladesh could not had been an exception if India supported 
her cause morally and materially in gaining the independence from the clutches of 
tyranny and genocide. Geography and history have tied India with the Bangladesh. 
Through diverse contacts Bangladesh has occupied an important place in Indian 
foreign policy partly on humanitarian concern partly due to the political and 
ideological affinities in course of protracted struggle against Pakistani‟s domination, 
oppression and suppression.  
Geography along with other factors were the stumbling blocks in the unity of 
Pakistan. However, what Pakistan needed in those formative years was national unity 
and balanced development in the two wings to ensure security and progress and to 
consolidate its position as a powerful nation in the sub-continent. But the then, 
Pakistani leaders myopic failure to recognize East Pakistani‟s as equal partners and to 
give them due share of political power and economic resource caused widespread 
resentment among the East Pakistanis. No amount of political negotiations between 
the two wings could improve the situation in Pakistan because of the stubbornness of 
West Pakistanis, which gave rise to increasing sense of alienation and deprivation 
among the people of East Pakistan, and finally when Sheikh Mujib was denied the 
premiership in 1970, Bengalis decided to get out of the relationship once and for all. 
So, for the first time and certainly for the last time in history, the disintegration of 
Pakistan became a common goal for both East Pakistanis and Indians as the former 
wanted to break Pakistan and the latter wanted to establish a separate independent 
nation to rid themselves of an insensitive and repressive political regime. 
As soon as the Pakistani army cracked down on unarmed East Pakistanis, 
India under the leadership of Indira Gandhi took bold steps to help the Bengalis in 
their just struggle for independence against the fascist regime of Yuhya Khan. The 
Indira government set their objectives to do the following things to ensure a desired 
outcome in the war for both Indians and East Pakistanis: 
i. To give safe passage to top Awami League leaders to India and to help form 
Mujibnagar government;  
ii. To help form Mukti Bahini and to provide necessary training and weapons; 
iii. To form Mujib Bahini as an alternative force and to use them in special 
operations;  
iv. To provide asylum to ten million refugees from East Pakistan;  
v. To launch a vigorous diplomatic campaign worldwide through its foreign 
services to garner support for East Pakistan‟s just struggle for freedom;  
vi. To use its military and intelligence resources to the extent possible to help the 
freedom fighters sustain a prolonged war against the powerful Pakistan army;  
While Pakistani atrocities were going on in East Pakistan a large number of 
people were fleeing to India from that territory to seek refuge on humanitarian 
grounds and regarded India as the only rescuer. The East Pakistani nationalists were 
seeking Indian help to overcome the Pakistani atrocities. The refugee influx was 
resulting in tremendous strain on Indian economy. At this time, Indian elites had 
perceived that Pakistan was not ready to come to any peaceful settlement of East 
Pakistani crisis. The Indian ruling elite‟s perception was becoming alarming due to 
the cooperation of United States and China with Pakistan and was perceived as a 
loaming danger for Indian security. India had already been attacked once by China in 
1962, while USA was busy in developing its base near Diego Garcia in Indian Ocean 
which was just 1200 miles from Southern borders of India. In reaction to this India 
decided by July 1971 to step up diplomatic efforts and at the same time make its 
military preparedness to meet any eventuality. As a diplomatic effort, India raised the 
issue in the United Nations on 29 March 1971 and officially requested to the UN 
Secretary General U Thant to advice and persuades the Pakistani president Yuhya 
Khan to stop genocide in East Pakistan.  India tried to create world public opinion 
against the killing in East Pakistan and Indira Gandhi government sent ministerial 
delegations to seventy countries and even personally undertook the journey to USSR, 
UK, Austria, Belgium, France and West Germany to request world leaders to find a 
suitable solution to the problem but these efforts did not yield much results except the 
stoppage of arms and aid to Pakistan by west dominated Aid Pakistan Consortium. 
Though, India was also able to assemble the support of non-governmental American 
public opinion in favour of Bangladeshi nationalists but these were not able to 
pressurize the American government sufficiently, which kept on continuing its anti-
India support to Pakistan and on a secret mission President Nixon's envoy Henry 
Kissinger visited China through Pakistan in July 1971, which highly alarmed India of 
a very high conspiracy as both the countries were having poor relations with India. 
Due to this sensitivity of conspiracy against India the Indian leadership tried to obtain 
the support of other super power of that time, the USSR. They signed a 20 year Treaty 
of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation, who‟s Article 9, had the disguised provision of 
support of USSR in case of any US-Pakistan-China aggression against it.  
Indian rulers thought it necessary to move for a quick solution to East Pakistan 
problem by ordering Chief Military Commander of Eastern Command, General Jagjit 
Singh Aurora to move his regiment to the border. However India acted with 
maximum restraint and hesitated in using force but kept on having a close vigil over 
the internal developments in East Pakistan. India besides its diplomatic help started 
providing military help to Bangladeshi nationalists and a liberation force (Mukti 
Bhani) was formed out of nationalists and some soldiers  of East Pakistan Armed 
Forces (Who had refused to obey Pakistani Central Government). According to the 
Times (London) estimate nearly 30,000 freedom fighters were trained in India in its 
30 camps. It helped the nationalists to form a Provisional Government of their own. 
Pakistani leaders even then were not seemingly ready for political solution and 
rejected the UN proposal in this regard. Though on the intervention of the US 
President Nixon in November 1971, India agreed to withdraw its forces from the 
border, on the condition of withdrawal of Pakistani troops, but Pakistan instead of 
withdrawing troops declared emergency. By 3rd December 1971, full-fledged war 
started between India and Pakistan and there were allegations and counter allegations 
of starting the war.  
The war was fought on eastern and western frontiers and within 14 days 
Pakistan had to surrender on 16 December 1971 and thus a new nation was created. 
India had already granted recognition to the new nation of Bangladesh. After 
liberation, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, the Bengali Nationalist leader was given the 
charge to govern Bangladesh as a sovereign nation. The involvement of United Sates 
of America and China dragged the problem of East Pakistan and India into multi-
furious world politics. Besides, its military and diplomatic support to Pakistan during 
the liberation struggle the US often kept on harassing India by one or the other 
resolution in the UN. India was also made a victim of the US Cold War strategies due 
to her signing of the Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation with the USSR. 
However India acquired a new image by its support to the nationalists of Bangladesh. 
By the victory in Bangladesh, against all these odds, it (India) emerged as a world 
power to challenge the combined military might of US, Pakistan and China. This 
boosted the image of India and the courage of its rulers who were feeling demoralized 
since India‟s defeat in Indo-China war of 1962. 
The caesarian birth of Bangladesh has exploded the myth of the two nation 
theory based on religion and the emergence of Bangladesh had its impact on the 
politics of the sub-continent. Bangladesh‟s historical and geographical proximity to 
India coupled with its allegiance to Non-alignment, Panchsheel, Parliamentary 
democracy, Socialism, Secularism, etc., were compelling factors which persuaded 
Bangladesh to have co-operation with India. Bangladesh liberation movement was 
spontaneous and democratic in content and secular in spirit. India‟s massive support 
and assistance to the Bangladesh liberation struggle was not a pre-planned, 
conspiratorial strategic move but a politico-strategic response to the continuous 
threats posed by Pakistan against the unity and territorial integrity of India since 
partition. Pakistan had provided an opportunity to Indian leaders to intervene in the 
internal affairs of Pakistan because of acute illegal migration which provided a 
starting point to India and it appealed the world leaders to solve the problem as soon 
as possible. 
Indo-Bangladesh relations had an exceptional beginning as it was not founded 
on the basis of two sovereign nations related with common interest.  It was 
relationship which began out of humanism during the crisis, chaos and slaughter of 
East Pakistan territory over the Bengalis, much before Bangladesh emerged as a new 
independent, sovereign nation. The people of East Pakistan (Bangladesh) could not be 
integrated properly in Pakistan as they were politically alienated, economically 
dominated and deprived, and their language (Bengali) and culture were not given due 
importance and place. As a result, the religious nationalism (1947) on which East 
Pakistan was created and made part of Pakistan, was rejected by linguistic-cultural 
nationalism of East Pakistanis. The present study attempted to study Indo-Bangladesh 
relations in cooperation as well as in conflict and it has been found true that the 
changing perceptions of Bangladeshi and Indian ruling class have always conditioned 
Indo-Bangladesh relations. 
The creation of Bangladesh had aroused much expectations and great hopes 
not only for the future of South Asia but also of close and cordial relations between 
India and Bangladesh. Bangladesh‟s independence had been helped by India‟s 
decisive intervention and energetic diplomatic maneuvers. India had demonstrated its 
goodwill and sincerity of purpose by withdrawing its forces from Bangladesh ahead 
of scheduled time and in the first few years had pumped in substantial economic aid 
despite its own pressing needs to restore Bangladeshi‟s war torn economy. The 
relationship was cemented by a Friendship Treaty and by a common outlook and 
shared concern of the two countries. In domestic policy both countries were 
committed to Parliamentary Democracy, Secularism and Socialism and in foreign 
policy both supported Non-alignment and abhorrence of any foreign powers 
involvement in the sub-continent.  
In the post liberation stage of Mujibur Rehman Indo-Bangladesh relations 
achieved its zenith as India became a great model to be followed for political 
development of Bangladesh and a great source for its economic reconstruction. Prime 
Minister Mujib of Bangladesh paid visit to India and expressed his gratitude to the 
government and people of India for their help in liberation. India and Bangladesh 
made an agreement for the return of the refugees from India and withdrawal of Indian 
forces from Bangladesh. Both the countries agreed to cooperate in the development 
and utilization of the resources to benefit the people of India and Bangladesh and 
sponsor trade on state-to-state basis. They further agreed to improve economic 
relations, resolve the Farakka barrage dispute and stop smuggling across the border. 
The Indian Prime Minister, 1ndira Gandhi visited Bangladesh on March 17, 1972 to 
strengthen relations and signed 25 Years Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Peace 
with Bangladesh. All this made the relations so strong that Bangladesh's Prime 
Minister declared that "no power on the earth would be strong enough to destroy such 
friendship". 
But Mujib's above declaration could not remain in force for a long time. The 
political parties with Islamic leanings which had been banned by the Awami League 
leader Mujib after declaring Bangladesh a secular state started anti-India propaganda 
and pro-Islamic mobilization. They highlighted the construction of Farakka barrage 
by India over the Ganges and blamed India for all miseries of Bangladesh. Opposition 
leader Ataur Rehman Khan allegedly blamed India for smuggling out their jute 
foodstuffs to create anti-India wave. When the situation became more alarming, 
Bangladesh's Prime Minister visited India and sought its help in overcoming political 
crisis. India extended all possible help for the benefit of the people of Bangladesh in 
order to create confidence among them: 
i. By agreeing to transfer the Tin Bigha Corridor to Bangladesh; 
ii. By taking measures to stop smuggling activities; and 
iii. By agreeing that it won't commission the Farakka barrage unless a water 
sharing schedule was decided between the two nations, even though the 
barrage had been completed by 1971. 
India also agreed to extend its economic cooperation by establishing joint 
ventures in Bangladesh. However, despite all these, the opposition parties did not 
change their perception and India was held responsible for all their miseries. These 
parties had also got success in mobilizing press, bureaucracy and army of Bangladesh 
on religious sentiments against India and developed strong anti-India perception, 
though India offered maximum economic assistance. It granted Rs.250 million to 
Bangladesh for purchasing essential commodities and further Rs 185.8 million for the 
rehabilitation  of refugees, but the anti-India wave did not change and Sheikh Mujib  
was assassinated in 1975 August coup-de-etate. This coup was in fact led by the army 
officers who had been motivated by anti-India elements. 
Now the question arises that was India, really responsible for the miseries of 
the Bangladeshis or was there something wrong with anti-India feeling in 
Bangladesh? As is evident from the above mentioned economic and political help by 
India it can be easily concluded that India was trying to provide all possible help to 
solve miseries and strengthen the economy of Bangladesh. However, it was a 
herculean task as the territory of Bangladesh had been consistently exploited over 
more than two hundred years, first by the British colonialists and then by West 
Pakistan. This had led to severe lack of infrastructure and quick economic 
reconstruction. On the other hand, India was having its own economic limitations and 
it was not possible to provide such large economic assistance required for 
reconstruction. In case of Bangladesh, its people‟s expectations were high from both 
their own government as well as India, and neither of the two was able to fulfill those 
expectations due to inherent constraints. Consequently the lacks of fulfillment of 
expectations was bound to led to dissatisfaction and create the problem of legitimacy. 
The opposition parties with communal leanings took advantage of the situation and 
mobilized the Bangladeshi people on anti-India propaganda. 
The assassination of great friend of India and a great supporter of Indo-
Bangladesh friendship, cooperation and peace had shaken India and it became 
apathetic to developments in Bangladesh. On the other hand, in Bangladesh 
uncertainty prevailed and a number of coups followed. Its relations with India 
worsened. The difference of opinion between Mujibur Rehman and Ziaur Rehman 
created a wedge in their relations. Zia‟s animosity to Mujib and Mujib‟s cordiality to 
India made Zia suspicious of New Delhi and suspected that the November 3, 1975 
coup in Bangladesh was backed by India and the Soviet Union. This persuades Zia to 
extricate the country from Indo-Soviet influence and lesser her dependence on India. 
Under the changing regimes, Bangladesh began to move away from India to forge 
friendly relations with the Islamic countries like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia etc., which 
provide ideological and economic support to her. However, such tilt towards Islamic 
states had already begun by Mujib in his last days when he attended the Islamic 
Conference at Lahore, and then visited Kuwait, Egypt and other Islamic states. This 
showed the changing perception of even Mujib. The post-Mujib Bangladeshi 
government also cultivated relations with USA and China which were not having 
good relations with India. Ziaur Rehman also continued the Mujib‟s four basic 
principles of state constitution viz., Nationalism, Socialism, Democracy, and 
Secularism but with a difference. The term „Liberation Struggle‟ was replaced by the 
term „War of Independence‟, replaced the „ethnic identity‟ of the people by „territorial 
identity‟ and preferred to call them as Bangladeshis instead of Bengalese. Ziaur 
Rehman took all these steps to please the Islamists who favored a territorial definition 
of nationhood. During the post-Mujib regime four major issues generated 
controversies between the two countries. Bangladesh tried to internationalize the 
bilateral disputes by raising them in various international fora. This further 
deteriorated the relations between two countries. The ruling elite in India failed to 
understand the psychology of small neighbours like Bangladesh, its small size, 
resources and relative political stability.  
During the rule of President Ziaur Rehman (Nov. 1975-1981) political 
instability was restored but like his predecessors he also formed anti-India perception 
and moved towards Islamic states for aid and assistance to overcome the deteriorating 
economic conditions of Bangladesh. He restored religious principles to appease 
Islamic states and dropped secularism from constitution and inserted „absolute trust 
and faith in Almighty Allah‟. The anti-India campaign of Ziaur Rehman brought 
Bangladesh closer to china and USA. During Ziaur Rehman‟s rule in Bangladesh, 
anti-India propaganda and perception was adopted as a means of getting legitimacy in 
the early period of rule (1975-77). This was the time of political instability and anti-
India propaganda used by Zia improved his personal status and provide the legitimacy 
by the nationals of Bangladesh. Anti-India propaganda was so high that the Indian 
High Commissioner in Dhaka, Samer Sen was the target of an assassin, though he 
escaped unharmed. On the other hand, Pakistan was openly fanning anti-India 
propaganda by pro-Pakistani rightist elements present in Bangladesh. At the 
governmental level the relations became worst when Bangladesh internationalized the 
bilateral  dispute of Farakka  Barrage and the distribution of Ganga water during the 
lean months, though India had agreed in 1974 (on tentative basis ) to provide 
Bangladesh with the flow of water, not even fulfilling   the requirement of minimum 
water-supply of 40,000 cusecs to its Calcutta port. Much to India‟s inconvenience, the 
Farakka dispute was raised in the Third World Forums and in the UN in 1976.  
For the first time in history of independent India‟s, a non-congress government 
formed by the Janata Party came to power in March 1977, displacing the Congress 
government and lasted till July 1979, with this India and Bangladesh relations took a 
new turn. During Junta Party‟s rule (1977-79), the Bangladeshi President Ziaur 
Rehman tried to improve relations with India. This change of perception of Zia was 
due to two factors. The first was the failure of Zia to get the world sympathy against 
India on Farakka issue, Secondly, due to the change in objective conditions as India 
itself began to improve relations with USA and China. The Janata party projected,” 
Beneficial bilateralism” as the credo of its policy towards India‟s immediate 
neighbours. There was little bit  conducive environment with the installation of Janata 
government and with this  Bangladesh entered into many agreements with India after 
Zia's meeting with Indian Prime Minister, Morarji Desai in London on June 10, 1977. 
Again India showed generosity by its full cooperation. President Zia even visited New 
Delhi to seek Indian help. India agreed to set up a high powered Joint Rivers 
Commission to work out a formula to prevent erosion along the Kushiara River and to 
share the water of other rivers in India. Besides this, India agreed to import more 
items from Bangladesh such as jute, rayon, newsprint, pulses, naphtha, paper and 
specialized textiles. India further agreed to cooperate by setting up joint ventures in 
the fields of fertilizers, bio-gas, solar energy and cement. Besides this, India offered 2, 
00,000 tons of food grains to Bangladesh in April 1979, on an emergency basis. 
During this period (1977-79), the two countries agreed to exchange data on New 
Moore Island. Though the Junta government in India was facing severe criticism by 
West Bengal government inside due to India‟s agreement with Bangladesh on Ganga 
water release at the cost of Calcutta port, but it maintained good relations with 
Bangladesh.   
After the collapse of Janta party government just after 28 months rule, 
Congress government again came to power in India (1980). The government in 
Bangladesh expected that the Congress government under the leadership of Indra 
Gandhi could made drastic changes in the Indian Foreign Policy of the Junta 
government. This had a psychological impact over the government of Bangladesh 
which again became active in propagating anti-India sentiments. This was favored by 
political developments in Assam (India) since 1979, as the Assam movement gained 
momentum and the native Assamese demanding the ousting of the foreigners, mainly 
the Bangladeshis who were staying in Assam in hundreds of thousands and thus 
grabbing the economic resources of Assam, resulting in drastic reduction of the share 
of Assamese. Bangladesh accused India of deporting the Indians in the name of 
Bangladeshis. The issue of New Moore Island was also raised by Bangladesh as it 
wanted its own ownership of the island.  
The General Ziaur Rehman was assassinated and General Ershad (1982-90) 
became Chief Martial Law Administrator of the country. He tried to improve Indo-
Bangladesh relations which developed a good perception among the neighbouring 
countries and early settlement of bilateral issues mutually seemed possible. This 
initiation of the Bangladeshi government was welcomed by Indra Gandhi‟s 
government. To strengthen the relations between the two countries Narasimah Rao, 
the then India‟s Foreign Minister visited Bangladesh in May 1980 and promised to 
supply 1,  00,000 tons of wheat to Bangladesh to meet the food shortage. President 
Ershad also reciprocated in the same way by visiting India in October 1982. Both the 
countries agreed to form Joint Economic Commission to identify various areas of 
mutual cooperation. They also directed the Joint Rivers Commission (JRC) to find out 
a mutually acceptable solution of the Farakka.  India further agreed to transfer Tin 
Bigha Corridor in perpetuity to Bangladesh. After the assassination of Indra Gandhi 
the unfinished tasks and relations were carried on by the new Prime Minister Rajiv 
Gandhi (1984-89).  During this period Bangladesh president paid several visits to 
India. India reciprocated in the same way and Rajiv Gandhi visited twice Bangladesh 
in 1985. He went to Bangladesh to express sympathy after severe cyclonic devastation 
and even visited the worst affected Island Urrir Char. He offered material help for the 
cyclone affected people and demonstrated goodwill towards Bangladesh. This was the 
time when India cooperated with Bangladesh in establishing South Asian Association 
for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and kept on improving cooperation at regional 
basis. 
General Ershad‟s period had a very distinguishing feature in the sense that 
while continuously improving relations with India; he also marched with his anti-
India propaganda and Islamization programmes. He emphasized on following Islamic 
principles in day-to-day life, built Islamic university and made Arabic a compulsory 
subject at the elementary level. All this were done by Ershad to attract large scale 
foreign aid for Bangladesh from the Islamic countries and in this connection 
Bangladesh was successful as it received large contributions. But this orientation 
towards Islamic countries did not allow the proper bridging of the gaps between the 
relations of the India and Bangladesh. Moreover, Ershad also used the water issue and 
the Islamization for appeasing the Islamic countries. By this time Assam movement 
had also emerged in India where Assamese people were demanding the removal of 
Bangladeshi people staying in Assam, dragging the resources of Assam at the cost of 
natives. This also affected Indo-Bangladesh relations. In 1984, India decided to fence 
the border to control refugees‟ influx which further fanned anti- India feeling. Ershad 
denounced to accept the Bengali foreigners in India as the Bangladeshi nationals and 
asked his people to oppose border fencing. This developed a negative perception in 
Indian leadership. However, this issue was resolved when Indian government finally 
reached an agreement with the agitators of Assam in 1985. But as Ershad was facing 
political challenges to his authority by two opposition parties, one led by Begum 
Khaleda Zia (Widow of Late President Ziaur Rehman) leading the seven party 
alliances and second, by Hasina Wajed (Daughter of Late Prime Minister Mujibur 
Rehman) heading eight party alliances. Ershad used anti-India propaganda to divert 
the attention of the people. This anti-India propaganda was bound to further 
deteriorate Indo-Bangladesh relations and reached its peak during the aftermath of 
'Kar Seva' episode in Ayodhya on October 30, 1990.  
However, the USA, Japan and the European countries have also impacted 
Indo-Bangladesh relations. The increasing external dependence of Bangladesh on 
foreign aid affected the formation of internal and external policies of the country. As 
particularly USA has supported Pakistan against India till recently, the Bangladesh's 
tilt towards USA was bound to be perceived negatively by Indian leadership. 
There was a change of governments in both the countries. The Khaleda Zia 
government in Bangladesh came in to power which improved the Indo-Bangladesh, 
though various areas of conflict still persisted. The open expression of desire by 
Khaleda Zia to improve the relations, her visit 1992 and agreement on Tin Bigha with 
the Indian Prime Minister Narasimah Rao raised new hopes. After her initiative Tin 
Bigha was transferred to Bangladesh on June 26, 1997 by the Indian government 
despite severe criticism and opposition by the Indian people. The deportation of 
Chakma refugees of Chittagong Hills to Bangladesh was started from the beginning of 
1994 which too gave a Philip to the relations. But the problem for India is that the 
Bangladeshi government do not have continuity in their perception as shown in the 
past despite all Indian generosity and help.  While as, the Indian governments 
perception had been guided by two main concerns; (i) Bangladesh ruler‟s use of anti- 
India propaganda; and (ii), their joining hands with anti-India powers. However, a 
good neighbourly liberal and generous attitude of India could not be taken for granted 
all the times. India is not against Bangladesh‟s maintaining good relations with other 
countries but when such relations is with anti-India countries it becomes a matter of 
security concern for India. On the other hand, Bangladesh should not fear India due to 
its size and power as these have never been used for the disadvantage of Bangladesh. 
India has always stood generously for the help of Bangladesh whenever it has been 
approached and till date it has not stopped. However the problem lies in the changing 
perceptions of the ruling elites of both the countries. Besides it is not always possible 
for Indian elites to help on conflicting issues against the public opinion in India. 
Unless such arrangements are made which are mutually agreed or the public opinion 
in India favor, the issues like Farakka and New Moore Island cannot be solved. It is 
also not justified on the part of Bangladeshi leadership to expect all conflicts to be 
resolved in favour of Bangladesh at the cost of India‟s own interests. For the 
economic recovery and development of Bangladesh, India has contributed a lot since 
1971. It has been cooperative with Bangladesh under Non-alignment Movement 
(NAM) and South Asian Association for Regional Corporation (SAARC) as well. 
Thus the economic relations have been conditioned by the kind and extent of political 
relations between the two countries depending much on the elite perception. On the 
other hand, India regarding economic matters as it too has its limitations, it could not 
become a donor all through. However, between India and Bangladesh there have been 
a great potential for developing mutually beneficial bilateral trade and cooperation. 
For example, Bangladesh is a great exporter of raw jute while India has a large 
number of jute factories located in Calcutta requiring raw jute. Similarly Bangladesh 
imports large number of engineering and electrical items, vehicular, railway etc. on 
the other hand, India has become a large producer and exporter of these items and it 
can benefit Bangladesh consumers by providing these at relatively cheaper rate than 
the imported European items. The economic relationship should be perceived by 
Bangladesh and India on mutual economic benefits if both want to maintain long 
lasting relations. At the same time Bangladeshi elites should not shake hands with 
anti-India forces just for economic gains, because they would provide economic help 
to Bangladesh only till their interests are fulfilled and cannot be long lasting friend in 
deed as well as in the need, as the international equations are fastly changing. In such 
circumstances Indo-Bangladesh relations are not geared on mutual interests, it can 
neither yield its result nor can it be long lasting as the case has been in the past. 
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